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INTRODUCTORY SYNOPSIS
"It is an interesting and largely unexplored question whether
Aristotle is in practice faithful to the general idea of science, and
to the rules of method, sketched in his Analytics.It is this
issue, "the Problem of Demonstration," which this study is concerned
to explore.
The objective of this study is not so much to render a detailed
and definitive solution to the problem, but rather to suggest a context
within which such a solution may be reached. Further, this study is
intended not as an historical critique of an historical question in a
classical author but as a philosophical enquiry into the roots, in
Aristotle, of a perennial philosophical question.
The structure of the study is as follows:
In the first chapter the problem is stated, and the possible
modes of response to the problem are briefly canvassed, in order to
set the framework of the response to be offered here.
The second chapter attempts, through an examination of certain
texts from the Posterior Analytics and elsewhere, to specify and to
raise objections to the particular elements in the traditional inter¬
pretation of Aristotle's methodological intentions which have generated
the problem of demonstration.
Aristotle's teachings concerning the nature of knowledge include
reference both to the distinctive object of knowledge and to the
psychology of knowing. At one time Aristotle gives a more subjective
and psychological, at other times a more object-based account of what
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is essential to knowledge. In the third chapter it is suggested that
we must examine the manner in which Aristotle accommodates these two
aspects when he comes to design a methodology of science. Aristotle's
views on the aim of science are, therefore, examined as a source of
insight into the balance struck between these two aspects in his
writings. It is here argued that when we attempt to understand
Aristotle's methodological intentions concerning the apodeictic
syllogism we must not underestimate the importance in Aristotle's
thought of the doctrine which holds that &rr< is a , and,
more particularly an . It is this doctrine which, chiefly,
enables Aristotle to produce a methodological doctrine which is
consistent with his accounts of the nature of knowledge.
Chapter four considers the evidence for understanding the
Analytics as a training in critical technique, and why Aristotle feels
that the apodeictic syllogism is unsuited to the task of communicating
findings. The principal theme of this chapter is an examination of
the Aristotelian doctrine which holds that the logical training as
provided by the Analytics constitutes a and, as such, is
unsuited to the task of publication.
Chapter five draws together the results of the discussion,
and attempts to reconstruct the specific Aristotelian context which
renders Aristotle's theory and practice coherent, and which may make
it possible to determine the degree of consistency operative throughout
his works. A model is presented which, it is suggested, reflects the
position intended by Aristotle for those bodies of demonstrated judg¬
ments prefigured in the Posterior Analytics within the economy of




"The method which Aristotle follows in his scientific and
philosophical treatises and the method which he prescribes for scien¬
tific and philosophical activity in the Posterior Analytics seem not
to coincide."^
In these words Jonathan Barnes presents what he refers to as
the "Problem of Demonstration" with which this study is concerned.
Barnes goes on to provide a brief yet comprehensive survey of the
variety of responses which have been made to this problem, and we need
here only summarize this survey referring to his paper for fuller
treatment.
In general terms, there have been two main sorts of response
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to the problem. Some have regarded the inconsistency as real and
irremediable and have chosen to recognise that, for whatever reasons,
Aristotle did in fact ignore his own methodological theory when he
came actually to engage in philosophical and scientific work. Others,'
amongst whom Barnes finds himself, have taken the inconsistency to be
apparent only, and founded upon misunderstandings of Aristotle's
intention, which misunderstandings they each seek to isolate and
remedy in their various ways.
The proposal which will be advanced in this study falls most
naturally into the second of these two categories. That is, it will
be argued that there has been a misunderstanding of Aristotle's
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intention, and that through the isolation and correction of this
misunderstanding we see the concept operating in Aristotle's thought
which embraces both theory and practice in such a way that the
conditions of their consistency are revealed.
The suggestion to be advanced in this study does not call for
the rewriting of Aristotle's scientific and philosophical works so
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that they exhibit apodeictic form, nor does it call for the atten¬
uation of the formal definition of in order to accommodate
Aristotle's practice. Consequently there will be no occasion in this
study to embark on any strictly logical examination of the logical
doctrines of the Analytics. Further, it is not suggested in this work
that the Posterior Analytics was written with a view to some special
science (e.g. the mathematical sciences^), or to the sciences in
general under some special circumstances (e.g. as "a formal model of
how teachers should IMPART knowledge"^). The suggestion to be offered
assumes that the method sketched in the Posterior Analytics was
intended by Aristotle to apply to all the sciences, and further that
the extant scientific and philosophical wTorks express doctrines which
owe their origin and growth, in large measure at least, to the actual
practice of that method.
The thesis to be developed in fact bears some resemblance to
g
that proposed by Jonathan Barnes in that both studies maintain the
view that the Posterior Analytics is concerned with education. Barnes,
however, holds that the Posterior Analytics "is concerned exclusively
with the teaching of facts already won," and "does not describe how
scientists do, or ought to, ACQUIRE knowledge," but "offers a formal
9
model of how teachers should IMPART knowledge." It will be argued
here that, on the contrary, the Posterior Analytics is intended to
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equip students, scientists, and philosophers with certain of the tools
necessary to the acquisition of knowledge. As such, Aristotle regards
the lessons of the Analytics as tools indispensible to the scientist-
philosopher"''^ in his search for knowledge (while, in fact, as will be
shown, Aristotle regards the actual apodeictic form as something of a
liability to the scientist in the final publication of his findings)."''
The Posterior Analytics is concerned with enabling people to
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attain knowledge - it forms part of a Barnes would seem
clearly to be right in seeing St as the proper context
within which to find the solution to the Problem of Demonstration.
This theme will be examined in somewhat greater detail in this work
in an attempt to perceive precisely how Aristotle wants the apodeictic
syllogism to operate within the context of St . It will be
suggested that Aristotle intends that the apodeictic syllogism should
be deployed in a somewhat more complex manner than simply as a device
for the publication of facts duly supported by causes. It will be
argued that the apodeictic syllogism is intended by Aristotle to be
deployed not only as an expository device but also as a critical tool,
a heuristic instrument to be used by the learning, the researching
intellect within the didactic context.
CHAPTER II
THE QUESTION
It must not be supposed that these works, /i.e. the Organon/
alone present the whole of Aristotle's theory of knowledge.
Indeed, while he is occupied with formal logic he tends to
brush aside the more fundamental questions about the origin
and validity of human knowledge. And many of his most
interesting observations on scientific procedure are to be
found in prefatory passages to his own works dealing with
the special sciences. It is an interesting and largely
unexplored question whether Aristotle is in practice faithful
to the general idea of science, and to the rules of method
sketched in his Analytics.1
Clearly, the Organon is concerned more explicitly with logic
than with epistemology. Yet Aristotle's relative silence in the
Organon on these "more fundamental" issues seems itself to require
some explanation, especially in view of the fact that we possess no
other treatise devoted explicitly to these questions. We may be
justified, then, in asking whether it is simply that he "tends to
brush aside" epistemological concerns here or whether it is rather
the case that in writing the Organon Aristotle is acting on the
assumption that his audience shares with him a certain common under-
/ 2
standing as to the nature of e-rrca-c^MT
In attempting to isolate aspects of Aristotle's thought which
might offer some insight into his methodological intentions and thus
aid in the resolution of the problem of demonstration it is reasonable
to begin the search in the general area of our understanding of Aris¬
totle's conception of • It is possible that the problem of
demonstration has arisen through our failure to see the teaching of the
Posterior Analytics as lying within the broader context of Aristotle's
6
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own doctrines relating to &iTcz^n ^.
For instance, in the course of his discussion of the problem
Jonathan Barnes comments: "'Science' is here of course to be understood
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in the broad sense of the Greek Ilm<r cy'ju *7 •" would seem more
appropriate, however, in this particular context to ask whether a
more precise understanding is required in terms of the specific
conventions within which Aristotle and his audience may be operating.
The issue becomes more critical - and the search for the
specific origins of the problem of demonstration narrows - when we
note a significant omission from Barnes' presentation of the basic
conditions which differentiate en *.T7oS*-<.jcj from the other varieties
of syllogism. Barnes writes: A demonstration "is differentiated from
other varieties of syllogism by the following characteristics: the
premisses of a demonstration must be (a) true; (b) necessary and
universal; (c) immediate; and (d) causally related to the conclusion,
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which must itself be true, necessary, and universal." The
Aristotelian locus to which Barnes refers^ reads as follows:
£-( rc>/*Vt/ i-cr-crl fo *■ TT <- <T ZT*i er~ (, o'o\S C-9C-yLtrSj & * JyK ^ L Tn
r7O r~i IS* e-7Ti 0-c?p/Zilj Z- £ >-> ✓" T~ ' /7-Zc ZT^>uj C~us K' <-J. s , \ ' , ✓ J /
cfjUZ-truj IS )€-< < j/Uco^ L/UMJ Z~^f!>oo S AV/t f~7~P O ArW < a! c
7ou crvp. 7rc-(0^cr' (Post. An. 71b19)
It will be noted that Barnes has omitted any reference^ to
/ ^ /
the phrase /«C*c riyoZytos in his account. Yet the
importance to Aristotle of the characteristics represented in the text
by these terms is signalled by the fact that in the subsequent text
he returns to elaborate on this theme (71b3if) at some length, and
does so again at 72a25-72b. At 71^31 Aristotle writes: TTyoy<--
pTvV ✓pC ou fA.'oi/'oy Zo X e-Ctr^ov' oiToi/ Sett. J^ 3/5 X tcXL
^ *** 7 ^ cr ^ i y . J \ s ^
c-idt-s*!. OVL //p z~yoc<- S'frf /k4«- c y iSc*jy> t/u v zrt-y*<
8
oiyXf T<*Zro>/ upJrc-fts ^ t^.j jMss rry'onyo^
J y\ f I C -< < —» ✓0i)S(r ySus^cyus ryo O V Ko/c fjjUtS j/Sus^ c/aujz~6^> 6s. ^tj/w s^- 77~y 0$
tH'J M*' iff 0 €-*-{*. ^c ysuj£ Ift Lj trtyc* r-i ^//r^0/r^s d-CT&n c- &UJS j £*- rr^o'T-tyot /S*?c j/t/uj^cyu ?r<y> <*. 7Z*L 7Tu ^CsT*--
go i/. £<rzrt ^ -rTc^p ujzt~c zruj tr^ *<*$e>dois y< y (yyyu r°fru>
So- T*. lS<*$ J f*?ur TTZu. ' /^Vt A YC1 za<. c TTosZ)~C 1 -^OA^otj
Antecedently known, this antecedent knowledge being not our
mere understanding of the meaning, but knowledge of the
fact as well. Now 'prior' and 'better known' are ambiguous
terms, for there is a difference between what is prior and
better known in the order of being and what is prior and
better known to man. I mean that objects nearer to sense
are prior and better known to man; objects without qualifi¬
cation prior and better known are those further from sense.
Now the most universal causes are furthest from sense and
particular causes are nearest to sense, and they are thus
exactly opposed to one another.^
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Barnes' omission may seem explicable on the grounds that such
criteria as are represented by the terms y t/co^t^usCy u>^ K«i 77~y oc/yv
seem to some extent tautological and to be subsumed under the term
e>c\ Aristotle himself might even be taken to lend support to this
view, with regard at least to the term at line 71^31 ( I
^i/T-y cxczrct*- )} ancj further extension of this to embrace
k/Z~y*s Z is easily made.
Further, the omission may seem defensible on the grounds that
these terms do not denote characteristics which may be readily treated
as formal characteristics of the apodeictic syllogism per se, but seem
to intrude, perhaps gratuitously, considerations relating to the
intellectual condition of the one who is constructing the £to~c> Sc-t^rj.
As such, these characteristics may be taken as not materially affecting
the form of the demonstration itself (as does, for instance, the
j /
characteristic represented by the term w<rco/).
9
Ross suggests, in effect, that it is best to see the term
✓
y/wsyys'oroyv'as expressing a secondary formal characteristic of the
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premisses themselves rather than to interpret it in the natural sense
expressing a consideration relating to the intellectual condition of
the demonstrator.
'Prior' and 'better known' state two characteristics both of
which follow from the premisses' being causes, i.e. state¬
ments of the ground on which the fact stated in the conclu¬
sion depends. Both 'prior' and 'better known' are used in a
special, non-natural sense. Aristotle would not claim that
the facts stated in the premisses are necessarily prior in
time; for in mathematics there is no temporal succession
between ground and consequent. . . . 'Prior' therefore must
mean 'more fundamental in the nature of things.' And again
'more known' does not mean 'more familiar,' nor 'foreknown,'
'known earlier in time.'10
Yet Barnes' omission and Ross' interpretation seem not to
account for Aristotle's own treatment of these themes at such passages
as 71^31f (quoted above) or 72a25-^4 (quoted^in part, below). Nor
yet do they seem even to entertain the possibility that these charac¬
teristics may have a connection with the initial and all important
theme of Posterior Analytics I,i. "All instruction given or received
by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge." Ross'
appeal to the principle that "the same thing is not more known by
nature and more known to us" (Post.An.72^1) seems in a sense to
jeapordize his own argument against any natural interpretation to
these terms. The true scientist-philosopher is represented by
Aristotle as the one who has achieved the state^ where he is in fact
more convinced of the premisses, the highest appropriate universals,
than he is of those things which were more familiar .
Scr /U- p tS <!--/✓ <r>) s e-TTL-
Cf1/4 rt i/ t/ S c J 6-C-^ O (JT o l/O !/ S trZ Z~<x^ c
y ^Uj^cJ'er' K" yuxrlsloi/ 77~( £-1 IS y ~~C~US ££-t ft?V*UjU. (-1/J
^ T7~(Cf~C~oZ~er~£ O i/ f i c
Czu / BiVf,■./£d-iyc&i/co i/ ZTcscj cK^opfoCcj oh ✓ g-o-cr^i. a~uD/ia<^ca-ju O
t\/c< l/TL<4J <x!/7~"~ y Z-C 77~tr-jO £c-( TOV fTTt Jd t o1/ ^7CoJ' ~*<xf4(rVC-
fTft<rT01/ f-lss l . (Post^An. 72a37f) 12
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Similarly, Ross' comments to the effect that "Aristotle would
not claim that the facts stated in the premisses are necessarily prior
in time," seem somewhat one-sided. Our prior knowledge (even in the
sense canvassed at the end of Post.An.I,i) is clearly as much at issue
in this context as is the priority "in the nature of things" of the
13
facts stated in the premisses. It is not the priority in time of
the premisses which is in question but the priority in time of our
knowledge of those premisses which are of course prior in the order
of being, not in time.
In short, we must see that these terms demand something of a
more natural interpretation than Ross allows. It is of course true
that Aristotle contrasts 'prior' and 'better known' foo-e-i. with
the 'more familiar Yet in his recent work, Die Aristotelische
/
Physik, Wolfgang Wieland has argued that means 'known'
(erkannt) rather than 'knowable' (erkennbar) (but cf. e.g. von Fritz,
j / i ^ 1^
p. 32) even within this anthithesis of futr*-1 and • Such an
interpretation takes into account the context of Aristotle's discussion
here which insists upon the attainment of a particular intellectual
state as a condition for the occasion of true tf/ro . It is
thus clear that these characteristics, while they are predicable by
virtue of considerations of the "order of things," are also so pre¬
dicable by virtue of the fact that Aristotle sees it as a necessary
j >
condition of that the demonstrator be himself more convinced
of the premisses than he is of the conclusions.
— X C~ \ ^ X 2 \ »-» "1
C TT(r<- o c- /7Vcr~C~C~(r AjkC t o TT^>
folOUTO!/ <r*f O l/ OV Ah< 0<JfA tS <%1TV&6-i.f11/ Ci S'
"7 ^ ^ J A r F1 . c \> / ? ' * '
CisCoS Cx-fStx-C r-£ t*jv O
, 1 ~ .. / ->/ ■? -\ \ ^ ^ N "-x
fTfioyitf ' C~<a <7 V'a/ZTSL f) <*. A A "1 — ( J ' s "
a v>/ \ jUe~A&.o </ 77~~i<r~z~~i~uc-11/ £
11
on 1 TT^cr-cx. cj >/' ro J
.
. (72a25f)
Now since the required ground of our knowledge - i.e. of our
conviction - of a fact is the possession of such a syllogism
as we call demonstration, and the ground of the syllogism is
the facts constituting its premisses, we must not only know
the primary premisses - some if not all of them - beforehand,
but know them better than the conclusion. ... A man must
believe in some, if not in all, of the basic truths more
than in the conclusion.
And herein for our purposes lies the significance of Barnes'
omission. Barnes ignores these conditions, in his treatment of the
issue, since they derive from considerations which are, to some extent,
extralogical. They derive from considerations of the thinking process,
of the psychology of knowing,so to speak. They derive from consider-
j / _
ations of what it is to know {erTcv~tc<cr9^C) rather than from consider¬
ations of what it is that one has when one has knowledge ( ^ J
6X6-L i/ ). The distinction raised here is somewhat reminiscent of
Socrates' admonition to Theaetetus (146^f).
This distinction is raised by Aristotle himself at Post.An.
74^21-24. It is raised in the context of a discussion of necessity
as it applies to the premisses of demonstration. Aristotle's point
is that while we may reason from true premisses without demonstrating
this is not so if we reason from necessary premisses (74^15). Thus
we object to premisses which are true but not necessary, whether
because we think the premisses altogether devoid of necessity, or
simply insofar as the argument is concerned. As an example Aristotle
offers the following: "This shows how na'ive it is to suppose one's
basic truths rightly chosen if one starts with a proposition which is
(1) popularly accepted, and (2) true, such as the sophists' assumption
that to know is the same as to possess knowledge."
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*£> * d-< CouDm/ K-it O C~c fUfj'-
/] £ *"% / ^ ^ J / ' \ ^ r
C^'J <?£ '"»«<• f-C& c* V 0< OfU&t/oi )C~Cr* «v>^ Z»<J o07j^»<rr ^ 6rrnlt/ fcOO^Oj
.1 ,t — / j -> v. rj / c" f , V «' ^ J /
rj 1) Tipo r~<n.j «:«:<. <=^ ^ C< ° 4/ Oc (Tod ^cr-XT^-t C?<Tt fb e-fTtrV*.'
t j / ^ ]} '
0~Qx< Co Cr/Tc^r-rjjHtft/ C^t-u/ 4 (74 21-24)
Why does Aristotle choose this particular premiss to exemplify
his point here? Ross suggests^ that it is drawn from the Euthydemos
at 277^ where this premiss is used by the sophist Dionysodorus in just
such a manner as Aristotle condemns here. It is popularly accepted
0 cl
and true, but, as Socrates points out (277 -278 ), it is not appro¬
priately used in this argument since it rests on an ambiguity.^ It
is, to be sure, a familiar sophistical quibble, and as such may have
been used here by Aristotle simply because it was ready to hand. Yet
it is appropriate to note that Aristotle has already on two occasions
b cL
(71 10; 74 28) alluded to the sophistic kind of knowing (that which
is simply content with proving the accidents rather than with proving
the accidents through the real causes), and he seems anxious to
discriminate his apodeictic syllogistic from their specious kind of
reasoning.
Indeed, even in the Euthydemos, Plato surely intends something
by putting this premiss in the mouth of Dionysodorus. Plato's object
is to ridicule not only the sophists' abuse of language but also their
epistemological irresponsibility. They proceed on the assumption that
once they have provided a method of proving their point they have
provided a means of attaining knowledge. What they fail to recognize
is that any valid scientific method must be a method which engenders
cl—b
understanding. (278 )
It seems quite likely that Aristotle's intention here is to
make the same general point (note the use of the plural in
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line 23). The apodeictic syllogism provides a medium not merely for
proving the essential accidents, but also for our understanding of
them as well. "We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific
knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way
in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on
which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other,
and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is." (71^9f)
While it is generally accepted and true, that to know is the
same as to have knowledge, this is an inappropriate premiss from which
to begin one?5 search for the methods of attaining knowledge. It is
this premiss which the sophists have adopted, irresponsibly, in
designing their own methodology - a methodology which fails to take
as its goal that essential component in which is under¬
standing.
Yet the distinction raised here by Aristotle may seem to have
little or no bearing on the omission noted above from Barnes' paper,
nor on Ross' refusal to admit any natural interpretation to the terms
Z~*Ocoy and Tf/oe.Barnes does include the characteristic,
"causally related to the conclusion" {atic'w i/. • . (71^22), which
seems to cover this whole issue in Aristotle's conception of what
constitutes a science. Barnes' treatment certainly would not let us
confuse the Aristotelian and sophistic conceptions of what constitutes
a science. Aristotle insists that any true scientific method must
make manifest the true cause.
Does Aristotle's conception of a science, however, differ from
the sophists' in this one respect only? If we accept Barnes' omission
as valid (and Ross' non-natural interpretation of the omitted terms),
it would seem that this is the case. However these omitted terms
represent yet a further, albeit a related point of differentiation
between Aristotle's conception of what constitutes a science and the
sophistic notion. For Aristotle insists that an apodeictic science
comes into being not simply when the true causes are known, but when
they are better known than, and prior to the conclusions. "We must
not only know the primary premisses - some if not all of them -
beforehand, but know them better than the conclusion: for the cause
of an attribute's inherence in a subject always itself inheres in the
a 17
subject more firmly than that attribute." (72 27-30) Aristotle
insists then that not only must the formal conditions of understanding
(i.e. the true causes) be present, but further that the material
conditions (conviction covering the premisses) must actually have
occurred before we may claim that an apodeictic science exists.
The point at issue between Aristotle and the sophists, then,
is twofold. First, their method does not lay the basis for the
revelation of the true causes while the apodeictic method does.
Secondly, their method does not aim at understanding the causes in
any case, while the apodeictic science is not considered to have come
into existence until the scientist is himself more convinced of them
than he is even of the conclusions. This latter element in the dis¬
tinction is obliterated once we accept Barnes' omission and Ross'
totally non-natural interpretation of the terms in question.
The distinction arises, again, in one of its forms, at
Nicomachean Ethics, VII,ch.3. The context is Aristotle's discussion
of . The relevant passages read (in John Burnet's text):
n <-> « ^ 15
b*)rJe>t/ Oct/ 0/~C CyLCOCuc^ ^ItUOrlt/
~b\C-tcf'cC0 / rot/^ «- ZTtrej TocCotJ . ifo S £ /ifry e-t c Coc^ 7)oyovj
j * > *• ->rv - . ,/ 1 i « ' -n /• ^
c?77c? 77;J <^rrca~TCj jc. oo ac-v f/j/Ufroi/ /\<zc J/y0 cc 7~o cj TTi/iye<r<-
fou£otj> OVT(-$ tfiro /Twt <^7Tij e^<yy/>u /-e y *£/J- ttc- EO K^eCcuj^ t
Cc 77^/)OZ~Ci/ ^cOoifflot / o i/C~&£ (T~c y &<■ /°o u *—c. /ocC e Too^ ~^oyoc^c a-e-a~c
y* ^ ' /* ^ I /*"* ^ ^ \ / ^ 'b ' OcTTCtJ ' &></<■ */•<? a~u/u. d>cYt*-C TOU fo ic -pypovo*! b*-c Z~OX t" U>c~ZT(r
s n / » * ' c' ' —- ^ ' ~. ' . <
K^b^T^p Veu \ (jfT o Kpt t/c jc. fVrwj Ou r<uj ijTt o r* iTTCToS c7 <s-y f-«✓ /Co.ec
\ J
_ /{ (1147 17f) ^
£~cuj af/C^Tt/vojLA-t-SooS -
And further the possession of knowledge in another sense
than those just named is something that happens to men; for
within the case of having knowledge but not using it we see
a difference of state, admitting of the possibility of having
knowledge in a sense and yet not having it, as in the instance
of a man asleep, mad, or drunk. (1147alfl-14)
It is plain, then, that incontinent people must be said
to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk.
The fact that men use the language that flows from knowledge
proves nothing; for even men under the influence of these
passions utter scientific proofs and verses of Empedocles,
and those who have just begun to learn a science can connect
up its arguments,^ but do not yet know it; for it has to
become part of themselves, and that takes time; so that we
must suppose that the use of language by men in an inconti¬
nent state means no more than its utterance by actors on the
stage. <1147a17f)19
Our interest in these passages is focused, of course, upon
whatever insights they may provide into Aristotle's understanding of
p / j ^
what it is to know (as in cc/' , line 22), as distinct from ex<nS fTujj
which is linked to ojcztC(in line 13); and into his understanding
of the processes involved in acquiring knowledge (as in the 'learners'
referred to in line 21).
20
Burnet's note on this passage reads, in part, as follows:
"When we say a man has knowledge potentially we may mean either that
he 'has' it but does not 'use' it, or, merely that he is capable of
having it . . . but does not actually 'have' it at the time. This
distinction is best brought out in Gen.An. 735 9 cyy(/Z~^yuj &&
Vopp tc Ct-pc*J u6-c*^(] oC v Co <=*cbc~oo fry&c--x:c-
? U , " C , . s)'r ' i
freeze oc/cfrec-c j u/ er~rj~/-y o /<ayc-cj^/i-coz)^
/ / ( C —* yo ^ ^ y
yo^oro^ ?7c>^>y uj r<^y L $ Too Crt-coyoZn/roc,
r<>/L
16
The case considered in this section is parallel to that of 'the
sleeping geometer,' ..."
Burnet rightly points out that this passage touches upon the
ways in which we can know potentially. There is an interesting nuance
in this passage however. Aristotle's concern here lies not only with
the varieties of potential knowledge but perhaps even more with the
fact that it is possible to possess potential knowledge and yet betcme.
actually ignorant (cf. Physics 255^5 below). He is, after all,
2 y
concerned to offer a possible explanation for the condition of
In a certain sense, he says, one may both have, and not have, knowledge
cL 3.
(1147 |3). The concluding lines of the passage quoted above (1147
22-24) describe the kind of knowing that is really only talk (cf. also
1147^10-12). But it is talk. We are able, says Aristotle, to say the
right things and yet rotnoin actually ignorant.
p b
Physics 255 30-255 5 reads as follows:
But the fact that the term 'potentially' is used in more
than one sense is the reason why it is not evident whence
such motions as the upward motion of fire and the downward
motion of earth are derived. One who is learning a science
potentially knows it in a different sense from one who while
already possessing the knowledge is not actually exercising
it. Wherever we have something capable of acting and some¬
thing capable of being correspondingly acted on, in the event
of any such pair being in contact what is potential becomes
at times actual: e.g. the learner becomes from one potential
Something another potential something: for one who possesses
knowledge of a science but is not actually exercising it
knows the science potentially in a sense, though not in the
same sense as he knows it potentially before he learnt it.
And when he is in this condition, if something does not pre¬
vent him, he actively exercises his knowledge: otherwise he
would be in the contradictory state of not knowing.
Burnet is quite right in saying that the case considered in
the Ethics passage is parallel to that of 'the sleeping geometer,'
but it is only parallel, not identical.
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Here in the Ethics passage Aristotle is anxious to display,
perhaps rather more than in the Gen. An. passage cited, the sense in
which that which is potentially something is also actually something.
In this argument Aristotle maintains that while it is true that the
is potentially a knower he isfc actually ignorant. It is in
terms of potential knowledge but actual ignorance (Physics 255^5) that
the whole dialectical passage has any meaning if, as Burnet rightly
suggests, Aristotle is trying to show the Academy how it may, within
its own doctrines (that is, holding to the essence of the Socratic
paradox as cited at 1145^23f), explain ; explain, that is, how
man can act wrongly while seeming to have knowledge but not actually
knowing.
Further, this case is only parallel to that of 'the sleeping
geometer' because that which turns potential knowledge into actual
ignorance differs with each of the passions cited - sleep, madness,
drunkenness, etc. As we will shortly see this fact has important
implications for our understanding of the case of the 'learners' in
a 21
line 1141 21, whose impediment is especially significant.
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Paul Moraux, writing of Aristotle's treatment of the stages
of potential knowing, says: "Aristotle n'envisage pas le developpement
d'une faculte cognitive: cette faculte'etant supposee prete a l'action,
il analyse ses rapports avec son objet, selon qu'elle en est privee,
qu'elle le possede ou qu'elle le contemple." Accurate as this comment
may be, it is worth noting that texts such as the ones we have been
examining would suggest that Aristotle holds that the potential knower
at the second stage must undergo some form of further development
before he can truly contemplate the objects his intellect possesses.
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We shall consider below the nature of this development, and the imped¬
iment occasioned to the full exercise of knowledge if such development
does not occur. Further, we will examine the possibility that
Aristotle intends the apodeictic syllogism to play an important role
in this development.
Before proceeding there is a problem to consider in John
Burnet's text of E.N.1147 17f quoted earlier (p. 15 above). Burnet's
<o->
text gives (line 21) and o-ty* c (line 22), while
Bywater's Oxford text gives s-J and cru^t. v . It is of
some interest here to consider which is the more probable reading.
23
The textual evidence reported by Burnet and Bywater is
not conclusive though neither offer any support from the manuscript
tradition for Thurot's conjecture of p for ju KiPo'wei-j .
The choice must therefore be determined largely on the basis
of the sense of the passage and this seems to me to favour Bywater's
treatment.
Burnet, following Thurot, and W. D. Ross in his Oxford trans¬
lation choose to construct the text so as to suggest that Aristotle is
comparing the incontinent person to those who have just begun to learn
24
a science but do not yet know it for it must become part of them¬
selves .
Bywater chooses to construct the text so that it has Aristotle
j ,
comparing the •£*.(>*. to students who have learned the science but
do not yet know it, for it must have become part of themselves.
It seems that Aristotle would be more likely to draw his
comparison with the latter class as it is clearly a more adequate
J /
reference for a comparison with the oSKp• The incontinent person
19
is not simply a tyro. He already knows the evil of his action. That
is the problem.
25
Burnet's note reads, in part, as follows: "... This is
another way in which Aristotle more than once describes merely
3. b
potential knowledge. Cf. Physics 255 33 ... ; de An. 429 8. . . .
Thurot's conjecture ftayfai/psc-c-s for /c*flovir*-$ seems to me cer¬
tain. We can hardly identify oi with oc p.*,starts
77f>'f //<*f". " (De An. 429^8)
Burnet seems not to have noticed that even on his own inter¬
pretation Aristotle is not here identifying the Ctry
with ci TTm* . Burnet has already noted
that the case being canvassed here is parallel to that of 'the
sleeping geometer' - that is, to a geometer who has already learned
the science but is taking a nap.
The Bywater reading seems the stronger. Further it fits
quite well with the suggestion made earlier that Aristotle is here
referring to a class of potential knowers who have indeed acquired
their subject matter but must still be called ignorant. This class
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corresponds to the one noted in the Physics passage. Such a person
has already acquired a science, (o e'xm ^ 255a34) , but is not
using it, 255a34) possibly because he is impeded from
doing so, (ft i(uj)u p 255^4).
We are now in a position to examine those elements in the
Ethics passage which are specifically relevant to the earlier discus¬
sion concerning the proper Aristotelian definition of what constitutes
an apodeictic science and his distinction between 'having knowledge'
and 'knowing.'
Aristotle asserts here that "those who have just learned a
20
science" (oc ■jr^Mrov'line 21) can be said to have knowledge
in a sense' (6)(6iiS 77wj, line 14) but 'do not yet know' (c'c-^c SJcunu>,
line 21-22.cf. 1147^13; 1147b6; Physics 255b5).
There can be little doubt that the r(-j here referred to
are those who possess a science of a sort very closely resembling at
least the model proposed in the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle's own
words Tl'oy ouj rro line 18-19; o&roS^t-tj ,
^ /■ 27
line 20',cn/rt-c^>oo<rc . . . ployouj , line 21 ) seem if anything to
stress the formal correctness of their science. But they are still
ignorant. Why?
There is an impediment to their knowing; an impediment which
is parallel, as Burnet has noted, to the sleep of 'the sleeping
geometer.' Yet the impediment proves, in the case of the to
be somewhat more complex than that of sleep.
The clearly do not belong to that class of
knowers possessed simply of potentia prima, as the schoolmen call it,
(even though Thurot's conjecture would, wrongly, imply this).
On the other hand, are we then to assume that of -f^ocDrbi/ /u^
can be classed amongst those who have attained possession of potentia
secunda? Again we must answer, 'no.'
Perhaps the clearest statement of the criterion for the true
possession of potentia secunda occurs at De Anima 429b5f.
Once the mind has become each set of its possible
objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used
of one who is actually a man of science (this happens when
he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative),
its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a differ¬
ent sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisi¬
tion of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is
then able to think itself.
Potentia secunda may be said to have been achieved when the
mind can, on its own initiative, proceed to the final actualization
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of knowing. Yet the -7y>£roS do not yet satisfy this criter¬
ion. There is some impediment barring their way to the stage where
they can, on their own initiative, simply, make the next step to
Qt-ujptThe Physics passage quoted above (255a30-b5) makes a
similar specific reservation when describing the stage of potentia
secunda. A man may be said validly to have attained potentia secunda
when there are no longer any impediments to his capacity to ^TV
at will (255b4).
We must therefore conclude that o£ -Tf^uirox/ are to be
classed as those who have passed beyond potentia prima but who have
not yet fully attained potentia secunda (at which later point they
might properly be called actually men of science - De An. 429^6-7),
since they are still subject to some sort of impediment.
What is this impediment? Aristotle provides the answer, and
in doing so points to the conditions which, in terms of his scientific
methodology, constitute the distinction between Tiaving knowledge' and
'knowing. ' tercet SJ o^rrco ' JfcsT Z~euro ££/f(0 o'i/ou pc-i .
"They do not yet know; for it must have become part of themselves,
and that takes time." (1147a21—22)
The impediment, then, is lack of time during which cru^u
might have occurred.
The word cru/^jv) i is not, perhaps, a very precise term, being
used here in a somewhat extended sense (its most natural and frequent
29
use being within biological contexts) f yet it is a strong word, and
one which Aristotle defines fairly carefully at Meta A , 1014b22f.
It is used to denote one of the basic means of natural growth or
increase (the other being 'contact'). "Organic unity (trufx
differs from contact; for in the latter case there need not be anything
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besides the contact, but in organic unities there is something iden¬
tical in both parts, which makes them grow together instead of merely-
touching, and be one in respect of continuity and quantity, though
not of quality." It is unnecessary here (perhaps impossible in any
case), rigorously to apply Aristotle's dictionary definition to that
30
which occurs between the mind and its objects. Yet the De Anima
seems to offer some grounds for our using this sort of language at
least in an extended sense.
We must conclude that one who is in possession of apodeictic
arguments, and further has the manifest facility to 'connect up these
> /
arguments' is nonetheless not ipso facto an <r- Ti/UujZ in the actual
sense of the term until and unless he has undergone the further
incomplete, or merely that the individual's possession of that science
is somehow insufficient while the science itself, with regard both to
form and content, is complete?
It is the contention here that this very question is improper
in the Aristotelian context (though, of course, we must ask it) since
) , ■> ,
the notion of an t-rrie-c^ju,^ existing independently of the e-7/ccrtr-jf^o*&j
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who possess it is simply not operative in Aristotle's thought.
Yet even despite this objection we discover that we must
answer this question by saying that, in strict Aristotelian terms,
the science is itself incomplete with regard both to form and to
content, until the is itself achieved. That is to say, in
the process of crup.( the mind turns its attention to matters either
not embraced by the specific apodeictic syllogisms possessed by cc
> or to matters embraced there, but not properly
But are we to infer therefore that the science is itself
23
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elaborated, and thus not fully embraced by the apodeictic system.
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The answer to this critical question must be sought through
an examination of what Aristotle means by calling "lack of time" an
impediment (E.N. 1147322).
Aristotle has already told us, in the Nicomachean Ethics, how
lack of time is an impediment, and further, he has specified the
nature of those objects to which the mind relates in the process of
CJ~ u <i> u •
At 1143^6f, Aristotle writes:
This is wThy these states are thought to be natural endow¬
ments - why, while no one is thought to be a philosopher by
nature, people are thought to have by nature judgment, under¬
standing, and intuitive reason (/oJ/ 1143 7). This is shown
by the fact that we think our pow7ers correspond to our time
of life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive
reason and judgment; this implies that nature is the cause.
Hence intuitive reason is both beginning and end; for demon- f
strations are from these and about these. 4pty ^£^05
•4>yj" GrlG "Gl<" ^To Sc-cf t- t_S /P*t f7~G-yc Z~c>unvp.
114.7 9-ll.)34 Therefore we ought to attend to the undemon-
strated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people
or of people of practical wisdom no less than to demonstra¬
tions; for because experience has given them an eye they see
aright. (4«i y-<(> Vo c-r c-i/ z~>yj ^oP^oo~<-\/
.1147b13-14). (■
35 a
And again a few pages earlier, Aristotle writes (1142 15f):
. . . but a young man has no experience, for it is length
of time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this
question too, why a boy may become a mathematician, but not
a philosopher or a physicist. Is it because the objects of
mathematics exist by abstraction, while the first principles
of these other subjects come from experience, and because
young men have no conviction about the latter but merely use
the proper language, while the essence of mathematical
objects is plain enough to them?
Oi 1Tp(ofes fcaSti/re-) are impeded by lack of time, then, because
a b
time is required for experience to occur (1142 15-16; 1143 13-14),
and it is really, therefore,experience in which they are lacking.
Further, lack of experience is an impediment by virtue of the fact
that it is experience which provides the of the various sciences.
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Yet, to be more precise again, the impediment occasioned by
lack of time during which experience might have occurred is really a
deficiency of \/cv$. (1143^5,9) For it is which, in time and
through experience, gives the eyes so that the^< of the various
sciences may be seen aright (1143^13-14). Thus we should pay atten¬
tion to men who have had the time and the experience and to their
undemonstrated assertions and their views even though they are
unsupported by proofs. (1143^11-13)
We must note here that in introducing reference to the reflec-
) '
tions on the on the part of those who have surmounted the
temporal impediment, Aristotle is in fact expanding both the form and
the content of the sciences as properly to be possessed by those who
are actually men of science. Lack of time is an impediment in that
L 0/ J / 1/0^
it prevents oc -fTnco^ot/ from . . must come
^ '
together with the so that they form a unity which resembles,
somehow, the integrated growth of parts within a natural organism.
cL J /
However, when Aristotle says (1142 19) that the c*(p7c<<. are
attained through experience does he mean that ot vc-oi. ( or ot' rrj?cZco\/
fjLc<9o^c(-j ) have simply no idea of the i °f their sciences at all?
Does he mean that they have not been involved in any induction of
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these premisses? Clearly, this is not the case. It is evident that
oc ve-oL, even though they lack time and experience for /ofy to operate,
nonetheless 'have' the iysywt at least to the extent that they are able
to 'use the proper language' (,7)/y£v^«i/1142a20; cf. di-yc-a/ Cou^
cctTV r^j e-Trt<rc~^/u>jj\\kl 18-19; °< 1147 20; c~vC£-c^e>L>o-c- ....
^<vjll47a21).
But Aristotle makes it quite clear what he intends by the
phrase £ cKc when he glosses it with the
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comment fd*. c Z~*. ou iriu-Ct-o eua-t %s cu i/toi. -<.3?^ Tlcyeiscri (1142 19-20).
The young men have 'no conviction about' ^ the because time and
experience have not been granted them through which /oJj could have
. , fc>
gained insight into the (1143 13-14).
5 then, is the faculty which enables the novice learners
■> /
first to isolate, and grasp the bare statement of the • But
[/oj^ is also, for Aristotle, that faculty which, on the basis of
experience and subject to time, so broadens the comprehension of the
j(a. c that a better and more complete knowledge of them may be
obtained and thus a firmer conviction concerning them.
We must, of course, enquire as to the nature of this 'exper¬
ience' - what is its field of operation and how does it enable
J r
to broaden and improve its comprehension of the . We must
further ask how the o(t7~oSc-<$ 6ry themselves relate to this final movement
of intuitive induction. The answers to these enquiries fall more
naturally into later sections of this study, though something of the
outline may be perceived in the pages which follow here.
Yet the general Aristotelian doctrine is simply that it is
-> f /
Vou ^ that provides the <■ » and one is left with the strong impres¬
sion that \Sous, is thus the prius (both in time and in the definition
of knowing) of all apodeictic activity. The De Anima, for instance
(III, 4-8), and the Posterior Analytics (II, 19) do not obviously
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depict Voo<^ as the special prerogative of any particular age group.
Thus the suggestion that Vo^ only becomes operative in some signifi¬
cant way at a later stage in life needs some qualification. Such a
qualification actually exists in the text at 1143^9-11 & o t-
\Joo^ ' 6/C Toi/t"w0 <*<■ f-*-J SCrci //&-,* 1 tot/cteS-
) r
it would seem, does double duty. Initially it provides the i. upon
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which all demonstrations are built. Subsequently,•with the passage
of time and through experience,YoO^ is the faculty whereby we gain
true conviction concerning the t which, initially, it isolated.
is, as well, the completion^ of the scientific process (that
is, of potentia secunda - it is not the ultimate actualization of
knowing for that is <hV) • ^1
Of course, Aristotle does talk of two ways of acquiring the
J s ^ '
o^>X*c • He talks of /ouj and of (For the purposes of this
study we may leave to one side for it sustains the of
action, not of science. We will consider the role of dialectic in
y t 3
providing the of the various sciences (Topics 101 25) in Chapter
5, below).
H. D. P. Lee an
. n ) /
alyses the roles of /o^ and of and
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summarizes the relationship between the two as follows:
But though he thus speaks of two different ways of apprehend¬
ing first principles, it is clear chat Aristotle does not
mean that they are absolutely distinct and unconnected. The
meaning of An.Post.B19 is rather that Vo3$ is the last phase
in a development from sense through memory and experience
(cf. also Met. A.1) ; Vcuy is not an isolated faculty, but a
final act of insight whereby after the experience of partic¬
ular instances (err°yuy'j) we finally see the general principle
involved. And thus Am-iy v , literally 'leads us on' to this
final insight. dndtrro^ wy ^ are in this way compli¬
mentary.
This comment, as far as it goes, is perfectly accurate.
Aristotle does use the terms v/p3y and with a fluidity that
makes them, to all intents and purposes, interchangeable. But Lee
does not ask, nor answer, the larger question. That is, when he
asserts that is not an isolated faculty, but a final act of
insight he does not enquire into the sequence of processes which
precede this 'final' act. Yet such a question seems inevitable if we
A3 /
accept his earlier invitation to compare with Plato's
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Lee writes:
Voo<^ then apprehends first principles, and the method of
is intuitive. This is evident from the general con¬
trast between \JoO3 and ^ncrc^fx^. The function of
is reasoning, passing step by step from premiss to conclu¬
sion; and the natural antithesis of this type of thought
movement is the intuitive. (Compare Vo^e-and in
Plato) ...
There is a parallel here both in terminology and thought
between Plato and Aristotle. It is unlikely that the simi¬
larity of terminology is accidental; and the difference in
meaning (between ij and ) is merely that between a
faculty and the exercise of a faculty. There is also a clear
parallel of function. Both Aristotle's and Plato's
have as their object the reaching of ; and
is contrasted with -c , vod$ with* the
contrast in both cases being between a deductive thought
movement and as intuitive. Vou^ and formulate the
first principles from which and cc. deduce the
consequences.
Lee is manifestly right in calling our attention to the
* y
parallel between ancj Platonic Yet he fails to carry the
parallel far. enough and note the fact that for Plato occurs
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methodologically after It is our experience in the deduc-
tive processes of hc^t/ot^. , in establishing the causes of things, which
enables us to gain insight (in the final stage of the "line") into
the conditions of the causes - into the ever more ultimate ^jo^occ until
we encounter the ffvi. The condition of the attainment
of for Plato is the painstaking process through f
We can hardly fail to ask whether for Aristotle the same
conditions are not requisite to the final act of insight - to Vov^
(though, of course, there is for Aristotle, no ultimate single
j s 45
but only the indemonstrable of the individual sciences).
Is it not this painstaking process through StfyoLJ- - the
careful elaboration, in Aristotelian terms, of the ~ which
the ff^u)£oShave not had the time, yet, properly to undertake?
They have the right arguments - but they have not yet so used those
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arguments as to see their grounds with the full comprehension of .
Aristotle seems to view the apodeictic movement as itself, on
46
occasion, bracketed between two movements of intuitive induction,
of (/ou^ • The first, initially to provide the ; and the second,
to bring about the j ~ that is, to complete the real content
of the science through an examination, exposition, and defence of the
<|iin their own right as definitions. We begin to see that the
formal apodeictic syllogisms act, at times at least, to provide the
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tool whereby the "confused situation" which is the subject genus
may be comprehended no longer as "confused" but in its necessary
being. It is not here being suggested that Aristotle conceives it to
be the single function of the apodeictic syllogism to provide the
medium whereby y/oo^ may achieve final comprehensive insight into the
; ,
of 3. science. The function of the syllogism is quite simply
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to demonstrate the demonstrable. Further, the defining relationship
between t/evj and <kop remains, for Aristotle, as he himself
summarizes it in the final words of the Posterior Analytics: "And the
originative source of science grasps the original basic premiss, while
science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the
whole body of fact." We must come to understand the various condi¬
tions under which Aristotle sees demonstration of the demonstrable as
appropriate. In this way we will avoid exhibiting ,
We must note, as a context to this study, the discussion
amongst such scholars as von Fritz, Wieland, Hess, Happ and others.
That discussion centres largely on two related questions: the types
and practice of induction according to Aristotle; and the nature,
function, and demonstrability of the . Their concern with the
status of the and with the possible logical structure of
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Aristotle's en^y *> constitute, of course, the field of our con¬
cern here.
In a sense, however, consideration of these issues lies beyond
the immediate requirements of our present study. Here we are concerned
with the possibility that Aristotle intends the apodeictic syllogism
to discharge, as one of its functions, a certain service vis-a-vis the
intellect. The , it is here suggested, present the per¬
ceived situation in a science to the mind in such a way that 0*"
will be able to attain conviction concerning the of that
science. It is the role of which is the focus of our
attention in this study.
We must leave to some future study the question of what type
-> j
of induction, if any, might make use of the of/To in the
manner here suggested. So too we must postpone consideration of the
question of the nature of the themselves. This issue is cer¬
tainly not irrelevant, but it is, perhaps, somewhat circumvented by
the suggestion made in Chapter 5 concerning the operation in Aristotle's
thought of the 'principle of essence' as distinct from the 'essences'
themselves.
We might, however, call attention to an issue raised, for
instance by von Fritz (p. 39: cf. Wieland (3), p. 55f; Hess, p. 50f).
von Fritz reminds us that the are t'rie t'rie individual
sciences and function as such. We are encouraged to take seriously
the claim here being pressed that the perception of the can
not be considered as entirely independent of the "analysis"^ 0f the
subject matter of the desired science.
Further, we might ask whether some contribution to the debate
j /
between Wieland and his critics on the nature of the might be
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found in the suggestion (Chapter 5, below) concerning the "principle
of essence." Wieland is himself concerned with the essences as prin¬
ciples or points of view - as gesicht^spunkte. Yet it will be argued
-ru
below (p. 78f) that it is not^telos itself but the principle of finality
which constitutes the true Aristotelian point of departure in method.
There is, it would seem, something of a fresh perspective thrown on
y /
the question of the status of the as considered by Wieland and
his critics.
It is, however, as we noted above, the apodeictic syllogism
and one of its possible functions which is our chief concern here.
One might, in fact, remember that Aristotle chose to entitle his works
dealing with the syllogism and the apodeictic syllogism
and it is in its analytic role - that of the resolution of c
of clarifying confused situations - that the apodeictic syllogism
performs its defining function.
A disclaimer is called for concerning this 'analytic.' It is
not suggested here that Aristotle entertains the possibility of the
circular demonstration of the c as described in Prior An. 2,23.
His rejection of that possibility is categorical at Post. An. 1,3
where he asserts that circular demonstration is far too limited in
its applicability to be of any significant use, to say nothing of the
general doctrinal principles such a procedure would violate within
Aristotle's system.
It should, finally, be emphasized that the operation of
intuitive induction is nowhere"^ accepted by Aristotle as "proof."
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Ross is quite correct when he writes:
Here, then, under the heading of induction he clearly con¬
templates a mental process which is not proof, yet on which
knowledge supervenes. . . . The induction here is not proof
of the principle, but the psychological preparation upon
31
which the knowledge of the principle supervenes. The know¬
ledge of the principle is not produced by reasoning but
achieved by direct insight. . . . This is in fact what
modern logicians call intuitive induction. And it is far
the most important of the types of induction which Aristotle
considers.
Aristotle's almost casual comment at Post.An.74^23-24 has
provided the occasion for an examination of certain elements in
Aristotle's thought which may alert us to the danger that the tendency
to ignore (with Barnes) or to interpret non-naturally (as with Ross)
53 ^ ^
certain of Aristotle's prime conditions of -rm>£tc£<s may be sympto¬
matic of a partial view on our part of Aristotle's conception of
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apodeictic science. For the tendency is really one of purifying
Aristotle's logic (and consequently his scientific methodology) of
any natural - i.e. physiological or psychological - elements, with the
inevitable consequence that it is seen simply as a deductive form.
It is a tendency so to purify Aristotle's logic as to render the
ambiguity"'"' between 'having knowledge' and 'knowing' null and void -
to reduce knowledge to the simple possession of a "replica of the
real." "The aim of science," writes Allan,"is to produce a body
of judgements which, in their connexion with each other, reflect the
necessary connexions between substances and properties in the real
world. 'The truth to be attained is a replica of the real' (H. H.
Joachim)."
Aristotle seems to see the aim of his methodology, more ambi¬
tiously, perhaps, than Allan does, as that of creating conditions
under which the "replica of the real" as it might be exhibited in a
finite set of ttiToft-ij may be recognised with conviction"''7 as a true
"replica of the real"; and it is this convinced recognition which
constitutes the prime condition for the existence of an apodeictic
science. His insistance upon the prior and better knowledge of the
p(p\oit seems to derive from his concern to effect this aim since it
32
is the priority and superiority which produces the specific conviction
5 8
which thus defines scientific knowledge.
At Post.An.75 12f, just a few paragraphs after his reference
to the naivete' of the sophists, Aristotle summarises his remarks by
insisting that our recognition, the psychological state of the knower,
is the ultimate determinant of the validity of the scientific know¬
ledge. Not only must the premisses be necessary (else there will be
no demonstration at all), but also the premisses must be recognised
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as necessary, else the alleged demonstrator will still be in a state
of ignorance (as were 0ic rr^OceS pi* Qot/rt-J) •
There is a further statement of this principle at Post.An.89
11-23 which passage offers further corroboration of the interpretation
here offered of Aristotle's methodological intentions. At 89a14,
Aristotle refers to a process of passing through "the middle terms
until the immediate premisses are reached." It would seem impossible
that Aristotle is here thinking of a dialectical process (as at Topics
101 36) since there is nothing in the context to permit such a refer¬
ence to dialectic. Further, it seems highly improbable that he has
the syllogism of induction (Prior Analytics 2,23) in mind since its
operation, as he notes at Prior An. 2,23 and at Post.An. 1,3, is
limited to convertible terms, and such a special class would not fit
the general discussion here.
It seems unavoidable that the process to which Aristotle is
referring here is a process of inductive inspection (cf.
3c-<-K-o^ at 88^36) which is conducted on the middles of an
already established apodeictic chain of the science. This interpre¬
tation gains support from what Aristotle says next (89316-18): "The
truth perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that cannot be other than
they are, in the way in which he grasps the definitions through which
demonstrations take place, he will have not opinion but knowledge."
CHAPTER III
THE AIM OF SCIENCE
"The details of Aristotle's theory are obscure, but its out¬
line is clear: a demonstrative science is an axiomatised deductive
system comprising a finite set of connected c?tfo or demonstra¬
tions. "
In the preceding chapter the completeness of such a definition
of Aristotle's conception of a demonstrative science was critically
examined,and it was argued that neither the form nor the content of
an Aristotelian apodeictic science is achieved until the of that
science are comprehended, explored, and defended in their own right
as definitions.
In this chapter the goals of Aristotelian science will be
examined and an attempt will be made to articulate what it is that
j - /
acts, in Aristotle s view, as the purpose, the of apodeictic
science.
d. b
At De Anima 417 26- 7, Aristotle says:
. . . but there is a difference between their respective
potentialities, the one (a) being a potential knower, because
his kind or matter is such and such, the other (b), because
he can in the absence of any external counteracting causeMl
Xc xijchjcry - 28) realize his knowledge in
actual knowing at will (<?' $' oCi $u^rpj, &e^Pe-Cp~
27-28). This implies a third meaning oi 'a knower' (c), one
who is already realizing his knowledge - he is a knower in
actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g. this
A ( o &' m, &vc~t-^ tr-prt-1 tjs £-rrc.rceZjj.
Co A - a28-29). Both the former are potential knowers,
who realize their respective potentialities, the one (a) by
change of quality, i.e. repeated transitions from one state
to its opposite under instruction, the other (b) by the
33
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transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar
to their active exercise. The two kinds of transition are
distinct.
Also the expression 'to be acted upon' has more than one
meaning; it may mean either (a) the extinction of one of two
contraries by the other, or (b) the maintenance of what is
potential by the agency of what is actual and already like
what is acted upon, with such likeness as is compatible with
one's being actual and the other potential (To 5e
\ < * r s i/ — , ✓ )/ ( \ c y
vtTo x~ou f car"s o c/<■-<- o*c~o$ ><r<W OfxaiotJ
ouCujj ^5 &7CC-X. rrPoj d-vz-fr? (-jrc-nty*- 417 3-5). For what
possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a transition
which is either not an alteration of it at all (being in ^
reality^ a development into its true self or agtuality & £ o^i/co
y<{> tf errt'too-^ <*. s - 417 6-7) or at
least an alteration in a quite different sense from the
usual meaning.
In this passage we see Aristotle making much the same use of
* /
i-rrcr-r^/A.<-? to exemplify the operation of potentiality and actuality as
he did at Physics 255a30f.^
We may note, first, that this passage is consistent in its
teaching concerning the nature of the true possession of potentia
3 3
secunda with the two passages (Physics 255 30; E.N. 1147 llf) examined
in Chapter 2. Potentia secunda is not to be considered as secured
n
until all the impediments to its attainment have been overcome
3 3
(417 27-28). We have already noted the occurrence of virtually the
same phrase (<*V yoy) Zt 7"zIV a28) at Physics 255^4, and
its sense is made manifest, as has been argued, in the Nicomachean
4 3
Ethics. At Metaphysics 1048 16, Aristotle advises us that we need
only add this proviso when the potentiality (in this case^potentia
secunda) has itself not yet been fully achieved.
We discern the correspondence of the passages even more clearly
when we note (line 417^6-7) that Aristotle describes the process of
gradually attaining the fullness of potentia secunda as a process of
J /
frr(£o<rijf a word strongly reminiscent of the "growth" concept
represented in the Ethics (11A7a22) by the term '.
35
The passage from the De Anima is, then, consistent with, and
to that extent corroborates, our findings in Chapter 2. Yet the
passage is useful not simply for that reason alone for it serves also
to bring into somewhat sharper focus the question of what it is that
constitutes for Aristotle the objective to be achieved in science.
What is it that constitutes the of ?
"The aim of science is to produce a body of judgements which,
in their connexion with each other, reflect the necessary connexions
between substances and properties in the real world. 'The truth here
to be attained is a replica of the real.' (H. H. Joachim)."b
aims at, says Allan, is completed in, has for its
j ,
, "a body of judgements" or "a replica of the real." Yet
Aristotle here repeatedly asserts that it is which is the
^ 3. b b
of the knowing agent (417 28,29; 417 5, 19), and reasserts
3 3
the doctrine frequently elsewhere (e.g. De An. 412 10, 22; Physics
255b2; Meta.1087a20; 1048a34; 105Qal2-14; E.N.1146b31-35; E.E.1216b11—15;
De Gen.An.735al1).6
-> / ; >
The of rr<o-cy/iis then, according to Allan
and Joachim, a body of judgements, a replica of the real; while we have
j s
evidence that the £H-c of the knowing agent himself is,
rather, the activity called
Some clarification is called for. It would seem that Allan
and Joachim are quite right in their comments in so far as they are
considering in its personified sense, as an abstraction.
Abstractly considered can not aam at any activity. Medical
science does not cure people; doctors do.
If man is constrained (as Aristotle's Organon clearly recog-
36
nises) to achieve his sciences through language then he must terminate
his sciences, in so far as they are confined to language, in state¬
ments, - in bodies of judgements which replicate the reality studied.
In this sense Allan's "body of judgements" or Joachim's "replica of
the real" are fully justified. They are the concrete terms which
correspond adequately to the notion of e-rrcrconsidered abstractly
(see pp. 45-46 below).
And yet it is certainly appropriate to call attention to the
fact that we are concerned in this enquiry with the practical, concrete
problems of Aristotle's scientific method. We must therefore attempt
) r
to reconcile, if possible, this sense of<*-r7Vabstractly con-
sidered with those statements where Aristotle treats 6-7f~tr-ny/u^ as a
certain condition of the mind relating it, physiologically so to
speak, to the objects of knowledge.^
There is one passage, at Metaphysics 1050 lOf, which seems to
afford some help in this regard. It appears to express Aristotle's
J r
view on how we are to understand the relationship between e-fZi
abstractly considered (as culminating in bodies of judgements) and
> /■
frri-tr-cr^/u^ considered from the agent's perspective.
For animals do not see in order that they may have sight,
but have sight in order that they may see. And similarly
men have the art of building that they may build, and theore¬
tical science that they may theorize; but they do not theorize
that they may have theoretical science, except those who are
learning by practice; and these do not theorize except in a
limited sense, or else they have no need to theorize. ___
poVm>S < *•*■ 1Tt fi ot " ou'Co < Se
O^X' oCt Oube>/ St-CJ6-t lX_J,
1050ai2-14.)
g
While Allan and Joachim would seem to concentrate on the
sense in which science must elaborate judgements we must be careful,
I think, not to reduce the meaning of science as Aristotle understood
37
it simply to the production of these bodies of judgements on the
cl 9
analogy, for instance, of housebuilding (1050 30). Aristotle has
here made it very clear that the actuality of the knower's poten¬
tiality resides not in any such produceable body, - rather it resides
in the activity of the agent. Aristotle makes his meaning very clear
at 1050a23-^2. He concludes that statement by saying (1050a34-36):
. . but when there is no product apart from the actuality, the
actuality is in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing
subject, and that of theorizing in the theorizing subject."
But if we are to reconcile the two perspectives we must
still work out the functional relationship between them. That is,
we must ask what specific function is discharged by the bodies of
judgements, the finite sets of oflTo$eC^&-i described in the Posterior
Analytics.
Aristotle's comment at Meta. 1050 12-14, quoted above, pro¬
vides us with a fairly clear indication of the proper way to see these
arguments, these bodies of judgements, in relation to the final
* / t. —1
of the agent. oc ^.t-At-rcoyTf-^ , he says, do in fact
theorize that they may have a theoretical science but they can not be
regarded as engaged upon true theorizing.^ It will be remembered
that in Chapter 2, ^ we saw that ot and c«c were
required to gain the experience which would free them of their imped¬
iment and thus let them reach their f-ncc-i .
But there is a further issue raised as well. That is, what
is it that constitutes the ultimate act of ✓ ? Is it perhaps
the act simply of gazing at the replicas of the real which we have
12
produced? Or, perhaps it is as Joachim puts it:
38
It is only in his speculative activities that man pursues an
'end' which is the proper 'end' of intelligence. In the
pursuit of knowledge simply for the sake of understanding -
in what Aristotle calls or jn7\pa-o^*. -
the intelligence moves freely towards the attainment, and
in the vision and enjoyment, of the truth.
On this question too Aristotle offers some direct, if not
£
entirely helpful, comment at De An. 417 28-29 when he writes: "One
who is already realizing his knowledge - he is a knower in actuality
and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g. this A."
The "knower in actuality" has a particular as the content of
his knowing. This seems the inescapeable intent of this line. The
cL 3.
same doctrine recurs explicitly at Meta 1087 lOf (and at Meta 1048 35
/ y 13
if we accept .
14
In his note on this doctrine, Ross says that it is contrary
to Aristotle's "usual view,which is that actual knowledge is of
universals. The doctrine of the Posterior Analytics cannot be under¬
stood in any other sense, and the other works as well occasionally
state the doctrine quite explicitly. De An. 417^22 . . . Meta 1039^27
. . . it is a genuine part of Aristotle's theory, though perhaps
inconsistent with another part."
It is plain that there is a real problem, if not a simple
inconsistency as Ross suggests, in this matter, and Aristotle himself,
no less than his commentators, recognises the dimensions of the diffi¬
culty. We should note for instance his manifest admission of over-
involvement at De An. 417^28-29, and his own confirmation of the
"greatest difficulty" at Meta 1087al0.^
In the face of such admissions on Aristotle's part it would
be most foolhardy to expect any simple resolution to this problem,
which, in any case lies well outside the scope of the present study.
The problem must, nonetheless, be at least examined since it seems to
39
have a direct bearing upon our understanding of what Aristotle compre-
7 /
hends under the term 'science, (^7Tda-cy/-^, and on the scope of his
scientific methodology as it is defined by that ultimate aim of
science.
Aristotle tells us that the of ^-77CrZ^^»»A.s 11/
which is not a process of building or producing bodies of judgements,
but is an activity residing in the agent, and relates, if De An.
417 28-29 is to be believed, to the particular, while we are every-
3 y
where repeatedly assured that <£-7Tt<r-tj/u>p has for its proper object a
-3
*
universal. Are we to infer then from this that has its
proper object, "the universal," while Qcr<*jy<< has a distinct object,
the particular?^ Or is it possible that both have the universal as
object, but in different ways such that, by way of contrast, Aristotle
refers to the object of as a particular.^
We have an interesting echo of this doctrine in that Aristotle
tells us that knowledge of the 'more intelligible' renders us more
'sensitive' to things that are 'less intelligible' at De An. 429 29f.
Observation of the sense-organs and their employment
reveals a distinction between the impassibility of the sen¬
sitive and that of the intellective faculty. After strong
stimulation of a sense we are less able to exercise it than
before, as e.g. in the case of a loud sound we cannot hear
easily immediately after, or in the case of a bright colour
or a powerful odour we cannot see or smell, but in the case
of mind, thought about an object that is highly intelligible
renders it more and not less able afterwards to think objects
that are less intelligible. The reason is that while the
faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is
separable from it.
Once the mind has become each set of its possible
objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used
of one who is actually a man of science (this happens when
he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative),
its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a differ¬
ent sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisi¬
tion by learning or discovery: the mind too is then able to
think itself.
40
This passage is reminiscent of the doctrine at 417a28-29. The
distinction between "less intelligible" and "more intelligible" seems
to equate generally in Aristotle to the distinction between particular
£
and universal. It may be that in the passage at 417 28-29 and in
those passages which exhibit the same doctrine Aristotle is, almost
by metonymy, referring to individual issues or ttropc^i- not specifi¬
cally covered by a man of science but which he is able to resolve by
virtue of his greater "sensitivity." At any rate, we have in this
text evidence of a psychological insight on Aristotle's part which
coincides with his earlier assertions about the relationship which
j ' ■> n - 18
obtains between <f-/T/^^/t«Kind p&» ✓.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of this immediate problem
may be, certain facts emerge concerning the general nature of
First, we see that Aristotle does in fact affirm an aim or
3 /
goal for the £-/r/in his works and it is not left implicit in
his teaching. That goal is
Further, 9e^^&7^ is not a process of building bodies of judge¬
ments but is an activity residing in the agent.
Further again, we have strong ground for believing that what¬
ever the precise object of may be, it involves something
beyond looking at the replicas the mind has produced. It involves
the attainment, as Joachim has said, of the truth.
We are now, perhaps, in a position to suggest that it is
ot ^AT^TWrv^who are charged with the task of building the bodies of
judgements through which they come to the full possession of potentia
secunda at which point, if they will it, they may proceed to -Tv.
However, in a comment applicable to the discussion here D. W.
19
Hamlyn observes: "There is a constant tendency for Aristotle to run
41
thinking and knowing together, as his invocation of an 'activity'
sense of 'knowing' reveals. . . . Aristotle's confusions in this
20
passage are evident enough, but they are endemic in his thought."
It is manifestly true that Aristotle does "run thinking and
knowing together." It is, further, true that this practice confuses
us. What is perhaps not so clear is whether this is evidence of
confused - i.e. sloppy or careless - thinking on Aristotle's part, or
proceeds rather from a conscious doctrine which is, indeed, "endemic
in his thought."
We have already examined, in Chapter 2, several instances
where this tendency is manifested. We noted Aristotle's unwillingness
(or inability) to elaborate logical criteria to define the apodeictic
syllogism which took no account of the psychological condition of the
knower.
The strength of this tendency may be seen on those few
occasions when Aristotle comes to recognise some sense to the term
knowing which is to be somehow distinguished from the active exercise
of thought. For on these occasions Aristotle still does nothing to
distinguish knowing from thinking. For example, Physics 247^11 reads:
". . . we do not claim an intelligent understanding until our thinking
21
has come to a stand." Aristotle sees the very etymological roots
of the term as lying within the process of thought coming to rest.
Again in the image of the "rout" in Post. An. 2,19 and of the "race¬
course" in E.N.1,4 the image is of a complete integration of the two.
De An. 407 32 has even more significance for our attempt to
discover just how fundamental was this tendency and whether it must
be ranked as confusion or doctrine.
"Further, thinking has more resemblance to coming to rest
or arrest than to a movement; the same may be said of inferring
✓ \ > \ r~ » / \ c \~\ ' \ "
\fo oL OTo i/ QC L^onOi/ K* <. c
The Oxford translation obscures somewhat the impact of this
passage for the final word is not <, but <?-</» •
The syllogism, the expressed implication, is characterized itself in
terms of the mind's thinking process and is not conceived of by
Aristotle as something that can exist isolated from the thinking mind.
But if the tendency is real and fundamental it remains none¬
theless confusion unless we can discern some element in Aristotle's
teaching which will resolve the problem.
It seems clear that any account of knowledge must refer both
to the distinctive object of knowledge and to the psychology of
knowing. However we must attempt to see what balance Aristotle
strikes between considerations drawn from these two aspects of know¬
ledge in designing his scientific methodology. We must try to see
how he integrates these two aspects.
On the one hand e-TTiris that rest-like moment in the
process of thought upon which will ensue (if only the thinker will
22
wish it) the activity of .
On the other hand &t?<u-ztj/s *7 has as its proper object that
-> /
which cannot be other than it is. f-mis defined as the
attainment of that cause which makes that which is incapable of being
23
other than it is.
It appears that Aristotle has two alternative ways of des-
> ,
cribing <?y7?<r-^^ which, while they may not be obviously contradic¬
tory, equally are not obviously identical. Do these two differing
modes of describing reflect a change in Aristotle's
thought or represent merely alternate descriptions appropriate to
43
differing specific areas of discussion? After all, each statement is
not a total definition.
Or are they differing modes at all? In a sense the problem
has the appearance of being contrived. Of course, it may be pointed
out, the moment in the process of thought which constitutes ^
is itself the attainment of that cause which renders what is incapable
of being other than it is (be that cause "identical with the essential
24
nature of the thing or distinct from it").
But it is not quibbling to draw attention to the ways in which
Aristotle characterizes t-rr ^ for there is a real area of con¬
fusion here and recognition of the source of that confusion carries
with it implications for our understanding of the proper role of
Aristotle's methodology, as depicted in the opening chapters of Post.
An. I, within his scientific and philosophic practice.
Is Aristotle's methodology, as presented in the Posterior
Analytics, designed as the vehicle of necessity on the assumption that
the ultimate and defining act of science is the exposition of scien¬
tific truth in such a way that its necessity is fully manifested? Or,
is Aristotle's methodology designed to serve some further objective
25
as well? That is, is the methodology designed so to enable the
thinker to acquire the "replica of the real" that he is thus enabled
2 6
to confront the "real" at will, whenever he pleases, and enabled to
recognise and comprehend the "real" itself as portrayed by, rather
27
than contained within, that "replica."
We are, then, searching for some element, implicit or explicit
in Aristotle's teachings which will help us to understand how Aristotle
integrates the two aspects of knowledge referred to earlier. Our
search begins to yield results when we recognise that, for Aristotle,
44
> ' C'L i /
tf/Tr r-tjy r) is everywhere a and, more specifically, an .
In the Categories, for instance, Aristotle affirms that, as a ff/c, ,
J /■
6-frt yj may quite properly be predicated in two categories, that
of quality and that of relation. The doctrine occurs quite generally
in Aristotle's writings.So firmly is the fact that lrr«is
(/
a a part of Aristotle's conventional apparatus that Bonitz
29 *' ■> -s J J
comments: "Itaque exempla imprimis (-/Tiret ~<at~c«z.<-
sunt."
_ , 1 / ) * 30 _ . .
Further, of course, frm irHj is an • It is because
> > <f , * '
Aristotle holds that c-rrfrry/**, is a £-?<$> , an , that he
is able to integrate the two aspects of knowledge into coherent epis-
temological and methodological doctrines. Once we perceive the signi-
(y
ficance of the concept of in this regard it is possible to
recognise at once that, for Aristotle, knowledge can never consist in
31
a statement but must always be the possibility of a stating.
It is in this context that we can most readily understand why
Aristotle uses the term <rcaC*yol«. to describe the way the learner is
"acted upon" in his gradual %7ft from potentia prima to that
point when, having fully secured potentia secunda, he can be called
either an &/T/ in the true sense of the word or a $&xo^>cu) i/
(since it is only an act of the will that separates these two). (De An.
417a30-b5 cf. 429b5)
The same term (cri*j ][Y» ) is used to describe the process
involved in the acquisition of the grounds of the moral virtues at
£
E.N. 1151 15f. It is practice of virtue which, produced by habituation
da - 115lal9), engenders the right principle so that the man
becomes good. Aristotle's conception of the acquisition of intellec¬
tual virtue is parallel to his conception of the acquisition of the
moral virtues. We become good by doing good actions. We learn
45
sciences by doing the actions appropriate to the sciences. The refer¬
ence to the teaching of the principles of mathematics is suggestive
(115ial6-18). We have already seen examples of such people in our
examination of cc rr^*Toi/ in Chapter 2. But, while the
two processes are parallel, there are very significant differences as
will be seen.
> ,
However, once we recognise that is, for Aristotle,
a we can perceive why it is that knowing and thinking are insep¬
arable in his teaching.
If one starts with the assumption that knowing is character¬
ized primarily by the ability "to produce a body of judgements which,
in their connexion with each other, reflect the necessary connexions
between substances and properties in the real world" then it is a very
simple metonymy indeed to equate the judgements so constructed with
knowledge itself - to see knowledge as a 'replica of the real.' The
sophists do this (Post.An.74^23). Once this equation is made it then
becomes possible to separate the intellectual activity of the knower
(which we call thinking) from the content of his mind (which we call,
by metonymy, knowledge). The separation has already been made, effec¬
tively, in the uttering of the judgements. It is then easy to insist
that thinking and knowing be kept distinct and separate so no "confu¬
sion" may occur.
The situation is radically transformed however if one starts,
as does Aristotle, with the assumption that knowledge is a certain
quality of the mind in virtue of which the possessor of that quality
32 , 33
relates to the real in a way that is marked by absolute fixedness
34
and certitude. The difference in the two assumptions lies in the
fact that the latter does not presume that the requisite certitude is
a function of the form of the judgements uttered or of their relation
46
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to the real, but leaves open the possibility that the mind may be
able to achieve certitude in some other way. There is no scope in
this case for the transfer of epithets as there was under the former
assumption, and consequently there is no possibility for the separation
of thinking and knowing.
Language, in such a context, now plays a somewhat larger role
than that of the medium for building bodies of judgements or replicas
of the real. Rather, language is now conceived of as that human
activity which, other things being equal, enables a human capacity
(the capacity to know) to grow (£-rr< a~tJ » o~VjUt > )
to actuality.
To be sure it is the mark of the philosopher to demonstrate
36 ^ ,37
things, and science is certainly the <^£*5 4/re> but these
characteristics belong in virtue of the fact that they proceed from
3 8
someone whose undemonstrated statements deserve our attention.
In returning, however, to the parallel noted above between
the mode of acquisition of the moral virtues and the mode of acquisi¬
tion of the intellectual virtues we must attempt to specify the
differences between teaching and habituation.
The general Aristotelian doctrine concerning the acquisition
of the moral virtues is summarized at the beginning of the Nicomachean
39
Ethics Book 2.
It is Aristotle's clear doctrine that the moral virtues are
acquired through habituation. But the mode of acquisition of the
intellectual virtues is not quite so clear. Aristotle says: ^ fxtv
Vo\s\ Tl K V-1 Co o 6-K HZo^c ywfrrxts /<Ui
\ )/ / j ' ' f , ifO.
»■) StoTn-f .N. 1103al5—17)
Certain things are clear. First, like the moral virtues, the
47
intellectual virtues are acquired not<r*yyt. Secondly,<bc&c<<rrt»t'r)t4
plays the role vis-a-vis the acquisition of the intellectual virtues
which corresponds to the role played by habituation in the moral
Or
virtues in that it induces a not present at the beginning.
41
Further, all virtues, both the intellectual and the moral, are
e,c 42
That is all virtues are both qualities and relations and
43
thus exhibit a certain potentiality vis-a-vis the for the
performance of which they render their possessors capable.
The intellectual virtues are acquired, and thus in their case,
as distinct from those faculties which are *-k/c-7j, the act precedes
the potency. We acquire the intellectual virtues, as we do the moral
44
virtues, by first exercising them. But this is clearly not to say
that they are acquired by habituation. It is by that they
are acquired. What then does it mean, in the case of the intellectual
virtues, that the act precedes the potency?
At E.N.1129 llf, Aristotle points up the difference between
45
the sciences and the other states of character.
For the same is not true of the sciences and the faculties
as of states of character. A faculty or a science which is
one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but
a state of character which is one of two contraries does
not produce the contrary results; e.g. as a result of health
we do not do what is the opposite of healthy, but only what
is healthy . . .
is not a training to respond to the 'real' in a
predetermined manner, as habituation trains us to respond to a chal¬
lenge to e.g. health, in a "healthy" way, or to a moral challenge to
46
justice in a "just" way.
trains the mind to cope, in words, with contraries
as and when the contraries manifest themselves. The nub-of the
( )3 /
difference between an 6f)L<rirnur) and the other states lies
48
in the fact that an efTt-rCtop y, unlike the other states
is fLfC*. and hence (Eh_N. 1129a 13—14; Meta 1046b7-12; 1048a8-10)
of contraries.
Since an i-mcrrvj^^ is of contraries, and since it is impossible
for the same thing to act in contrary ways at the same time, it is
required that some further element resolve the impasse. This resolu¬
tion lies in the operation of or 7T^ooti^crin.^ (Meta 1048ail; 1046^
21-22).
2 r
Now clearly the £-*-<.which Aristotle has in mind, at
Meta 1046b3f are the productive, not the theoretical ^.atand we
may assume that it is these too which are uppermost in his mind in
Meta 9,5 and even at E.N.1129 6f cited above.
But the theoretical sciences, no less than the practical, are
defined in terms of . Hence they, too, as Aristotle tells us at
1129 14, relate to contrary objects. We have already noted several
47
passages where desire is given the function of making possible the
transition from potentia secunda to S. Any science is of con¬
traries. Man requires the operation of desire to motivate his choice
to contemplate the truth which is in terms of one side of a set of
contraries. Truth and error are to be distinguished.
But we must have some grounds upon which our desiderative
48
choice may assert one set of contraries to the exclusion of another.
- ci
At Rhetoric 1355 35ff, Aristotle has occasion to reassure us
as we stand confronted by contrariety either in terms of practice or
of theory.
No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic
and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite
conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts
do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views.
49
No; things that are true and things that are better are, by
their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier
to believe in.
This is not simply a naive reliance on "the facts will out,"
but, as we shall see in Chapter 5 below, a direct appeal to the
rigorous critical analysis of theories in the face of the phenomena
which constitute the prime context of .
£>c IktirAiZ&h does not, as does habituation, address itself to
the training of desire. The opening lines of the Metaphysics make it
clear that no such training is needed since the appropriate desire is
3.
present "by nature." "All men by nature desire to know." (980 21)
Si &c<ri<6^\u*does not constitute a training of the appetites
for knowledge. Rather it is a provision of the context wherein those
trained in language, i.e. those trained in handling contraries and in
3. b
resolving the confusions that confront man (Post.An.72 35- 4), are
invited critically to analyse the accounts of the teacher and thus
provide the grounds for their desiderative choice to enable them to
CHAPTER IV
I lo(L S f" LtX~~
In the introduction to his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics,
Burnet calls attention to the role of the Analytics in providing
"culture" and comments: "With (Aristotle)the man of culture is above
all things the arbiter of method. He is the judge of how much preci¬
sion is fairly to be expected in any enquiry (E.N.1094^23), and in
the Metaphysics we are told that it shows want of culture not to know
£
what can be demonstrated and what can not." (Meta.1006 6)
At Metaphysics 1005^1f. Aristotle, commenting upon the preten¬
sions of certain physicists, writes: "And the attempts of some who
discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted ( Z~^ $
< -V ) _ 0 ' b
Oi*' Tfouoyt S °ijrb b e-^e-cr-^ac c » 1005 3), are due to a want of
training in logic ( ^ * & tt~^. c ot w'W ^ovl k o ujo— \ ^
1005^3-4); for they should know these things already when they come
to a special study, and not be enquiring into them while they are
pursuing it/ (1005^2-5)^
Burnet's brief treatment of the nature and importance of
TToLc&eui- is clearly correct. It suggests some important areas for
further exploration. Specifically, we are led to attempt a more pre¬
cise understanding of the role of the "arbiter of method." We might
ask, for instance, how extensive the arbitration is to be. Also, in
view of the fact that Aristotle clearly regards as that
training in logic provided by the Analytics (cf. Meta.1005^4), we must
ask which lessons or techniques taught by the Analytics act as the
50
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grounds for the arbitration.
On this latter issue Burnet gives a good summary of Aristotle
/
expressed views. What the derives from his logical
training is a knowledge of "what can be demonstrated and what can not
4
A little later Burnet points out that the man of culture can also
tell us that "every science must have a starting point."
This of course leaves considerable room for further enquiry.
Is the 77>-7rv<0^ simply aware of the general fact that he
should not expect everything to be proven, and should not, therefore,
be surprised when he finds certain propositions given without proof,
especially the initial starting points of each science.
The rather vague and general admonitions which we meet in the
opening pages of many of Aristotle's works would suggest that it is
just this general sensitivity which is intended. Certainly Aristotle
repeatedly makes it clear that he expects at least this general aware¬
ness before he can proceed.^
If the were to have any more advanced com¬
prehension of the implications of these principles for the actual
structure and methodological development of a science we would assume
that he possesses something which Aristotle might call a "special"
, (E.N. 1094b27-1095a2; De Part.An. 639a10f) .
Yet we should ask whether Aristotle's comments on the
suggest something rather more than simply a
docile, acquiescent student. There are certain indications, which we
will examine below, that Aristotle intends the man of general culture
to be genuinely critical; that he should not simply suspend his
methodological expectations, but rather that he should be equipped
with the appropriate methodological expectations and expect the
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lecturer to conform to them.^
It is beyond question of course that Aristotle does expect
that the man of general culture should, at the barest minimum, possess
a general sensitivity to the limits of method. It is quite clear,
>
moreover, that Aristotle's intention for TT^t^triu is not to instill
a general "culture" as one might interpret the word on Isocrates'
g
lips. Burnet is quite right when he says that ". . . Aristotle means
something far more definite than this." It would seem possible that
on certain occasions at least he means something more definite even
than a knowledge of the distinction between demonstrable and indemon¬
strable.
It will be noticed that Aristotle's remarks about ^
are very often addressed to "listeners" or to those "accepting the
truth.
This is not at all surprising. These texts arise in the
opening sections of their respective courses of teaching and are
cautionary preliminaries, on Aristotle's part, warning his students
that they must accept the conventions of the didactic context. We
shall examine more closely in Chapter 5 what these conventions might
be. Aristotle's insistence on the "listener's" critical awareness of
how the science should proceed would suggest that he regards it as
important to the communication between teacher and student. The
actual structure of the method would seem to provide a point of shared
understanding. The Analytics teaches people to "listen" and to
"learn" by providing them with the tools requisite to learning.
If the is an arbiter of method deriving
his skill from the Analytics we must ask whether he is expected to be
competent to judge whether those propositions asserted as indemon-
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strable are genuinely indemonstrable (not whether they are true, but
whether they are demonstrable); and further whether the lecturer's
demonstrables have been properly demonstrated,^ (apart from the truth
12
or falsity of what is asserted).
The fpnroLc fxis critical. But there seem to be two
<' v , c >
types of this critical ability; e-^^r-ro^ St
yiVti'v^ jC^c TTooCo </ e-trcn/ ICf cn/j . ' £-/c«.r rci/ jUts y^
0 rrt~!T+>-i 7T*-f < 77~it>''fTktrrcx*.'S(-oy.(-v*c>% "Now each man judges
well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the
man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject,
and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge
in general." (E.N.1094b27-1095a2)
If we turn to the opening paragraphs of the De Partibus
Animalium we see that the Se-ojUfr/o^ is not necessarily a
student. A. L. Peck's translation is as follows:
There are, as it seems, two ways in which a person may
be competent in respect of any study or investigation, whether
it be a noble one or a humble: he may have either what can
rightly be called a scientific knowledge of the subject; or
he may have what is roughly described as an educated person's
competence, and therefore be able to judge correctly which
parts of an exposition are satisfactory and which are not.
That, in fact, is the sort of person we take the "man of
general education" to be; his "education" consists in his
ability to do this. In this case, however, we expect to find
in the one individual the ability to judge of almost all sub¬
jects, whereas in the other case the ability is confined to
some special science; for of course it is possible to possess
this ability for a limited field only. Hence it is clear
that in the investigation of Nature, or Natural Science, as
in every other, there must first of all be certain defined
rules by which the acceptability of the method of exposition
may be tested, apart from whether the statements made repre¬
sent the truth or not. I mean, for instance, should we take
each single species severally by turn (such as Man, or Lion,
or Ox, or whatever it may be), and define what we have to say
about it, in and by itself; or should we first establish as
our basis the attributes that are common to all of them be¬
cause of some common character which they possess? (De
Partibus Animalium 639al~19)
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Aristotle tells us that we can approach any subject as a
scientist or as a TTerro'c * When he proceeds to examine
the nature of the scientist's approach, however, he says that the
scientist exercises the same critical capacity as the
( tof *£cc> 1/ t^o/Tos T~u> 639S11) except that he does so over
a narrower field. (639 8-12) The scientist seems in a very similar
situation to the one who possesses special culture as described at
E.N. 1094^3^-1095aX quoted above.
Yet there seems a certain difficulty here. Aristotle has
just described the ri~h-Tr*.c ^05 as the man who can judge
correctly which parts of an exposition are satisfactory and which are
not. Now he wishes to describe the scientist as having the same
capacity but over a limited area. We will examine shortly a text
from the Eudemian Ethics which would depict the true philosopher as
engaging on a careful critique of his own work. But here in the
De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle suggests certain conditions which
must exist if his description of the two approaches to science is
accurate. Both the scientist and the man of general culture, the
p-err*.<-£e-o, must assure themselves that, from a methodolo¬
gical point of view they have expressed the subject of their enquiry
in an appropriate manner, apart from considerations of truth. (639 14)
(/
There must be certain o^ot . We shall have occasion to consider this
issue in the final chapter of this study.
Aristotle addresses himself to setting up these o^oc at
three points: 639a15-639b6; 644a23-644b15; 645a36-645b14. In all
these discussions the principle consideration is economy of presen¬
tation. At all costs one must avoid being otTo^folTo^ Kioci fCoiKvoS.
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(644 35- 1) He concedes that it might be best if we were to deal
with the attributes to be examined species by species but there would
be so much repetition that this would be "unreasonable and long
winded." It would be more reasonable, more economical, to consider
the attributes as they belong in common. It will be recalled that in
the Posterior Analytics (98 20f) Aristotle envisages both methods of
exposition as equally appropriate and shows no sign of either having
the edge as regards the truth being expressed.
The interests of economical treatment and exposition are
u
served by establishing the o^o c appropriate to the subject genus
in question. If it so happens, as in much of biological science,
that the subject matter exhibits its properties in a somewhat regular
fashion (many properties in common, others unique and highly specific),
then we are able to adjudicate the appropriate groups by inspection
of the "shape" of the attributes in the light of the principle of
13
"excess and defect." (De Part.An.1,4) The subject matter of ethics,
for instance, is not quite so regular (E.N.1,3) in the way its pro¬
perties belong.
Clearly the establishment of the is the preliminary
delimitation of the subject and is, therefore, the selection of the
perspective from which it will be analysed and expounded. As such
the job presumably falls to the man who can judge best the subject in
b sl
hand, the man of special culture, the scientist. (E.N.1094 27-1095 2;
De Part.An.639ai0-15)14
Thus we can understand Aristotle's meaning in describing the
scientist himself as the one who enjoys the capacity to "judge
correctly which parts of an exposition are satisfactory and which are
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not," applied over a limited field. Not only must he constantly check
his own work (E.E.1216^35f - see below) but he must also examine which
of a range of possible formulations of the subject are appropriate to
his needs.
But the man of general culture is not here described as simply
suspending his methodological expectations. It is his role fo 9^.c.
*i/crCo-^uo$ "C< <, irrrohi p r) 9 5-6)
His critique is an informed one in so far as method is concerned -
£
leaving truth to one side. (639 14-15)
There is a passage in the Eudemian Ethics, at 1216^35, which
seems to reveal what arbitration is expected from the 'TftrlTUc
the man of general culture.
Now in every enquiry there is a difference between
philosophic and unphilosophic argument; therefore we should
not think even in political philosophy that the sort of
consideration which not only makes the nature of the thing
evident but also its cause is superfluous; for such consid¬
eration is in every enquiry the truly philosophic method.
But this needs much caution. For there are some who,
through thinking it to be the mark of a philosopher to make
no arbitrary statement but always to give a reason, often
unawares give reasons foreign to the subject and idle - this
they do sometimes from ignorance, sometimes because they
are charlatans - by which reasons even men experienced and
able to act are trapped by those who neither have nor are
capable of having practical and constructive intelligence.
And this happens to them from want of culture; for inabil¬
ity in regard to each matter to distinguish reasonings
appropriate to the subject from those foreign to it is want
of culture. And it is well to criticize separately the
reason that gives the cause and the conclusion both because
of what has just been said, viz. that one should attend not
merely to what is inferred by argument, but often attend
more to perceived facts - whereas now when men are unable
to see a flaw in the argument they are compelled to believe
what has been said - and because often that which seems to
have been shown by the argument is true indeed, but not for
the cause which the argument assigns; for one may prove
truth by means of falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.
In commenting on this passage,''""' Allan writes: "Now this fails
to prepare the reader for the most singular feature of the method
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which the author actually uses ..." Allan then proceeds to describe
that method as consisting in the presentation of "a mathematical
pattern of deduction."
And yet it would seem possible that a reader, or a "listener,"
who was a -fr£-ma.c in Aristotle's sense of the term, would
have been so fully aware of the conventions as to be prepared in fact
for the method which followsFor what Aristotle describes in this
passage is the critical application of the techniques inculcated by
the Analytics. He is at pains to distinguish the apparent from the
real philosophic method. The mock-philosopher will simply adduce
arguments. The true philosopher adduces arguments as a critical
analysis of his position. (1217 lOf) The true philosophic method is
the one which not only makes evident the nature of the thing but also
its cause. (1216^38-39) The true philosopher institutes an examina¬
tion both of his conclusion and of the grounds for these conclusions.
(1217al0-ll) When people are unable to (a13) they are com¬
pelled to believe whatever they hear. Above all they must be equipped
to separate a specious from the appropriate cause. (1217 15f)
There is compression in this passage, as everywhere in
Aristotle's writings, and here Aristotle relies, perhaps too heavily,
^ 3.
upon his reference to o(Vc*<. St-vr-i*.S (1217 7) to summon up the conven¬
tional apparatus recalled by that term.
On the one hand, tT^c ^ c- ..«/ j_s here represented as that capacity
which would enable men of general experience and proven effectiveness
wittt£»<k MM1
to evaluate or judge the doctrines put: forth by a true philosopher
and to discriminate them from the sophistries of the charlatans. Yet
the "TTcxc bf-u-; is also represented here as providing the critical appar¬
atus which the philosopher himself must use if he is to avoid self
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deception and attain ^ (a6—7) .
Aristotle has not inserted a detailed exposition of what we
are to expect from him in the study which follows since he has already
laid the grounds for those expectations in the Analytics and he
expects his listeners to be . We should expect what
we in fact get - a critical deduction of the facts and an exposition
of the causes in a manner which enables us to perceive the indemon¬
strable grounds for the demonstrable.
In the texts so far examined in this chapter, the role of the
Analytics in providing a T7^c&r<^. has been seen to have a predomi¬
nantly critical character. It is suggested that the deductive proce¬
dures of the Analytics constitute means whereby the philosopher-
scientiest-listeners may engage in a reduction to syllogistic form^
of their own or others' views on a particular subject. The deductive
procedures have not in these texts been presented as that structure
whereby these views are confirmed or validated; rather as the structure
through which inconsistencies in the accounts may be discovered and
rooted out. The role of the syllogism seems not so much to be a
constructive but rather a corrective one. It is seen not so much as
a medium to insight as a barrier to deception. And yet such a repre¬
sentation of its role in Aristotle's thought is partial and therefore
incorrect left as it is. For it does discharge a constructive role
as a medium for insight.
At De Anima. 402^21f, Aristotle tells us that "... the
knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted
by an acquaintance with its properties."^ ^ q jCeZ-*-
TT^oS ro e-crc-ti/
18
Aristotle specifies that it is apodeictic knowledge of the
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accidents to which he is referring. (402 16-21; 402 25)
Finally, he indicates how it is that the demonstration of the
accidents largely promotes the knowledge of the essential nature of
the substance. (402^22-403^)
For, when we are able to give an account conformable to
experience of all or most of the properties of a substance,
we shall be in the most favorable position to say something
worth saying about the essential nature of the subject; in
all demonstration a definition of the essence is required
as a starting-point, so that definitions which do not enable
us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to
facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously,
one and all, be dialectical and futile.
Before examining Aristotle's meaning in these last few lines
it would be as well to note that earlier in the De Anima., Aristotle
has made a couple of oblique references to the demonstrative syllogism
19 a
as a means of hunting the essence. At 402 15, he refers to demon¬
stration, the single method appropriate to the study of derived proper¬
ties, by way of exemplifying the kind of single method he would wish
a. ' ' c r
to achieve in the study of essence. Again at 402 19, osrre£*<-<. is
canvassed (together with division) as one of the methods which, even
if its utility to this end were manifest, would still be hedged with
hesitations and doubts.
Aristotle's emphasis of considerable difficulty in attaining
any such method must here be re-emphasized. There is no single method
for securing the essence. What Aristotle does offer is a procedure,
the truly philosophic procedure as it is called in the passage from
the Eudemian Ethics just examined, which must be applied with the
greatest care and which leaves wide scope for charlatanism against
which we must be on our guard. Further, the method is in no way a
proof of essence but it is capable of providing a very great help
(402^21),and it constitutes the grounds for enabling us to secure
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the "most favorable position to say something worth saying about the
essential nature of that subject" (402^22-402^25). This is all
Aristotle ever claims for the method; and it is all that is being
claimed for it, in this study, on Aristotle's behalf.
We must turn, however, to that passage where Aristotle
explains how the demonstration of the accidents largely promotes
knowledge of the essential nature of the substance.
•>
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(402b22-403a2)
The specific and immediate operation which renders us able to
talk most meaningfully about essence is not the demonstrating itself
so much as the use of the demonstration in a particular manner. The
J
c ( ' \v/ x 20demonstration must permit us to o(rre acdo ~Cy\ y <r-*~ •
21
The phrase indicates a process of offering an account which mani¬
festly conforms to the phenomena. The process, then, which enables
us to see the essence is the process of examining to see how the
) r
y/To&^if-t-<j manifest their conformity to the phenomena. Aristotle
b sl
indicates this procedure at De An. 402 26-403 2. Expressing posi¬
tively, what Aristotle expresses negatively, we might say that since
the starting point of any apodeixis which succeeds in enabling us to
discover the derived properties and facilitates our understanding of
them is itself the definition of essence we have, in that successful
process o f c/rfo&c <fc > a guarantee that our definition of essence
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was right.
We might say this but we would most assuredly be wrong in
doing so. For Aristotle chooses, very carefully, to express himself
in the negative and what he says is not transformable. He does not
suggest that there is any such guarantee. He expresses himself in
the negative to avoid giving any false impression. All he claims is
that what we achieve in considering the discoveries of the phenomena
made possible by our demonstration of the accidents provides us with
a comprehensive insight into the essence whose definition made that
22 23
demonstration possible. All we can hope for is a genuinely elenctic
situation but, as we shall see, this hope is capable of attainment and
is for Aristotle at least, the sufficient key to methodological proce¬
dure.
For Aristotle the term TT*t denotes varying degrees of
familiarity with the principles governing the logic taught in the
Analytics, and varying degrees of competence with the logical tech¬
niques to be learned there. Often the term may mean no more than a
general sensitivity to the distinction between demonstrable and indemon¬
strable. On other occasions it seems to denote a critical competence
based upon a mature command of the principles and techniques of the
logic and deployed as a rigorous test of the methods used by any
scientist.
The rrc~rr<*-<. is the arbiter of method rather than
content in a science since it is method which binds scientist and
student in the search for the truth.
CHAPTER V
Sc e$d f /{o£?*C<u.
"Pour Aristote," says Roland-Gosselin,* "la definition est
au centre meme de la science. Elle doit exprimer les natures, et,
/ / /




Augustin Mansion strikes the same note: . . le souci de
saisir ces essences et d'en etablir la definition se manifeste tout
au long de la carriere d'Aristote. De plus, dans la construction
formelle du syllogisme servant a la deduction des proprietes, la
y / f
definition doit figurer necessairement dans les premisses dont elle
est ainsi un element indispensable."
There can be little quarrel with these comments. Yet they
signal a problem in our understanding of Aristotle's method, for, as
Mansion himself goes on to point out, there seems to us to be an
inconsistency between Aristotle's devotion to essence and his method¬
ological concern with the establishing of properties.
Mansion treats this tension in Aristotle's thought as part of
the evidence which must be examined in attempting to piece together a
chronological account of the origin and development of the syllogism
and of Aristotle's conception of science.
4
In the introduction to his paper he writes:
Si l'on met ensemble toutes ces donn^es en essayant
d'introduire une succession chronologique dans les
temoignages qui paraissent se contredire, on pourra en
tirer la consequence que, si la critique du procede de
division n'a pas contribue k la decouverte du syllogisme,
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elle a du moins eu pour resultat de faire substituer le
syllogisme a la division comme moyen de prouver une defi¬
nition. Mais, apres cela, une critique plus poussee du
syllogisme utilise a cette meme fin a abouti a un resultat
encore plus important: non seulement elle a fait rejeter
le procede syllogistique comme susceptible d'etablir une
definition, mais elle a amene Aristotea exploiter dans un
autre sens les virtualites contenues dans le syllogisme.
En deplacant ainsi le centre d'interet de toute la con¬
struction scientifique, en lui assignant un objet repondant
mieux aux possibilites du raisonnement syllogistique, il a
modifie' et elargi sa theorie de la science.
There is no reason in this study either to question or to
raise objections to Mansion's treatment. It does, however, suggest a
further issue which Mansion does not consider in his article and which
we must consider. Mansion speaks of Aristotle's having been led to
"exploiter dans un autre sens les virtualites continues dans le
syllogisme."
It will be suggested here that one of the "virtualites" of
the syllogism which Aristotle develops is the way in which the
apodeictic exposition of a science can, in certain circumstances,
5 •» '
provide the grounds for an intuitive recognition of the . It
will be argued that once Aristotle realized that a definition of
essence could not be made to emerge from prior premisses, he turned
to the demonstration of essential properties not only as a goal
desirable in its own right but also in the realisation that, if care¬
fully used, the apodeictic syllogism can enable the demonstrator to
j '
attain a fuller grasp of the J(p>^occ of the science.
It is significant, perhaps, to note that Aristotle himself
does not appear conscious of any profound methodological tension
between the need to define essences on the one hand and to demonstrate
properties on the others. He blithely attributes to Socrates, the
founder of definitional method, the search for syllogism. (Meta.
1078b23-24)
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It is, of course, entirely true that in the Analytics Aristotle
expends considerable energy in examining, and rejecting, the notion
that essence may be demonstrated. It is also true that in the Analytics
Aristotle casts definition of essence in the role of a means to an
end, so to speak. Definition of essence is that which makes demon¬
stration of the properties possible. These are, without question,
the doctrines of the Analytics.
And yet there are texts^ which would seem to suggest that for
Aristotle the attainment of the definition of the essence is not to
be understood solely as a step towards the demonstration of the pro¬
perties.^ At Meta. 1031^6-7, for instance, Aristotle comments: ". . .
there is knowledge of each thing only when we know its essence."
£
Again at Meta. 1064 19-20: "And since each of the sciences must some¬
how know the 'what' and use this as a principle, we must not fail to
observe how the natural philosopher should define things and how he
g
should state the formula of essence." Mansion comments upon these
texts: "C'est la doctrine des Analytiques mais ici la necessite de
connaitre la definition est soulignee davantage que le role qui lui
est devolu dans la deduction (subsequente) des proprietes."
There is a certain real ambivalence in Aristotle's own manner
of speaking of these issues. Aristotle does not seem to be aware of
himself as caught in any inconsistency, or as forced to cite one or
the other, demonstration of properties or definition of essence, as
the ultimate goal of science.
9
We observe in the Nicomachean Ethics as elsewhere the way in
which Aristotle treats the relations between the and the demon¬
stration in terms of the way in which their structure is interdepen¬
dent. Aristotle seems almost to infer that there must be <-
because syllogism is possible and to treat the not as means but
65
as the defining ground. The same reciprocal relation is manifest for
example at Post. An. 1,6, especially 74^13-15.
What is clear is that in the Analytics, Aristotle advances a
deductive method. What is not clear is the context in which Aristotle
intended that method to be used. There are grounds for suspecting
that we will find, in tracing that context, the grounds for Aristotle'
manifest lack of concern to separate out these two operations and his
insistence upon the unity and finitude de la connaissance scientifique
One very significant element in the context of this whole
issue is the notion of essence itself and the tentative attempts of
Aristotle's predecessors to develop a method in science which makes
full use of the concept of essence.
Roland-Gosselin holds a view similar in many respects to that
advanced by Mansion. In his analysis of the alleged dilemma he raises
an issue of paramount importance.
. . . sur quoi fonder une synthese necessaire? Telle
est la question, en definitive, a laquelle Aristote ne
reussit pas a repondre. L'abstraction intellectuelle, 1'in¬
tuition du vo'ui n'est certaine qu'en regard des idees sim¬
ples et des principes. Des qu'il s'agit de concepts plus
determines et de les organiser suivant leur comprehension, -
puisqu'il n'y a pas de recours possible a une progression
synthetique purement rationelle - 1'intelligence est en
dependance etroite des donnees de 1'experience, et, sans un
principe qui sache discerner le necessaire, elle restera
prisonniere de l'empirisme. Ce principe Aristote ne l'a
^ ^11
pas enonce.L±
It is, of course, true that Aristotle tells us repeatedly
12
that definition is not demonstrable. It is also true, however,
that Aristotle tells us that certain knowledge of the definition is
13
attainable through i/pf 5 , through 1' abstraction intellectuelle.
Yet Roland-Gosselin is quite right in pointing out that vooj
by itself is insufficient when faced with "concepts plus determinees"
and with the need to "les organizer suivant leur comprehension."
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Aristotle himself seems to deny there is any "single and general
method for solving the problem of essence."^ Roland-Gosselin says:
". . . il n'y a pas de recours possible "a une progression synthetique
purement rationelle." Aristotle makes much the same point himself at
De Part. An. 640a6-8.
But Aristotle too regards VoC^ , by itself, as insufficient
16
to the task and insists, as we have seen earlier, that "1'intelli¬
gence est en dependance etroibtdes donne'es de 1' experience." (We
shall examine shortly the way in which Aristotle sees o< C*c ,
as a prime condition for human learning. Further we will have reason
to suggest that and \/o 1/5 rest upon the careful elaboration
of the conditions for insight. As Aristotle reminds us:^ ". . . it
is an advantage to advance to that which is more intelligible. For
learning proceeds for all in this way - through that which is less
intelligible by nature to that which is more intelligible"
/ C f' ^ . - . « c / j y , \
ye*.??) O U!T IC y Iy CM c. TTmiTC OlM. (.IMi/ yy itjo I fA.fi 1/ <JV(Ttr<.
yyty^i1029 3—5.)
Roland-Gosselin indicates his dissatisfaction with this state
of affairs in which experience is left as the basis of the theory
(. . . "restera prisoniere de 1'empirisme"}since Aristotle has not
enunciated any principle "qui sache discerner le necessaire, •"
Yet an appeal against this sentence is in order. It was
suggested earlier that Aristotle's subscription to the theory of
essence should be examined to see whether the particular perspective
he adopts affects the use he sees for the syllogism. That same prin¬
ciple might be seen to acquit him, as well, of the charge here laid
by Roland-Gosselin.
18
In writing of Aristotle's commitment to the theory of
essences D. J. Allan comments: "(Aristotle) fails to consider how far
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the distinctions implied in the structure of language can be taken as
a safe guide to the categories of thought, but this was excusable at
a time when there was no comparative study of languages. As a contri¬
bution to the logic of science, the whole discussion misfires, because
Aristotle's 'essences' are as otiose, and remote from the real require¬
ments of science, whether physical or mathematical, as the Platonic
forms which he intended them to replace. . . . The whole later pro-
n19
gress of science is a commentary on this."
Professor Allan's historical judgement need not be read,
however, as a categorical rejection of the possible utility of the
theory of essences within a science differently defined. That is, we
must, I believe, examine the possible role of Aristotle's conception
of essence within a science defined as Aristotle himself might define
that science.
£
Ongle's Oxford translation of De Part. An. 642 13f reads as
follows:
It is plain then that there are two modes of causation,
and that both of these must, so far as possible, be taken
into account in explaining the works of Nature, or that at
any rate an attempt must be made to include them both; and
that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about
Nature. For primary cause constitutes the Nature of an
animal much more than does its matter. There are indeed
passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this, and
following the guidance of fact, finds himself constrained
to speak of the ratio (<? Scyoj ) as constituting the
essence and real nature of things. Such, for instance, is
the case when he explains what is a bone. For he does not
merely describe its material, and say it is this one ele¬
ment, or those two or three elements, or a compound of all
the elements, but states the ratio ( o 3cyfj ) of their com¬
bination. As with a bone, so manifestly is it with the
flesh and all other similar parts.
The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon
this method of treatment was, that they were not in posses¬
sion of the notion of essence, nor of any definition of sub¬
stance. The first who came near it was Democritus, and he
was far from adopting it as a necessary method in Natural
Science, but was merely brought to it, spite of himself, by
constraint of facts. In the time of Socrates a nearer
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approach was made to the method. But at this period men
gave up inquiring into the works of Nature and philosophers
diverted their attention to political science and to the
virtues which benefit mankind.
20
Both Aristotle and Socrates most explicitly talk of the
notion of essence as having profound methodological significance.
Aristotle attributes to the notion the birth and development
of method as he conceives of it (642 24). Without this notion it is
i /
impossible to conceive of that range and complexity of </ which
the scientist must be competent to discriminate in each subject area.
(642a16-17; 642a21-22) The single minded concentration on the essence
as the key to the unity and intelligibility of the subject areas
releases the mind from the materialist and mechanist perspective.
We must look for definitions* (642a19—21; 642a28-29). Socrates
further developed this method of definition. We are left with the
clear impression (made explicit at Meta. 1078^23-25) that Aristotle
perceives himself as a faithful heir to this tradition, not as one who
has radically redirected it.
Our concern here is with the role of essence, and more partic¬
ularly essence considered as finality, in Aristotle's methodological
22
thought and practice. If Vlastos is right in his interpretation then
Plato provides us with a most helpful point of departure for our exam-
I 00
ination. Vlastos interprets Phaedo C5-B2 as follows: ". . . what
Socrates has failed to discover by his own labors or from those of
others and is prepared to do without for the present is the teleolo-
gical aitia itself."
It will be suggested that we can see in Aristotle echos of the
kind of reflection described by Vlastos. It is through reflection of
this kind that we come to see the development of Aristotle's own
methodological use of the principle of essence.
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23Socrates' interest, diverted into ethics and politics, did
not extend to the development of an adequate method in Natural Science.
Aristotle offers some revealing comments at E.E. 1216^3f (H. Rackham's
Loeb translation) on the validity of Socrates' ethical method.
Accordingly Socrates the senior thought that the End is
to get to know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the
nature of justice and courage and each of the divisions of
virtue. And this was a reasonable procedure, since he thought
that all virtues are forms of knowledge, so that knowing
justice and being just must go together, for as soon as we
have learnt geometry and architecture we are architects and
geometricians; owing to which he used to inquire what virtue
is, but not how and from what sources it is produced. But
although this does happen in the case of the theoretical
sciences, inasmuch as astronomy and natural science and
geometry have no End except to get to know and to contemplate
the nature of things that are the subjects of the sciences
(although it is true that they may quite possibly be useful
to us accidentally for many of our necessary requirements),
yet the End of the productive sciences is something different
from science and knowledge.
In the De Partibus Animalium (640 3-4) the theoretical and
constructive sciences are contrasted on the grounds that the theoretical
sciences begin with what is while the constructive sciences begin with
what will be.
Here in the Eudemian Ethics Socrates is depicted as recognising,
/
methodologically, the significance of the in determining the
perspective from which the scientist should proceed. (Socrates "thought
that the is to get to know virtue" - 1216^3-4). Of course
24
Socrates knows he is engaged in a practical science, and that the
goal is to be virtuous. However, because of his intellectualist view
r
of the nature of the virtues he must equate this £">*■?os with knowledge
b 25
of virtue. Thus it becomes "reasonable" (1216 6) for him to treat
virtue now not as something to be attained but something about which
we must know. In the language of the De Part. An. Socrates is forced
to treat virtue as something which is, not as something which will be.
Socrates starts from the being of virtue and tries to sort out
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its parts and types} (1216^4-5). But a practical scientist should start
with what will be, not with what is. One should, somehow, deploy a
process of reasoning which concentrates upon how and from what sources
the becoming of that form of behaviour called virtue occurs. (1216^19f)
One might be led to assume that Socrates' method, while inappro¬
priate to ethics, might have proved satisfactory, in Aristotle's view,
had it been applied to the theoretical sciences. Aristotle points out
(1216^8-9) that it does in fact happen in the case of certain sciences
that once we have learnt, e.g. geometry, we are geometers. But Socrates'
method would have been no more successful, in Aristotle's judgement, in
the theoretical sciences than it had been in ethics. It was necessary
to isolate and make explicit the variety of roles played by final and
2 6
efficient causation in the theoretical and constructive sciences.
(Meta.991^3-9; 984al6-^24; De Gen.et Corr.335^7-17) It is true that in
the theoretical sciences we are what we have learnt, but this is simply
to reaffirm that in the theoretical sciences the final cause operates in
27
a manner different from its operation in the constructive sciences.
Aristotle's claim to have improved the Socratic method arises
principally out of his insistence upon the integration of final,
material, and efficient causation, the grounds for becoming, which had
fallen outside the purview both of the method as Socrates developed it
2 8
and the Platonic methodology predicated as it was on separate forms.
Aristotle's own perspective, then, on the relations between his
own method and that of Socrates seems to have this issue at its focus.
It remains to be seen whether from this vantage point, the introduction
of the syllogism could make any advancement in the method.
The difference in methodological perspective occasioned by
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differing ends of the theoretical and the constructive sciences very
greatly affects the ways in which the various kinds of necessity became
manifest, precisely because of the alteration in the role of final
cause.
This becomes much more apparent when we see Aristotle address
himself to the same issue in De Part. An. Book 1. In this work
Aristotle's intent is to show how to design the method for a theore¬
tical study, natural science, rather than for a constructive science
such as ethics.
In the De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle complains that the
failure to develop an adequate method prior to his own time was due,
in the first instance, to the absence of the notion of essence and of
the procedure of definition. (642 24-26) In default of such a notion
there was an insufficient grasp of the possible range of causation.
(642a13-24).
£
He further comments that during Socrates' time (642 28-31) a
methodological advance was made but since interests had shifted, this
advance was not in Natural Science. We must carefully distinguish the
types of definienda, and therefore between the various types of neces-
£
sity manifested in each of the various kinds. (642 1-17)
There is absolute necessity which belongs Toi\ .
(639^23-24) There is hypothetical necessity which belongs
39 24-25)
Further, there are more causes than one concerned in the
formation of natural things. (639 11-12) A theme which seems to run
through this passage is the assertion that two modes of causation must
be recognised by the scientist. There is final cause, cause "for the
sake of which," and efficient cause, cause "to which the beginning of
b cL
the motion is due." (639 11-13) At 642 1 Aristotle again refers to
two types of causation, final cause and necessity, which must be
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recognised by science. This time, in speaking of Democritus and
Empedocles, Aristotle depicts necessity more in their terms as resem¬
bling material cause (cf. 640^1-7, and Physics 194^23f) rather than
efficient cause as at 639^11-13. ott'c-a u clearly has several senses
and Aristotle is not here confining himself to any one specific sense.
At 642 13, Aristotle yet again refers to two modes of causation
requisite to any proper method in natural science and insists that
unless the scientist describes both he is bound to fail.(cf. Meta.
1025^31; 1064a23; Physics 194a6; De An.403^1) In fact we see that
Aristotle is insisting primarily upon the integration of formal-final-
efficient causation, into any method in natural science, and is not,
at this particular point, taking any special pains to discriminate
efficient and material causation. In fact it may well be that at this
particular point in the context of this biological treatise Aristotle
feels entitled to group material and efficient under one general
heading (cf. De Gen.et Corr. 335^24-29) variously called
K!( Vf) 0-c-wS, (639^12-13) or (642a2) (cf. 641^21f). Aristotle
takes more care to render his meaning precise at De Gen.et Corr.335^
£
24-35, and, in a more general way, at Physics 255 31f.
The fact, however, that Aristotle here in the De Partibus
Animalium repeatedly insists that there are two causes which must be
integrated into any method in natural science - one of which, and the
primary one, is the final cause - makes us seriously question such an
30
assertion as that made by During when he says that Aristotle "never
makes a clear-cut distinction between ou and . " It
31
is certainly true, as During also says, that "the supposed goal of
Nature's work is constantly mixed up with the laws that govern the
processes leading to that goal." This is due to Aristotle's explicitly
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conscious attempt to design a method which will reveal the unity of
goal and process in nature and is not due to any unwillingness to draw
the appropriate distinctions.
It is Aristotle's very point in the first book of the De
32
Partibus Animalium, and repeatedly elsewhere, that the natural
scientist must do a double accounting. Unless his method takes
account of both of final cause and of those modes of necessity and
causation which,also, are operative in natural things he will never
achieve, in his study, the final synthesis - the recognition of the
33 a t
unity of goal and process in Nature (cf. 642 9—17^; for the "what,"
in the case of natural objects is not independent of matter (Meta.
1025 31f), and we must be able to perceive the operation of form on
matter in the becoming of the subject (De Gen.et Corr.335^30f).
b sl
The precise translation of De Part.An. 639 30-640 2 has been
disputed. <? -zr^orres
&Tfl Tir s (fufUc'Pjs Cuj * $&oo^ >, iTucu> Peck's
Loeb translation gives: "Howbeit, the method of reasoning in Natural
science and also the mode of Necessity itself is not the same as in
the Theoretical sciences." During's somewhat amplified translation
35,
reads: Yet in physical science as well as in the theoretical sciences
the method of demonstration and the mode of necessity are different
. . . from the method of demonstration (reasoning) and the mode of
necessity in the constructive sciences."
Perhaps this debate can have no definitive resolution.
During's interpretation involves a certain amount of stylistic
violence to provide sense. The traditional interpretation (Peck's)
on the other hand needs at least some explanation to reconcile it with
acceptable Aristotelian sense. In fact, Peck's note on his translation
of the passage provides just such an explanation. "In the present
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passage . . . Aristotle contrasts natural science vjith the 'theore¬
tical' sciences. This is because he is considering Nature as a
craftsman whose craft or science belongs to the . . . 'productive'
sciences. Our study of Nature's science may be a 'theoretical'
science, but Nature's science itself is 'productive."
As to the fundamental Aristotelian doctrine involved, then,
Peck and During seem less far apart than one might have thought.
Aristotle's general methodological advice to us in our study of
36
"Nature's science" is clear, especially in view of the methodolo¬
gical similarity between biologist and mathematician which he
b 3.
canvasses, somewhat rhetorically at 639 7 and confirms at 644 23f.
In our study of "Nature's science" Aristotle's intention is that we
£
should begin with what is, not with what will be. (640 3-4)
The constructive sciences, aiming to bring about some future
thing and beginning with that future thing as the determinate and
37 a
limiting criterion, proceed to a deliberation (E.N.1112 18f) of the
means within their power to effect that goal which, itself, lies
within their power. Out of their deliberation (E.N.1112^23-24) emerges
the initial stages in the becoming of the object of their choice (E.N.
1113 2-5). They thus "bring back the moving principle to themselves"
(E.N.1113 5-7). The whole process of reasoning moves from the inten¬
tion of the artizan or nature, through a process of analysis (E.N.
1112^20) which determines the shape appropriate to the goal, to the
final seizure of the initial stages in its attainment. We may com¬
pare this account with Aristotle's account of natural and artificial
production in Metaphysics 2T, chs. 7-9, where the doctrines are con¬
firmed.
Nature and the artizan thus contain within themselves the
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synthesis, already inherent in the power of intention, of finality
and form"^ (Physics 194a33-35).
Not only the processes of reasoning but also the modes of
necessity manifest in the theoretical and the constructive sciences
differ. In the constructive sciences it is man (or Nature, or Chance,
or Necessity) who is cast in the role of cause (E.N.1112 31-33).
But the theoretical observer can discharge no such causative
role, nor is the theoretical observer capable, by adopting the mode
of reasoning or the kinds of necessity operative in Nature, to trace
39 a
back the links of necessity to eternity (640 6-8).
In the face of this problem Aristotle does not turn to
empiricism, or to the processes of experimental verification of models,
or to any process of stochastic computation in an attempt to mediate
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the possible to the natural fact. During is right when he says:
"It does not seem reasonable to characterize his method as empirical,
for what we mean by empiricism was quite unknown to him, and so was
the modern distinction between theoretical and empirical natural
41
sciences." Again McKeon rightly tells us what not to expect from
Aristotle.
The method of Aristotle is not based on the assumption either
that the mind will discover truth if it is reoriented toward
the source of truth or that it will find truth within itself
if the distractions of sense are removed, and therefore the
method is not constructed to reproduce the stages of thought
as they are normal to the human mind^ freed from the intru¬
sion of error or of the characteristics of things as they
exist and evolve apart from the intrusion of the mind.
Instead, Aristotle rejects any attempt artificially to relocate
the scientist. He recognises that the natural scientist can not adopt
the perspective either of nature or of the artizan in the hope that
he might start, as they do, with what will be.
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The natural scientist, says Aristotle (640 3-4), must start
with what is, not with what will be, and the mode of reasoning will,
accordingly, differ from that used in the constructive reasoning of
nature or the artizan. For his first and most critical task will be
to establish what is. The artizan and nature already possess their
starting point - in their intention. The natural scientist does not.
He must first secure his starting point - that which is.
The theoretical scientist must realize that in his theoretical
studies his aim is knowledge and contemplation and that the subjects
with which he is concerned must be considered as outside his power.
Nor, in any case, would the types of reasoning and of necessity oper¬
ative in nature's or the artizan's constructive processes be of any
use to the natural scientist since he could not, through them trace
back the links of necessity to eternity (<s<3 i640a6-8). Such
constructive necessity is temporal not 'eternal.
Aristotle insists that the natural scientist, like the mathe¬
matician in conducting his astronomical investigations (639^*7—10; cf.
640 10-19), must begin with what is. He must recognise that what is
, ' 7
is what it was to be (r*«? T1 *jv/ ). That is to say, he must
recognise that what is is the cause of the matter and processes of
its becoming (640 18-19). Such recognition is, of course, of para¬
mount importance too in the constructive sciences. "Even in building
the fact is that the particular stages of the process come about
because the Form of the house is such and such, rather than that the
house is such and such because the process of formation follows a
3
particular course" (640 15-18). Yet, while final cause plays a
certain role in both the theoretical and the constructive processes
of reasoning its role in each is not the same.
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In the constructive process of reasoning final cause acts to
mediate the doer to the means. Final cause is thus, in the contruc-
<■ / r\ b
tive sciences, the un~o <9e«- (639 24 - it is the doer who asserts
it). In the constructive sciences final cause does not necessitate
in its own right, but only as urro . That is, it necessitates
if nature or man wills that it will be. Thus the necessity consequent
upon the final cause in the constructive process of reasoning is only
present when that final cause is itself willed by the original source
of the construction. We might bear in mind here the penetrating
analysis of Aristotle's teleology offered by Wieland and particularly
his analysis of necessity (3, p. 264f).
In the theoretical sciences, on the other hand, because the
subject of enquiry already exists - it is what it is - it is now in
its own right a necessitating force which entails (in its own right -
not now as vno ) the being of those further elements without
which it could not be (De Fart.An.642 8). It is the final cause of
its own essential properties. Now it is certain properties necessi¬
tated by the being of the subject which exist £r£ t rro<PW-<(642 9).
They are perceived by the theoretical scientist as contingent upon
the already existing subject (which is thus their final cause)
(640a33-bl).
The fact that there are different ways in which the scientist
sees (and can trace necessity in terms of) final cause contributes to
the methodological differences between constructive and theoretical
sciences. In the constructive sciences final cause is only insofar
as the constructing nature or man asserts it, and insofar as there is
material available appropriate to the becoming of that final cause.
In the theoretical sciences the final cause already is and we perceive
the grounds of the necessitated matter to be the final cause.
In the constructive sciences, because man asserts it, he knows
what the final cause will be and therefore he can use this knowledge
directly as the principle of selection of the means to that end, the
making of the matter (Physics 194^7-8).
In the theoretical sciences the final cause can not be used
in this manner. We can not deduce the properties from the final cause
of the subject (though this would be best and it describes the condi-
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tion for which we are striving - De Part.An.640 33-35). Rather it
is the principle of finality (not the final cause itself, for this he
can not yet know) to which the natural scientist must hold in his
researches and which links the 'what' and the 'why.' This principle
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he has in the finality aspect of the notion of essence. A thing is
l x c Cy s - '
only insofar as it was to be. ([or-too 7To i e-<-
(641^12). Once this is accepted as the grounds for explanation and
understanding, the scientist is then free to proceed, through the
apodeictic syllogism, to reveal the causes of the parts using their
own definitions as middle terms for he realizes that the what (the
essence of the subject) and the 'whys' are indissolubly one by virtue
of the fact that the subject is what it was to be. In doing this he
creates the conditions for his understanding of why the parts are for
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the sake of the whole. He has hunted the knowledge of essence.
While the existent subject necessitates matter and conditions
of particular natures in order that it may be, yet, in turn, the causes
proper to those conditions and matter serve to inform our understanding
of the form of the subject and the way in which the subject is formed,
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is actualized (642 9-13). Aristotle is most insistent that the nature
of the matter can not be ignored by the natural scientist since it is
not any matter that can become any thing (641^26).
Again,matter is a relative term: to each form their corres¬
ponds a special, matter. How far then must the physicist
know the form or essence (sc. of the "special" matter^)?
Up to a point, perhaps, as the doctor must know sinew or
the smith bronze (i.e. until he understands the purpose
of each): and the physicist is concerned only with things
whose forms are separable indeed, but do not exist apart
from matter. Man is begotten by man and by the sun as
well. (Physics 194 9f)
The point of the final comment is to show us the limit up to which we
should study the form of the matter of any subject - that is we should
study it up to the point at which we have established the proximate
matter of the subject which, as we know (Meta.1045^18) is one with
the form of the subject.
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Time and again Aristotle tells us that the natural scientist
can not neglect the matter - not, indeed,all matter or qua matter,
but that matter which is seen ro be proximate to the subject con¬
cerned. There must be undertaken a process of elimination. Not all
of the matter is in the definition subject, but only that in
the matter which is proximate. "If then matter is one thing, form
another, the compound of these a third, and both the matter and the form
and the compound are substance, even the matter is in a sense called
part of a thing, while in a sense jit is not but only the elements of
which the formula of the form consists" (Meta.1035 If).
There is a very real difference between a /Lto^toS and a
crCoL^tn& S or element in the definition (Meta. 1041^2f) . The element
is the cause of the part's inherence (1041^25f), and it should not be
called an element as if it were itself part of the matter, but rather
as its principle (1041^27f). It is this that must be isolated,
80
through our demonstration of the inherence of each of the parts, in
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our search for the essence of the subject.
It is because Socrates neglected the matter that Aristotle
censures him. ^ It is because Democritus included an account of the
matter and its formative processes that Aristotle praises him."*''"
Clearly, Aristotle insists upon the closest examination of
the matter in the conduct of natural science. But how does Aristotle
propose that this is to be performed? By use of the syllogism in its
dialectical and apodeictic forms. Ideally, we should be able to
assert simply that because the essence, e.g. of man, is what it is,
therefore a man has such and such parts since there cannot be a man
without them (De Part.An.64Qa33-35). This is the ultimate goal of
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science - so to comprehend the essence that one is able without
doubt to demonstrate the demonstrable properties. This is the 'best'
way but it is rarely the possible way, and in the vast majority of
cases we must resort to another form of the statement. "If we may
not say this, then the nearest to it must do, viz. that there can not
be a man at all otherwise than with them, or, that it is well that a
sl b
man should hav'e them" (640 35- 1). We then proceed to a demonstration
of the existence of these properties. In performing this demonstra¬
tion we not only prove the existence of the properties, but also,
since the demonstration proceeds through their definitions as middle
terms, we reveal to ourselves the elements or principles in virtue of
which they inhere in the subject and which constitute the elements in
the defineable form. We perform, that is, the process of elimination
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upon which Aristotle insists. We place ourselves in a position
where we can come to comprehend those elements in the matter "of which
the formula of the form consists" (Meta.1035alf). Our final task then
is to "follow . . . through . . . the . . . middle terms until the
immediate premisses are reached" (Post.An.89a13-14).
It is in rendering precise the way in which the parts inhere
in the subject that we come to be in the best position to say some¬
thing worth saying about the formula of the form (De An.402^22-25).
The natural scientist, unlike the housebuilder, does not
commence his researches with a foreknowledge of what it is that
constitutes the purpose, the explicit final cause, of his subject.
The natural scientist has only mute nature before him; nature which
rarely declares what the ends of its generated things are, though it
everywhere declares that they have ends (De Part.An.641^12). The
natural scientist is unable therefore to start his enquiry with the
declared final cause of the subject of his enquiry.
And so he must undertake, first, to examine the parts, for
the natural scientist is aware of the principle everywhere manifest
c , ✓ c ' ' a / |)
in nature ^ a>ucr<-$ rou //6c&< (641 12). He is aware that
/
the principle of is, above all, a principle of economy, of
unity between form and function. He is aware that this principle
operates in nature to determine that what a thing is is the actuali¬
zation of a goal. He is au7are that is, that formal, efficient, and
above all final cause are one;^ and that once he is able truly to
comprehend the form of his subject its finality will be immediately
obvious. He is able to come to a comprehension of the form of his
subject because the being of the subject is the final cause of its
essential properties. Thus he must undertake to comprehend why the
parts belong (demonstrate them through their own definitions as
middle terms) if he is to comprehend the form of the subject and its
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finality.
The unity of form and finality of a subject can be analysed
if we undertake to examine the hypothetically necessitated processes
of material and efficient causation, which examination we saw earlier"^
to be, in Aristotle's view, his chief contribution to the advance of
Socrates' definitional method.
Aristotle himself assures us that this question is legitimate
and its analysis possible providing that we ask it in the right way
(Meta.l04la14f).
"Now why a thing is itself is a meaningless inquiry" (1041
14-15). In answer to the question why a man is a man the only appro-
priate response is "because he is a man" (Meta.1041 15-20).
But we can inquire why man is an animal of such and such a
nature. This, then, is plain, that we are not inquiring why
he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why
something is predicable of something. (1041a20-23)
Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence
(to speak abstractly). . . . The object of the inquiry is
most easily overlooked where one term is not expressly
predicated of another (e.g. when we inquire 'what man is')
because we do not distinguish and do not say definitely that
certain elements make up a certain whole. . . . Since we
must have the existence of the thing as something given,
clearly the question is why the matter is some definite
thing; e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that
which was the essence of a house is present. . . . Therefore
what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form by reason of which
the matter is some definite thing, and this is the substance
of the thing. (Meta.1041a27-1041 9)
Post.An.2,chs. 1 & 2 again assure us of the propriety of the
question "what is God?" or "what is man?" (89^34-35). When we ask
whether a thing without qualification is "we are really asking whether
. . . the thing has a middle" (89^37-38). Aristotle is showing us,
as he did in the Metaphysics passage cited above, that the ability to
to answer the question "is centaur" or "is God?" (89^32-33) is itself
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contingent upon whether the question can be properly asked (Meta.1041
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14). "Why is man an animal of such and such a nature?"
Once we recognise that asking "is man?" is the same as
b EL
asking "why is man" (89 37-90 1) we must further recognise that this
£
question is, as expressed, meaningless (Meta.1041 14). Our knowledge
of the being of anything, man, moon, centaur, or God included, is
wholly contingent"^ upon(Post.An.93a20) our knowledge that it is some-
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thing and whether in fact we know what that something is, its form,
its essence, its cause. Aristotle is telling us in the beginning of
the Post.An.Book Two, as we have seen him tell us elsewhere, that we
come to the knowledge of the essence of a thing through our analysis
of the causes of its properties in terms of their constituting the
becoming or being of the subject. In asking the question "is man" we
must avoid the meaningless question "why is man" in favour of a formu¬
lation which can be managed. The answer will be found in establishing
e.g. what can be predicated of man, and then hunting the causes of
those predicates through apodeixis, and seeing in that cause an element
in the answer to the question "why is man as he is?" "For the cause
through which a thing is - not is this or that, i.e. has this or that
attribute, but without qualification is - and the cause through which
it is - not is without qualification, but is this or that as having
some essential attribute or some accident - are both alike the 'middle"'
(90a9-ll).6°
Clearly, Aristotle insists upon the closest examination of
the "matter" in the conduct of natural science. But there were some,
says Aristotle,^ "who thought the 'matter' was adequate by itself to
account for coming-to-be, since 'the movement originates from the
matter. ... To say that 'matter generates owing to its movement'
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would be, no doubt, more scientific than (what adherents of the Forms
say). For what 'alters' and transfigures plays a greater part•in
bringing things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the
products of nature and art alike, to look upon that which can initiate
movement as the producing cause. Nevertheless this theory is not
right either."
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It might be thought that the type of necessity here being
discussed - that by which we come to see the form of the subject in
the causal definitions of its demonstrated parts under the principle
of "what is is what it was to be" - is really nothing other than the
mechanism flowing from the material cause as it was understood by the
(jvfiXo<■ who preceded Aristotle. Aristotle is careful to forestall
this judgement.^
The ancients assumed that the factor of necessity was present
in all the works of nature in a similar sense (639^21). Thus they
saw nature simply as a source of movement and their 'method' was
simply to trace any object or event to any cause seen to be capable
of occasioning that object or event. Matter is potentiality. But
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potentiality must be harnessed and this is achieved through the
efficient causation of form. The forces of matter can only be
harnessed to constitute becoming when form is operative. Matter must
be moved (De Gen.et Corr.335^30f). Its function can only be compre¬
hended when the notion of essence, operating in some appropriate
method such as Aristotle's, enables us to perceive that potentiality
as harnessed by the unifying and actualizing constraints of form. It
is only within these constraints that we can perceive what kind of
matter - matter of a particular form - it is that makes possible the
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becoming of the subject.
Thus when Aristotle determines that the natural scientist
should, like the mathematician in his astronomical enquiries (De Part.
An.639^7-10; 640a10-19) begin with the parts and go on to state their
causes he is insisting that the processes of the earlier philosophers
be inverted.^ We must first study the animal as it actually is
g
(640 12). We must "take the phenomena that are observed in each
g
group, and then go on to state their causes" (640 14-15). We must
not, that is, do as the earlier philosophers did, see the matter as
motive cause; but rather we must see the matter as subject to cause,
** i ^
as itself caused by having its being within a whole. £C<- Cuj \/ fTy^ Vc
c>^ 7^^ cJ> y>y> £~c&c-c ^ u sici 11 H 1 )
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As was noted earlier, the natural scientist in his theore¬
tical studies can not use final cause in the same manner in which the
constructive scientist uses it. "In the products of art, we make the
material with a view to the function" (Physics 194^7-8). As Aristotle
says in the De.Part.An., the constructive sciences must start with
what will be, the matter which, "must be or become to serve a further
purpose" (De Part.640 3-5). "Whereas in the products of nature the
matter is there all along" (Physics 194^8). In the constructive
sciences we start by making the matter to subserve the known final
cause. In the theoretical sciences we must start with the matter
already present, but not just as matter for such is not comprehensible
(De An.403^9-10). The matter can only be comprehended when seen in
terms of the causes of the parts necessarily belonging to the whole,
as demonstrated properties of the whole. Once the essence of the
part is revealed in demonstration (for this is the middle term) then
we are able to perceive, comprehend, the form and finality of the
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subject, the minor termjfor we are now in a position to comprehend
why the parts are "for the sake" of the whole,and thus to comprehend
the nature of the whole in its finality.
The structure and sequence of the elements of the Aristotelian
method are most easily seen when we examine the model which Aristotle
advances as that which the natural scientist must follow, that of the
mathematician in his astronomical enquiries. He clearly presents this
method as involving two processes.^n~ja <Z era v C«. 7T£-^>c 7~<k JfcZs crusr,*.
fctc m ca TTijo\ (639^8-9) constitutes the first stage.
o UCbJ dt-j/Cr/S Co Cc 1 c~<*S (639^ 10) constitutes
the second phase (cf. 640 14-15). The examination of the phenomena
is one process. The telling of the causes is the second. We see
confirmation that Aristotle intends this as a two stage process at
b 3.
Posterior Analytics 78 39 and 79 2-6. These passages occur in the
context of Aristotle's discussion of the relations between the
syllogism of the fact and the syllogism of the reasoned fact (Post.
6 8
An. 1,13). When we have two sciences one of which is subordinate to
the other the one gives the syllogism of the fact and the superior
the syllogism of the reasoned fact (78^34f). Such is the relation of
astronomical observation to the mathematical astronomy (78^39). "It
is the business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of the
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mathematicians to know the reasoned fact j for the latter are in
possession of the demonstrations giving the causes, and are often
£
ignorant of the fact" (79 2-4). The latter must rely upon the former
(76^11), for the latter must assume the existence and meaning of the
subjects and the meaning of the attributes (76^5-7).
The initial examination of the phenomena is conducted using
the syllogism of fact as its instrument of analysis. At Prior An.1,30,
Aristotle maps out the procedure. Where apodeictic syllogisms are
possible they are made. Where only dialectical are possible they are
used. "But in each science the principles which are peculiar are the
most numerous. Consequently it is the business of experience to give
the principles which belong to each subject" (46 17-18). WOnders
wnether one type of this experience is that attained by the observer in
his syllogistic analysis^ of the phenomena described in the preceding
sentences (46a3-17). (cf. 46a24-27; see below, pages 88-89)
It is the making of the syllogism, the reduction to syllogistic
form^which itself constitutes the analysis. Robinson is quite right
to insist, against Cornford, that it is the deduction which consti¬
tutes the analysis in the Greek tradition of mathematics. We start
with what is and demonstrate what follows from it. This "was followed
by a synthesis, and the latter constituted in the first place a check
on the analysis, to make sure that there had been no error; but,
secondly, provided that there had been no error, it constituted the
actual proof or solution for the sake of which the analysis was under¬
taken" (in mathematics). The synthesis consists in going through
the same steps as the analysis in the reverse order. "For this method
to work," notes Robinson, "the implications must be reciprocal. . . .
In other words, the propositions concerned must be convertible."
This describes precisely what Aristotle means by analysis and
it is the function which the syllogism, and more particularly the
apodeictic syllogism, discharges in his method.
For Aristotle, of course, recognises the problem of the non-
£
reciprocity of most implications (Post.An.78 7f).
But Aristotle's method accommodates the fact that his method
is used over fields where convertibility is virtually never possible
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and it does so in two ways.
Aristotle insists that the synthesis is not a demonstration
(see page 90f below).
Secondly, he discharges the two functions of the synthesis
cited by Robinson by placing the whole operation within the context
of . The scientist, acting qua teacher provides the
grounds for the synthesis by "telling the causes." This does not
constitute a proof. Yet the scientist's findings must be subjected
to the test. This is provided in forcing the students themselves
critically to assess the synthesis provided by the scientist-teacher
by themselves undertaking precisely the same kind of analysis of the
subject in the most rigorous possible confrontation with the phenomena.
The synthesis made by the teacher, and ultimately by the
students on completion of their own analysis, is a process of following
up the middle terms until the immediate premisses are reached. It
does not constitute a proof but it does provide the experience
necessary for i/oO^ to perceive the full nature of the indemonstrable.
The analytic criticism engaged in by the students acts as a check and
a further vehicle for the students too to gain the requisite exper¬
ience for i/ooj to achieve its goal.
Of course we are speaking in the broadest possible terms. The
actual conduct of any science will depend on the type of subject
matter as we saw in. Chapter 4.
Aristotle goes on to show (46 19-27) how this analysis pro¬
vides the foundation upon which the mathematician can proceed to
establish the syllogisms of reasoned fact. "I mean for example that
the astronomical experience supplies the principles of astronomical
science: for once the phenomena were adequately apprehended, the
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demonstrations of astronomy were discovered. Similarly with any other
art or science."
Discovering the demonstrations provides the opportunity for
attaining the synthetic grasp of the indemonstrable definition of the
whole. For the culmination occurs when, providing the "historical
survey" (46 24) has been complete and we have thus been "able to
discover the proof and demonstrate every thing which admitted of
proof" (46 24-27) , "we make that clear whose nature does not admit of
proof" (46a27).^
In building these theories the mathematicians may well be
a a 72
unfamiliar with certain facts or details (79 4-6; cf. Meta.982 9).
But they must rely upon the accuracy of their observational foundation.
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Yet that is not all, for they know too that they must, as teachers
"tell the causes" and that their students will perform the final test
by rigorously testing the "causes" they are told through their own
74
apodeixeis of the phenomena.
Aristotle makes it clear that his method is neither easy nor
sure. His concern in De An. 402 10-22 is real, yet his comment as to
the insufficiency of Plato's scheme (402 21-22) is categorical. For
he has his method and he proceeds to execute it (De An.402^9-16) and
402b16f).
In the notion of essence, itself operating in Aristotle's
thought as a principle of economy, we find the principle enunciated
"qui sache discerner le necessaire.Its implementation is method¬
ologically possible through the demonstration of the parts. The
syllogism, and more especially the apodeictic syllogism, has rendered
possible the integration of final-efficient, and material elements
into the method of definition. Thus Aristotle avoided adopting a
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a method which precluded any accommodation of the fact of becoming.
In the De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle claims to have provided the
notion of essence with an appropriate vehicle for its deployment in
7 6
philosophical enquiry. Nor is his claim limited to the field of
natural science alone for he makes the same claim for ethics^ and
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for First Philosophy.
There are, of course, three (at least) major objections to be
raised against this interpretation. The method as here described
seems manifestly cyclical and to involve a petitio pricipii. Secondly,
on the evidence of the Posterior Analytics (1,6; 1,31) it is not
possible to demonstrate unless the demonstrator has prior and better
knowledge of the essence. Yet this interpretation seems simply to
ignore that principle, placing better knowledge of the essence at the
end rather than at the beginning of demonstration. Finally, of
course, there remains the central "problem of demonstration"; where
do we find, in Aristotle's extant works, any demonstrations?
Each of these objections must be examined in turn but some
general comment is appropriate first. It must be recognised that the
reflexive structure of this method wherein the demonstrated knowledge
of the parts informs our understanding of the essence of the whole
does not constitute circular demonstration for it is not, in any sense
of the word, a demonstration at all.
It is suggested here that demonstration of the parts can inform
our knowledge of the essence of the subject. This procedure, whereby
we gain further insight into the essence by examining the demonstration
of the parts, must not be regarded as circular demonstration.
The proof of the parts is, of course, an cSrTo f(j . We start
with the definition of our subject (De Part.An.640 36), and proceed to
prove on the basis of a necessity which governs the existence of the
£
properties. (Post.An.91 1-2) When, however, we turn back to examine
the grounds of the proof, and try in this way to deepen our comprehen¬
sion of the subject essence we are, once again, involved in definition,
and definition does not touch existence. (Post.An.2 ,7)
Now we are examining the way in which the causes of the proven
properties determine the character of the subject and, therefore, its
finality. The necessity involved on this occasion does not relate to the
being of the subject, nor to the being of its defining properties. Rather
it is the necessity one recognises when one recognises the integrity of a
subject. There is no mediation involved here nor is one possible.
There is no proof of essence. We either see it or we do not,
but we can prepare the ground for the recognition and thus become "best
qualified to speak about essence." (De An.402^24-25)
It is clear, too, that this method would be inconceivable with¬
out the complete integration of the notions of thinking and knowing.
The necessity which we can see when we move from the demonstrated pro¬
perties to the form of the subject is manifest only to the mind which
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is actively thinking. Roland-Gosselin is quite right when he observes
"L'intelligence est en dependance etroite des donne'es de 1' expedience."
It is only our experience attained according to this method which can
act as the ground upon which we could "fonder une synthese necessaire"
80
since any proposition (however extended that proposition) which would
result would be an immediate one corresponding to the question 'why is
a man man?' (cf. Post.An.2,9)
Once the methodological significance to Aristotle of the
notion of essence is appreciated it becomes possible to see the origin
of certain of the more manifest shortcomings of his scientific works.
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"Even in his most advanced works in biology," says During,
Aristotle's "reasoning is based on a priori principles and book-
92
knowledge more than on observation." It is to this that During attri¬
butes many of the gross errors that Aristotle makes in his scientific
treatises.
Aristotle has been repeatedly upbraided, with justification,
for having established his principles without a sufficiently compre¬
hensive observation of the facts. Yet it must be emphasized that this
shortcoming is due not to a failure in the structure of the method
but to Aristotle's own failure to apply the method with sufficient
rigor. His own methodology requires the most rigorous critical obser¬
vation of the facts, both on the part of the researching scientist
and on the part of his students. It is this critical adjudication of
the syllogistic analysis in the light of the phenomena which leads to
82
full comprehension of the principles of the science. Aristotle
recognises that the success of a science depends upon how exacting
83
has been this examination of the facts.
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During says, "fortunately he did not always apply his own
rules," implying that Aristotle's successes are largely despite his
method rather than because of it. Yet the reverse is the case. The
obvious failures Aristotle has in science are due to his own incapacity
(laziness, or even more, the haphazard state of data gathering, and
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lack of sophisticated tools) to fulfil the requirements of his
. , 86
method.
But Aristotle must be shown to meet the objections raised
above. The first objection, that concerning the circularity of the
method, he meets principally at three places: at Post.An.11,6 (where
the problem is raised); at Meta.Z,12 (where it is further analysed);
and at H,6 where the resolution is offered.
At Post.An.11,6, Aristotle offers a concise formal analysis
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of the method as it operates in the sciences generally (92 6-19).
He offers first a syllogistic formulation (1st fig. Barbara)
of the method.
The definable form of a thing is the set of peculiar attri¬
butes of the thing's essential nature.
The set of peculiar attributes of this thing's essential
nature are xyz (and only xyz).
The defineable form of this thing is xyz (and only xyz).
Aristotle brings three objections against this as demonstra¬
tion.
First, it is a petitio principii in that the middle term is
one with the minor term.
The second objection is in many ways the more interesting.
We can not assume the principle on which we reason as the principle
from which we reason in any particular syllogism (cf. Post.An.1,7;
1,9). The principle enunciated in the major premiss is, of course,
the principle of essence itself - viz. "a thing is what it was to be,"
or, alternatively stated, if (fvv-i-j) Cvu -TToce-'Z 7r°<i/zr*~ (De Part.An.
641b12).
The principle is not commensurate with the subject of the
enquiry. We have tried to use a universal principle as genus and this
simply will not work since there is no universal over and above the
defineable form of this thing (e.g. man, or animal) (cf. 74 7-8).
This form of reasoning, Aristotle concludes, does not consti¬
tute a demonstration of essence. Such reasoning does not conform to
the natural manner of definition and its consequents (cf. Meta.1045 7f).
We can not, says Aristotle, include what syllogistic inference
is in our syllogising, nor can we include a statement of what defini¬
tion is in proving a definition. The principle of what constitutes a
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definition can however be used, says Aristotle, "when someone doubts
whether the conclusion proved is the defineable form." We
"defend it as conforming to the definition of defineable form which
we assumed" (Post.An.92 16-18). The situation depicted in these lines
characterizes precisely the situation which obtains in the method
presented here as Aristotle's method in philosophy and science. We
have before us a demonstration and we are asked (or ask ourselves),
"does the property as demonstrated belong to the essence of the sub¬
ject?" and we answer "yes, since it conforms to the principle that a
thing is that which it was to be." (Note the direct speech in Greek
text reflecting the immediacy of the perception involved and perhaps,
too, the didactic context of such an exchange.)
Aristotle adds a final decisive rejection of the possibility
that the essence can be deductively proven. Deduction proves the
properties, but can offer no proof that "the predicates shall consti¬
tute a genuine unity and not merely belong to a single subject as do
musical and grammatical when predicated of the same man." Aristotle
is insistent that the knowledge of the essence must be knowledge of
the unity of the synthesis and not merely of the discrete belonging
of the parts. But there is no unifying formula (Meta.1045^16-17).
There is only the unity to be recognised or not depending upon whether
or not they come to know the proximate matter and recognise that
3. b
proximate matter and form are one (Meta.1045 23-25 and 1045 17-18).
To be sure, if the method is taken as wholly demonstrative it
is manifestly cyclical. But the method as a whole is not demonstra¬
tive. It contains within it a key element of demonstration, but this
is operative only in the context of a conscious, active, thinking
person who reflects and asks himself immediate questions to which he
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can give immediate answers under the principle of essence. As demon¬
stration it is cyclical. As reflective consciousness it is the
synthetic act of perceptive thinking, asserting mind. The principle
"qui sache discerner le necessaire" is not a principle of deductive
method but of the recognition of unity. Deduction by itself can not
suffice, and induction by itself "proves not what the essential nature
of a thing is but that it has or has not some attribute." "Presumably
one cannot prove essential nature by an appeal to sense perception or
3. * b
by pointing with the finger" (Post.An.92 38-92 3). It is only by the
reciprocal functioning of the two, generating the experience necessary,
that one can come to "defend" the synthesis.
At Meta.Z,12,1037^8-9, Aristotle explicitly offers a supple-
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ment to his discussion of this issue in the Analytics. The problem
is raised by directing our attention to the question of how we come
to know the unity of the formula of essence which consists in many
parts. "I mean this problem: - wherein can consist the unity of that
the formula of which we call a definition, as for instance, in the
case of man, 'two-footed animal'; for let this be the formula of man.
Why then, is this one, and not many, viz. 'animal' and 'two-footed?'
(Meta.1037^10-14).
Clearly the principle of unity is not because these elements
"are present in one thing; for on this principle a unity can be made
out of all the attributes of a thing. But surely all the attributes
in the definition must be one; for the definition is a single formula
and a formula of substance, so that it must be a formula of some one
thing" (1037b23-26).
Aristotle recognises that the unity of the synthesis must have
88
some grounds in our comprehension. There must be a principle which
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enables this unity to become manifest to us as a necessary unity.
The definition provided through division involves us in super¬
fluous repetition and, again, does not give grounds for the compre¬
hension of unity (Meta.1037^27f; cf. Post.An.92&27f).
Aristotle has here shown that the problem has two aspects
(cf. 1044 3f). First, there is the clear need for a principle upon
which to ground our comprehension of the unity of the synthesis which
is the definition, (and this must be a ground not only of our compre¬
hension of its unity but of its being a unity (Meta.1037^27).)
Secondly, the principle must be such that it encompasses the necessity
of the inherence of the attributes and not their mere predicability
(1037b23-26).
At Meta.H,6, Aristotle indicates how these two requirements
are to be fulfilled. He confirms first (1045 8-10) that there is a
cause of unity "in the case of all things which have several parts
and in which the whole is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the
totality is something besides the parts." He then explains how the
necessity of the inherence of the attributes is to be seen. He does
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this by giving examples: "for as regards material things contact is
the cause in some cases, and in others viscidity or some other such
quality." His examples are precisely those of efficient and material
causes by which he explains the belonging of parts; that is to say
the kinds of middle terms used in the demonstration of demonstrables.
It is in these causes, says Aristotle, that we must satisfy
the requirement that our definition be composed of necessarily inhering
elements and not merely predicable elements (1037^23-26; cf. Post.An.
1,6).
As to the grounds for our perception of the unity of the
synthesis as a whole he goes on to show that the problem is one of
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perspective. If we act from the perspective provided by the nature
of essence we experience no problem at all.
Plato's rigorous adherence to separate forms contains no
a 90
solution (Meta.1045 12f).
The problem resolves itself if "as we say, one element is
matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other
actually" (Meta.1045a23-24).
Quite simply if we adopt, as Aristotle has repeatedly told us
to do, a perspective made possible by the principle of economy which
is the notion of essence there is no problem. We will recognise that
in demonstrating the parts we see the causes of the parts - we come
to understand the principles of the matter, and "there is no other
reason why the potential sphere becomes actually a sphere, but this
was the essence of either" (Meta.1045a31-33). People advance many
causes for unity "participation," "communion," "composition," "con¬
nexion" (1045^7-16). They are floundering. All such explanations
resolve to one. They are seeking a unifying formula (hence a media¬
tion of some difference, between potency and complete reality) (Meta.
1045^16-17). "But, as has been said, the proximate matter and the
form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other
actually" (Meta.1045^17-19).
The method provides for the analysis of an immediate unity.
It does not pretend to mediate that unity unless we are to call the
intellectual act of perception a mediation.
"To be sure, there are paths which lead up tn principles, but
principles can never be derived from them in the strict sense. They
are 'evident' in the sense that once they are discovered nothing
t 91
equally plausible can be discovered which contradicts them."
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Wieland's thesis that the principles are "evident" corresponds
to the theme here being proposed. Of course Wieland would not accept
that the principles are themselves "evident" to the intuitive intellect
92
as is suggested in this study.
Wieland suggests that the principles are "points of view,"
"concepts of reflection" (Wieland (1), p. 136), and that Aristotle's
search for principles is a search into "presuppositions" (p. 132-133).
The findings of this study would lead us to describe the principles in
terms rather more remote from such a "Kantian" (p. 136) view. The role
of the syllogism as grounds for insight into the principles (under the
methodological perspective offered by the principle of essence) seems
to offer a far closer relation between Aristotle the scientist and
Aristotle the philosopher than Wieland proposes (p. 136).
£
At Meta.1006 llf, Aristotle shows how the problem of begging
the question may be avoided in dealing with the immediate • (His
subject is an axiom but the answer is appropriate to the °f
the sciences.)
We can, however, demonstrate negatively (fotyKriiCtS^) even that
this view (sc. that there is a prior principle to that of
non-contradiction - Meta.1005^35f) is impossible if our
opponent will only say something; . . . Now negative v
(£.;wx r^xJVs) demonstration I distinguish from demonstration
proper, because in a demonstration one might be thought to be
begging the question, but if another person is responsible
for the assumption we shall have negative proof cl ,
not demonstration. The starting point for all such argument
is not the demand that our opponent shall say that something
either is or is not (for this one might perhaps take to be a
begging of the question), but that he shall say something
which is significant both for himself and for another; for
this is necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if
he means nothing, such a man will not be capable of reasoning,
either with himself or with another. But if any one grants
this, demonstration will be possible; for we shall already
have something definite. The person responsible for the
proof, however, is not he who demonstrates but he who lis¬
tens.
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The petitio principii is avoided by appealing to the possi¬
bility of significant utterance, to the elenctic invitation of the
interloqutor (either oneself or another (1006 23-24)) to perceive
b ^ '
the necessity (Post. An. 76 23f) of the <- . It is however, the
interloqutor who is responsible for the proof (1006 25-26).
The absolute context for the method as a whole is conversation
- the possibility and exercise of significant statement brought to its
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fulfilment in that conversational argument which is didactic, viz.
<*vrp Aristotle remains true to that most profound of Socratic
insights into the mode of human communion, 05 .
In Chapter 4 above, it was proposed that Aristotle casts the
Analytics, the theory of the syllogism and the apodeictic syllogism,
in the role of a , a training in the critical techniques to
be used by the scientist-philosopher in his researches (in his conver¬
sations with himself) as by the listener, the student in his critical
assessment of what is being taught.
That is to say, the scientist can not regard his task as
complete when he has discovered the causes. He must subject this to
the test by telling the causes o i> Sc.*-
De Part. An. 639^10. This he may do using whatever device,
including demonstration, is appropriate to the subject matter, and
to the circumstances. But it is the causes which he must tell. "The
science which investigates causes is also the more communicable, for
the people who teach are those who tell the causes of each thing"
(Meta.982a28-30; 982al2-14). "Again," says Aristotle, "every science
is thought to be capable of being taught, and its object of being
learned" (E.N.1139^25-26). Teaching is the required test, in
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Aristotle's view, of the validity of the claim of the science (cf.
Meta.981^7f) to be a science. Aristotle's works are strewn with
references to the testing of a science by the scientist proceeding to
o(rTo&c&the science and allow it to be subjected to rigorous
94
criticism in the face of the observed facts.
"intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its
growth to teaching." ^ Co TT^p^
y/v'Ctrit/ K*l (E.N. 1103 15-16).
Further, it is as teacher that Aristotle is best known to us, since
what remains to us of his work is, by and large, his lecture notes.^
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It is simply because this didactic context is so all
pervasive - is the assumption upon which Aristotle proceeds (cf.
Post.An.1,1,71 If) - that Aristotle does not trouble to distinguish
between research and teaching but subsumes them both under the phrase
P>c-y(-iw co £<.« co /<.,co cri-s olc-cc^s . The two activities,
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research and teaching, are in no way to be separated, for the
research is not completed until the causes are told and subjected
to the most rigorous criticism by the students using the same
analytic tools (the syllogism in its dialectical and, finally,
apodeictic form) that the researcher used in his own conversation
with himself.
Yet there is a circumstantial and temporal separation of
research and teaching for they each have different requirements which
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determine their actual modes of procedure. There is a temporal
separation because the researching scientist must have completed his
research. He must be an actual knower before^^ he can undertake
to guide the potential knower to actuality. He must, that is, have
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already completed the dialectical and apodeictic syllogistic element
of his researches by the time he comes to tell the causes.
In any case the apodeictic syllogism is often, though not
always, unsuited to the task of telling causes since generally
learning proceeds from what is less well known in nature to what is
better known in nature;^^^ whereas, as the Analytics makes clear, the
apodeictic syllogism proceeds in diametrically the opposite direc-
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tion: and yet Aristotle tells us that we learn "sometimes
through induction and sometimes by syllogism." Clearly, the syllogism
is an instrument in the didactic context, but not the instrument of
communication. It is the instrument of critical analysis, for when
he talks of learning through the syllogism it is of the discovery, for
£
oneself of a truth that he speaks (cf. Post.An.71 16f, where the
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student is led on to make a syllogistic 'discovery' for himself).
Aristotle will not be a party to any teaching method which
gives the students the "facts already won."^^ He praises his own
work for not doing this and condemns previous teachers for having
, , . .106
committed this sin.
Ernst Kapp has set right "one source of confusion which has
hindered the general understanding of Aristotle's logic from later
antiquity up to our time."^^
The problem set by the definition of the syllogism may
be understood in two entirely different ways. Either we
must start with given combinations of premisses and look
for the possible inferences, or we must start with a con¬
clusion and look for the possible premisses. The first
seems the natural thing to do, and so it has been over¬
looked again and again that Aristotle understood his task
in the second sense. His syllogistic is essentially a
system of possible combinations of premisses leading to
given conclusions, not a study of the possible inferences
from given propositions.108
But there is also a circumstantial separation between research
and "telling the causes" to students. As was seen in Chapter 4 above,
the question of how one should proceed to publish one's findings is,
for Aristotle, contingent upon purely practical conditions of commu¬
nication such as economy of presentation, the mode in which the
subject matter manifests itself, and so forth.
But this issue is also contingent upon the qualification of
the audience being addressed. "Moreover, before some audiences not
even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for
what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge
implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct"
(Rhetoric 1355a24f).
Aristotle is not referring here only to the congenitally
stupid or unintelligent but to those who, however intelligent, have
not received the training requisite to the didactic situation. His
meaning comes clear a little later at 1356^35 where he shows that
those who have not had the training in syllogistic provided by
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dialectic are unable to "take in at a glance a complicated argu-
ment, or follow a long claim of reasoning" (1357 3-4). We could even
form the syllogisms for them and they would still not understand for
£
they are simply not trained (1357 9f).
The scientist must, then, when he comes to teach, tailor his
recounting of the causes to accommodate the technical qualifications
of his audience.^ But when he comes to tell the causes to an
audience whose only interest is truth he must be confident that he
can rely upon an audience which has the proper technical expertise to
judge the truth of his statements so that he may be left free to
structure his statement of the causes in the most illuminating way
possible given the practical confines of economy and the manner in
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which the subject matter exhibits its form. He must be left free to
lead the students on. He must be able, that is, to rely upon an
EL
audience of «- (De Part.An.639 5). He must be able to
rely upon an audience whose critical powers have been derived from
their training in the theory and practice of the syllogism and
apodeictic syllogism presented in the Analytics.
It is of course well recognised that Aristotle stands within
the tradition of the pedagogic moot as it evolved prior to and in the
Academy. The didactic situation as Aristotle designed it is a
further evolution of that tradition for it is required that the
students who listen to the scientist-teacher telling the causes must
themselves subject his teachings to a rigorous criticism by under¬
taking by themselves to prove the demonstrable and to come to under¬
stand that which does not admit of proof.
Barnes is manifestly correct in seeing cC as the
proper context within which to come to our understanding of Aristotle's
intentions for . But he has clearly misread that intention
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when he suggests that the theory of demonstrative science "offers
a formal model of how teachers should impart knowledge" and is thus
"concerned exclusively with the teaching of facts already won." Teachers
do not, according to Aristotle, tell the "facts;" they tell the
"causes." The syllogism is, in its apodeictic form, admirably suited
b 3,
to the telling of the facts (Post.An.90 30-91 2). But therein lies
its liability for Aristotle (cf. Rhetoric 1418a9-12 and E.N. 1147a18f).
The student must be led to see the causes. Aristotle is all too fully
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aware of the snares of the syllogism. It is a potent weapon and
could easily lead to the development of science away from the causes.
He insists upon concentrating on the causes and confining the syllogism
104
to its proper analytic role.
And yet there remains the problem that Aristotle insists in
the Posterior Analytics that a true demonstration is not possible
without the prior and better knowledge of the <^Dj(olc .
Yet the problem ceases to exist when the apodeixis is viewed,
as it must be, within the didactic context. Aristotle is laying down
the goal to be achieved. Scientific knowledge, when it finally is
attainedjproceeds in this fashion. This is the best way (cf. De Part.
£
An.640 33f). It is because this way of knowing is the actuality of
our knowing that we practice its form even though we have to take a
less than perfect form to start with (cf. De Part.An.690 35f).
It should hardly surprise us to see Aristotle, in the Posterior
Analytics, treating scientific knowledge first in its actuality, as
it will be, and subsequently proceeding to an analysis of its parts
and how they are to be brought about, for this is the pattern of
procedure we saw him advocate for any such constructive science.
The full comprehension of the4^^c constitutes the full possession
of potentia secunda of knowing. It is only when we have analysed,
through demonstration, that we tome to possess the key, the "KfJCl, of
demonstrative science and are finally able to proceed to the exercise
of that knowledge qua true knowers whenever we wish. We are now able
to solve any aporia which may confront us in that subject area.
Scientific knowledge is being able to demonstrate the demonstrables;
V V
it is a £5<y ; it is not the possession of demonstration of all the
demonstrables.
In a sense, Ross^^ was correct in advocating a non-natural
interpretation to the terms 'better known'and 'prior.'Insofar as they
are better known and prior in the actuality of scientific knowledge
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but not its first potential being there is a 'natural' problem to be
faced.
And yet, if we look closely at what Aristotle says about the
nature of this "better" knowledge of the <■ which must be
possessed if there is to be any true demonstration we see that even
in the opening chapters of the Posterior Analytics he describes it in
a way that renders it fully consistent with the exercise of the method
3 b
as here presented. At Post.An.1,2,72 37-72 4, Aristotle writes:
Moreover, if a man sets out to acquire^^ the scientific
knowledge that comes through demonstration, he must not only
have a better knowledge of the basic truths and a firmer
conviction of them than of the connexion wThich is being
demonstrated: more than this, nothing must be more certain
or better known to him than these basic truths in their
character as contradicting the fundamental premisses which
lead to the opposed and erroneous conclusion (cuV 4St
r-<?3 °< PX^'5 ^ ^ ^ 6-trCc^c. 0"o~?)~Aoy ccr/-t-0^ O CTfj
irrUxriy^). For indeed the conviction of pure
science must be unshakeable.
This condition can not be fulfilled unless and until one has
followed out the process requisite to this condition. The "character"
whereby we are to secure this better knowledge of the 0(^*1. is the
dialectical examination of the conclusion entailed by taking the
contrary to the l as premisses. Aristotle here, as at Topics
3 118
101 34f, grounds the character of our better knowledge of the
s /
l in a preliminary dialectical exercise. Such a knowledge of
, •
the , dialectically attained, constitutes a sufficient (if not
the 'best') "better" knowledge from which we may proceed to make true
demonstrations and come, in the end, to transform the dialectically
> /
attained knowledge of the 1 with which we started into a full
comprehension in terms of the unity of the whole.
Such a dialectical procedure (described more fully at Topics
3 b
153 23- 24) does not constitute demonstration of the essence.
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Aristotle makes that very clear in the very same chapter (Post.An.
106
11,6,92 20-27) in which he rejected the validity as demonstration of
the proof of definition through the parts. It is not demonstration.
But that fact does nothing to reduce its immense importance in the
establishment of scientific knowledge.
We might properly conclude this study with a tentative and
admittedly sketchy map of the place which, on the thesis here
advanced, Aristotle gives to the apodeictic syllogism as described in
Post■An.Book 1.
The method is the same in all cases, in philosophy, in any
art or study Prior.An.46 3.
1. What confronts the scientist as he first determines to embark
upon a subject of enquiry is a confused whole to be analysed
(Physics 184a21f).
2. His first task will be to establish that he has taken his
subject in a properly analyseable form. To ask 'is God?' or
'is man?' is to ask 'why is God?'or 'why is man?'. But such
questions are meaningless. We must ask 'is God something?'
before we can go on to ask 'why God is something?' and through
that enquiry to arrive at the knowledge "God is." In doing
this the philosopher is establishing the "defined rules" of
the subject area (De Part An.639 13).
3. Once he has properly framed the question (perhaps by estab-
Si'
lishing its category - cf. De An.402 23) we then proceed
(Prior An.1,30) "to look for the attributes and the subjects
of both our terms and supply ourselves with as many of these
as possible" (46a4-6). Division will be a great help in
achieving this and will ensure that nothing is omitted (Post.
An.96b25-26, 35-36, Prior An.1,31).
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We then proceed to syllogise, or, as Aristotle puts it
(46 6-7) "consider them by means of the three terms, refuting
statements in one way confirming them in another." Where
demonstration is possible right away it is made. Where it is
not thus possible we turn to dialectic (46 7-10; cf. Topics
10la34f; 153a23-b24, Post An.72&37-72b4). This constitutes
our "analysis," the reducing of the material presented in
stages 1-3 above to arguments in the moods of the three
figures (47 2-5). However since it is possible to hunt the
q
essence through the 1st figure only (Post.An.79 24-25) we
3 b
must know how to reduce or "analyse" (Prior An.51 22, 4).
Our analysis will be completed with the reduction to 1st
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figure form of the material gathered in stages 1-3.
We then undertake to test the analysis we have created and
trace back the chain of middles (89 12-14). In so doing we
realize that we will be coming to perceive the proximate
matter of the subject in hand, which will be seen as one with
the nature of the subject of our enquiry. The experience
gained in these procedures will enable us eventually, with
time, to see the unity of the synthesis and hence attain the
c
true of scientific knowledge. However, this synthesis
must, itself constitute not simply a review but a critical
test. We recognise that this experience, and our whole under¬
standing, must be subjected to the test of the phenomena. We
must subject it to this test, therefore, by "telling the
causes" and engaging in a further reanalysis of those causes
(E.E.1216b35f).
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The effective occasion for such a recounting of the
causes is the didactic context. We must therefore, in this
context, be careful not to use the apodeictic form in
recounting the causes because: (a) learning proceeds in the
opposite direction to that of Jiro ; and (b) we would
lead the students away from the causes, rather than towards
the causes. The students are not only learners. They
discharge an indispensible function within the process in so
far as it is they who provide the true synthetic verification
or falsefication of the science.
6. The truth is complex, and we must rely upon the capacity of
those who listen (a) to understand what is said, and (b) to
subject what is said to the most rigorous test in terms of
the phenomena. Therefore we must secure adequate critics by
training them in the method so that they may themselves use it
against us. Therefore we insist that they learn and practice
the lessons of the Analytics.
The apodeictic syllogism appears in none of Aristotle's works
because it is we who are to use it in critically assessing the
"causes" recounted to us by Aristotle in his treatises, as he has used
it in coming to understand the subjects of his various studies. It
is we who are to use it as a tool within a process which is designed
so that we too may come, in time and with experience, to attain that
intuitive grasp of the essences - which insight constitutes the




1. 1. Allan (1), p. 126.
CHAPTER I - THE PROBLEM
3. 1. Barnes P- 123.
3. 2. Barnes P- 137 (and notes).
3. 3. Barnes pp. 125-137 (and notes), and 138f.
4. 4. Barnes pp. 125-126.
4. 5. Barnes pp. 126-127.
4. 6. Barnes pp. 127-137.
4. 7. Barnes P- 138.
4. 8. Barnes P- 137f.
4. 9. Barnes P- 138.
5. 10. The term 'scientist' and 'philosopher' can
be used interchangeably in the Aristotelian context.
. See A. Mansion (1).
5. 11. See below, Chapter 5, esp. p. 99f and note 102 on p.
101.
5. 12. See below, Chapter 4.
CHAPTER II - THE QUESTION
6. 1. Allan (1), p. 126.
6. 2. As to the grounds for such an assumption on Aristotle's
part we need look no farther than the Academy. The
broad outlines, at least, of such a common view of the
nature of are available in the Republic
itself. (cf. H. D. P. Lee, p. 124 ". . . there is a




the logical procedure of science and Plato's dialec¬
tic.") Cf. also e.g. von Fritz, p. 39.
On the question of the chronological sequence of
Aristotle's own writings and the place of the Posterior
Analytics, it will be sufficient for the purposes of
this study, to adopt the view expressed by Msgr.
Mansion (1), pp. 5-6: "II en resulte que les traites,
- tels que nous les possedons -, rendent en gros la
pensee d'Aristote, au terme de son evolution . . ."
This seems a somewhat more balanced view than that
expressed by During (1), p. 7, in that it does not
discount the possible role of evolution in our under¬
standing of Aristotle's thought, but does place it
within a context.
7. 3. Barnes, p. 123.
7. 4. Barnes, p. 124.
7. 5. Barnes, p. 124, note 4; Post.An.71^19f. All references
are to the Ross edition.
/
7. 6. Barnes also omits any reference to the term l7~p^ctujs
(line 21), but this is perhaps understandable in that
Barnes is listing the characteristics appropriate to
the differentiation of any apodeixis from other varie¬
ties of syllogism, and not merely those relating to
the initial or ultimate apodeixeis.
Translation that of The Works of Aristotle, translated
under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Unless otherwise
indicated all translations of Aristotle's works quoted
in this study will be taken from this Oxford transla¬
tion.
cf. Ross (1), pp. 509-510.
Ross (1), p. 53. Cf. Wieland (1), pp. 129-130.
For Ross' comments on -rfs>o u)o~bourse- (71^31cf 72a28)
see (1), pp. 54-55.
Even though he must begin all his searching, of course,
with "things known to us." cf. e.g. E.N.1095^3-4;
Meta.1029^3. The student who has not yet attained the
stage where he is more convinced in his own right of
the premisses must reconcile himself to accepting the
cogency of his teacher's assertions. cf. 71a7, 76^27;









9. 12. We shall deal with Aristotle's meaning in lines 72^1-3
below in Chapter 5. (See pp. 104-106).
10. 13. Aristotle is quite explicit on this (71^31-33).
10. 14. Wieland (3), pp. 69-85. Cf. Meta.1029b3-12: Topics
141b15f. See also McKeon's comment (p. 27): "When it
is a question, therefore, of demonstration or scienti¬
fic proof, as it is in the Posterior Analytics, the
distinction is between proof and principles, and the
cogency and validity of the proof is shown to depend
on first principles which are prior and better known
than the conclusions or the demonstrations (72b25-30;
100b8-10), and the superior demonstration is shown to
be that which proceeds from better known and prior
premisses (86b27-30; 87a25-30)."
McKeon's statement could, I think, be stronger. The
cogency and validity of the apodeictic syllogism (as
distinct from the syllogism generally) is shown to
depend upon our better and prior knowledge of the
principles which are themselves, of course, prior and





Ross (1), p. 528.
cf. S.E.170al2f.
Ross (1), p. 511 emends the text to give a meaning
different to Mure's in the translation quoted. Yet
Ross' interpretation offers similar support. Aristotle
insists that there is an order to the "belonging" which
must be taken into account in tracing the order of our
knowing.
15. 18. The translation quoted is that of the Oxford transla¬
tion except for the words "connect up its arguments"
for which the Oxford translation gives "string together
its phrases" in rendering trwe-<'(>cu<r<. j
(line 21). The translation here offered seems more
appropriate in the light of Aristotle's use of the
term (^^r^f^/) at Meta. 986a7 where the sense is
clearly more of close, even rigorous, connexion, rather
than of casual succession as is implied by "string
together." I would suggest that the activity Aristotle
has in mind here is something resembling that of
producing a "finite set of connected <J/To Ze-Sft-cj to
which Barnes refers (p. 123).
15. 19. It should be noted that this passage occurs within a
dialectical context, and that Aristotle's own treatment
of (1147a24f) has a more strictly psychological
character, and does not in fact turn upon epistemolo-
gical considerations such as those cited here. The
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epistemology, however, is genuinely Aristotelian, as
we shall see. The fact that the problem of
is not to be resolved in epistemological but psycho¬
logical terms does not vitiate the epistemological
principles themselves (see below). Burnet notes (his
editorial comment on 1146^31f, p. 299) that the epis¬
temological considerations are derived from the theory
of potential knowledge first worked out by Plato in
the Theaetetus. Aristotle is showing the Academy how
may be explained in terms of e-mxr-r^even
though^he does not so explain it himself. It is
, however, that Aristotle feels is not adequately
explained in terms of these epistemological doctrines;
he does not reject the epistemological doctrines in
their own right.
15. 20. Burnet, p. 300.
17. 21. On the operation of impediments to the actualization
of potentials, see Physics 255a30-33 and Ross (6),
p. 695.
On the question of "how ignorance is dissolved and
the incontinent man regains his knowledge," Aristotle
tells us that "it is the same as in the case y£ the
man drunk or asleep," and is not peculiar to-d/C
(1147^61). Burnet feels (p. 304, note 12) that
Aristotle is here referring us to a discussion such as
that in the De Somno concerning how the sleeping man
wakes up. But Aristotle is not referring to the physio¬
logical processes of 'waking up'; rather he is refer¬
ring us to discussions of the physiological processes
of^how a sleeping (or drunk, or^<.^r^j) man
t and the locus of his reference
would therefore seem more likely to be a passage such
as De An.II,5(417a10f and a21f) or Physics 247°lf where
this question is properly put in its 'general context'
(ouC chio$ c'dees coo rrl>-9ous 1147^8) "that 'general
context' being the movement from potential to actual -
the related problems such as sleep, drunkenness,
madness, and the impediment to be surmounted when a
science has first been learned (247^16-17) are noted
as special cases.
At first glance it might seem strange to rank lack of
with impediments like sleep, drunkenness,
madness, etc. Aristotle's use of 'sleep' as an example
of an impediment standing between a potential state
and its final actualization might seem to suggest that
it is his view that the simple act of waking up imme¬
diately and per se transforms the potential into the
actual. But as the Physics makes clear (255a30f)
Aristotle has no such simple view of the processes
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involved. The simple act of waking up merely resolves
the impediment - it does not impart the r-^ which
brings the full potentiality into being nor transform
the potentiality into actuality. Thus the 6-ver(3y&t.j.of the upward movement of fire is not caused by the
removal of an impediment to movement. And 'the sleep¬
ing geometer' may become an actual when he
wakes up (he certainly will not unless he wakes up.'),
but he may also move to the other state, that of
(Physics 255^5). So too oc may, with
the passage of time so secure potentia secunda that
they will be able to at will (unless they have
time they will not achieve this), but this will only
happen, as we shall see, if experience occurs and
is operative, and there is something actual, a teacher,
to actualize the potentiality of the student.
17. 22. Moraux, p. 80.
18. 23. There are several codices, apparently, which offer
(with Burnet) crvy. /c/i/wx , but is the reading
of cod. Laurentianus LXXX.11 (of which Bywater
comments (preface): "optimum esse codicem . . .") (cf.
Bywater, p. 135). Neither Bywater nor Burnet offer
any support from the m.s. tradition for Thurot's
conjecture of for rv-j •
18. 24. The au'rruj is ambiguous - it may either mean "not yet"
or "not" as a reinforced negative. Aristotle's practice
seems to give no help. See Bonitz Ind.Aristotelicus
541a12-13 for a selection offering both uses. "Not
yet" is perfectly acceptable in either (a) or (b) ,
whereas "not" could only easily be accepted in (b).
19. 25. Burnet, p. 301.
3. b
19. 26. Physics 255 30-255 5 quoted above (p. 16) in transla¬
tion. This is perhaps to labour a point in an attempt
to emphasize a key aspect of Aristotle's methodology.
The movement from possession of the arguments relating
to the facts of a science to being a scientist requires
some attention.
20. 27. See above, note 18.
21. 28. We will note in Chapter 3 below, q.v., the role of
as ultimate actualization. Further we will
note that Aristotle is most careful, when referring to
those who have attained potentia secunda, to specify
that no impediments remain, and that all that is now
required is a simple exercise of the will to occasion
. We may note, in this regard, the caution
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exhibited in the phrase cv s oc 6-v o
An. 429^6-7), and the insertion of the
criterion itself in this passage.
21. 29. See Bonitz. Ind. Arist.. p. 719^20f.
22. 30. De An.429^5f and, generally, De An.Ill, 4-8.
22. 31. When Aristotle speaks,as he often does, of *<c i-rrnrrj/<*.c
he is referring to capacities of (rrrc^-r^ , not to
bodies of knowledge separable from knowers.
23. 32. That is, the special of the individual sciences.
23. 33. "Critical" in terms of this study, since it raises
again the adequacy of Barnes' treatment (corroborated
by Ross) of the defining conditions for the Aristotelian
apodeictic syllogism.
23. 34. On the bracketing of this line by Bywater, see note 39
below.
23. 35. cf. E.N.1095a2f.
24. 36. But see Post.An.81^2f.
25. 37. This comment is strongly reminiscent, to say the least, 1
Aristotle's comments in the initial chapters of the
Posterior Analytics I concerning the requirement that
the demonstration must be performed by one who has a
better and prior knowledge of the Apj*ocl , and that "the
man who sets out to acquire the scientific knowledge
that comes through demonstration must . . . have a
better knowledge of the basic truths and a firmer
conviction of them than of the connexion which is
being demonstrated" (72a37f). Clearly oc vt-oc and
of ZTafJioi/ are not in such a position though
time, experience, and VoUj will provide the conditions
for their attaining this position.
25. 38. But cf. Problemata 955^22 A<-X. Z £ ZTp & cr A i/TT&p o c
\ / v —* J/
fAe-v y t✓ efii-6-v'oc. /ov A . . .
25. 39. Burnet brackets this line in his text (as does Bywater,
and Ross in his translation) saying (p. 281): "These
words break the argument here, nor do they come in
very well after <*urv) S' crr-cf above, where Rassow
and Bywater would place them. ..." But Burnet does
not doubt the genuineness of the text nor offer any
alternative to the relocation proposed by Bywater and
Rassow. Indeed, while the expression is admittedly
abrupt the line seems not so much to 'break the argu¬
ment' as to gloss the argument. Aristotle is dealing,
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albeit tersely, with the very issue we are at present
considering - viz. the apparent restriction of the
operation of Youj to one particular age group, while
his general theory seems to cast the operation ofvowj
as the prius of all apodeictic arguments. These words
simply affirm the obvious; that is the beginning
and end of apodeictic activity, and that demonstrations
proceed 'from these' L (acquired by ke't/j operating
in the initial phase), and are 'about these'
(cf. 1094b20; 1095a3f) both in the sense that the
£<(?)(o<-' stipulate the subject matter (as definitions)
of the demonstrative sciences; and also in the sense,
as the context here shows, that experience in the
demonstrations themselves enables Vo35 to acquire a
fuller comprehension of the o<o^«a (cf. De An.402a16f;
Post.An.89a14 - )
26. 40. cf. ELN. 1141a17f (u»W>f- a19)
is again cast in a finalizing and completing role -
after the occurrence of some formal j
26. 41. See Chapter 3 below; cf., e.g., E.N.1146b31f; Physics
255b2; Meta.1048a34.
26. 42. Lee, P- 122.
26. 43. Lee, P- 120. von Fritz, p. 39 elaborates the issue.
27. 44. When we have finally attained true knowledge and turn
to its integration (return into the "cave" either in
action or in comprehension) we already possess the
c(or in Aristotle's terms) in the fullest
possible sense. Yo^in.^ may now be said to be to come
, prior to (or to <*.c$ ) in the order
of time as well (cf. E.N.1095a32f). Also see Republic
VI, 510b, 511b; Phaedo 101^; Meno 86e on the deductive
processes through which Socrates is constrained to
move prior to the final insight.
27. 45. It is in view of this that Aristotle uses the term
XoLL where Plato uses the term urro (in Plato's
case to designate premisses which are adopted as
unproven but proveable by deduction from the ultimate
single .
We might well ask at this point how they are to be
recognised as if it requires some subsequent act
of i/« 0^ , occurring after the have been
elaborated, to fully comprehend their nature. This
issue will form a main theme of the remaining chapters
of this study.
We might anticipate that discussion here, however, in
the interests of orientation. It will be suggested
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(in Chapter 5) that dialectic proceeds, oil the basis
of a careful "historical" catalogue of all the pertinent
facts available relating to subject genus, to limit
the range of the to those which may be intuited
by /<as the definition of the subject genus. At
this point this is viewed not so much as a definition
but as an act of immediate predication. The finite
set of connected are then elaborated and
the "science" expands by drawing on the already prepared
'historia' of the subject. Once this is completed
Sis then able to make its final intuitive induction
7 '
of the initial <*{*,*•*-<- 9 this time perceived and under-
stood and defended in their definitional character.
At this point the science is finally completed both in
form and in content. Potentia secunda has been secured.
"Discovery," however, is still possible even after
this final stage of complete and comprehensive know¬
ledge of the since we may well be presented with
^rrefZo't within the area of the science which will
require resolution, and discovery is precisely the
resolution of c*'77i>g<*.c (E.N. 1146^7-8). Scientific
knowledge is the ability, S , to demonstrate; it
is not the possession of the demonstrations themselves
per se. , the actualization of scientific
knowledge, would seem possibly to be best described as
continuing "discovery" (or rediscovery) of individual
c within any area of science.
28. 46.
See Chapter 5 below Gf. v/ew Frtitj j /d^h)
28. 47. The allusion here is to the somewhat perplexing passage
at Physics 184a21f which would seem to reflect this
kind of methodological intention on Aristotle's part,
cf. Wieland (1), p. 131.
28. 48. cf. Post.An.7lb28-29.
29. 49. See Chapter 5, note 120. The further question of the
cyclical reasoning which seems implicit in any metho¬
dology such as that here suggested will be examined in
Chapter 5 as will be the question of whether the final
activity of ✓<>« ^ constitutes proof in any sense of
that word.
30. 50. Cherniss, p. 66f.
30. 51. cf. Post. An.1,3, especially 72^18f. cf. also E.N.1151
a15-19.
To say that knowledge of the immediate 1 is
'ds*.77~o £(~x/ctq✓ (72^20) is not quite to say that it is
"independent of demonstration" (G. R. G. Mure's Oxford
translation), but rather that it is non-demonstrative.
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We may, at this stage in the discussion, at least
entertain the possibility that Aristotle perceives the
proper relationship between the and the I'rro &(-'<}er<j
as parallel to the relationship that obtains between
the first principles of morality and the virtues. Just
as the virtues "save the first principles" (E.N.1151
a15-19) so too the arguments "save the first principles"
of the sciences. If, further, we see this against the
backdrop of the Aristotelian doctrine concerning the
acquisition of the virtues (the difference between the
moral and intellectual virtues in this regard will be
examined in Chapter 3) then we begin to perceive a
further relationship between and the a^uc-v-*-
paralleling the dictum that 'one becomes good by doing
good actions.1 But it remains unalterably true
that "neither in that case is it the argument that
teaches the first principles." ^ ^ce-Z &
Zioyo^ &c C cd>V E_j£. tiS~l a/"J-l8)
For a recurrence of the term in this context
see De An.417^3f. I
30. 52. Ross (1), p. 49.
31. 53. It would seem significant that, in the Nicomachean
Ethics when Aristotle is defining and refers
us to the Posterior Analytics for the defining condi¬
tions, he singles out for special mention that very
condition which Barnes ignores and Ross would treat in
a non-natural way (E.N.1139^31-35).
31. 54. cf. Kapp, pp. 79-80. It would seem possible that Kapp
might be in danger of tending too much in the other
direction (though in very much the right direction) if
he excludes from Aristotle's intention any function
for syllogistic reasoning from principles to conclu¬
sions. It seems not to be a case of one role operating
to the exclusion of the other, but rather of a real
reciprocity between the two roles.
3l. 55. cf. also S.E.165^30. See Plato Euthydemos 277a, where
we note the use of corresponding to
r~cJ*o'ju in S.E. 165^32.
31. 56. Allan (1), p. 147.
31 57. This convinced recognition is, as has been argued,
contingent upon the operation of induction and is, in
essence, a kind of verification. This is a process,
however, which is conceived of by Aristotle as an
operation of the soul - as a psychological process
rather than as a logical process of proof (cf. Kapp,
pp. 78-82). It would not be extreme, then, to say
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that Aristotle requires his science to be self-verifying -
to contain its own verification - before it may be
genuinely admitted as a science.
32. 58. See, inter alia Post.An.72^If.
32. 59. Ross (1), p. 530 seems clearly to offer the correct
interpretation of this passage.








Chapter 2 above, p. 16f; on this occasion he uses
to exemplify the nature of the operation in
sense perception.
See Chapter 2 above, p. 16; cf. also p. 17, note 21.
See Chapter 2 above, p. 21f.
Allan (1), p. 147.
We must, of course, ask whether the object of the
is in fact a 'replica of the real.' We find
(see this chapter, below) that Aristotle's answer,
while somewhat ambiguous on this point, would seem to
suggest that the object of the is not a
'replica of the real' but rather the "individual," the
"particular" real thing, seen as an to be
resolved.
36. 7. cf. this chapter, below, pp. 43-46.
36. 8. Joachim (p. xiv) seems fully aware of the area of
distinction being drawn here, but seems to see no
inconsistency in continuing to look upon "truth" as
something which can be produced, a 'replica of the
real.'
37. 9. But cf. E.E.1216bll-15.
37. 10. This much of the text seems reliable but any attempt
at reconstruction of the last part of the sentence (see
Ross (4) , pp. 262-263) would be conjecture.
37. 11. See Chapter 2, p. 23f. We shall see in Chapters 4 and
5 below, how it is that Aristotle conceives of the
bodies of judgements as means to an end rather than the
end itself.
37. 12. Joachim, p. xiv.
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38. 13. As does Ross in his Oxford translation, though he
appears later to have had second thoughts. Ross (4),
p. 251. (But, again, see his note on 1087a13, Ross (4),
p. 466.) cf. also Wieland (1), p. 132.
38. 14. Ross (4), p. 466.
38. 15. cf. Meta.999a24 for a similar acknowledgement of
intense difficulty in this and immediately related
matters.
39. 16. cf. Allan (1), p. 160 where the implications are drawn
from this; but cf. De An.417a29.
39. 17. We have, for example, instances of Aristotle's use of
the term %k.*o-zt»s to refer, manifestly, to
universals of diminished generality. cf. e.g. De Part.
An.642^5 (cf., possibly, Post.An.71a9; 71a17f; 79a5f.)
40. 18. We might be tempted to conclude that Aristotle sees in
this psychological fact the peculiar virtue of the
knowledge of universals - namely, that it renders us
more capable of finally knowing the particulars, the
substances, the real things. (cf. Meta.1087a15f). Yet
this temptation must be resisted and J. Owens (1) is a
great help in strengthening our resolve. Aristotle's
denial of this possibility is categorical at Meta.
1036a6-8 and again at Meta.1040al-7 (as elsewhere).
As we shall see in Chapter 5, Aristotle makes it a
clear part of his method to isolate those parts of the
formula of a thing which belong qua matter and which
qua form so that the knowledge of the individual through
its form is quite possible. cf. Prior An.67^1-5. As
Owens puts it; ((2), p. 163) "The universal, upon which
scientific knowledge is based, is therefore for
Aristotle something that is identical with each of the
singulars in turn" (Meta. 26, 1023^30-32).
40. 19. Hamlyn, p. 103 - the locus of his discussion is his
note on De An.417^16.
41. 20. LeBlond makes a parallel observation (p. 273f) and
attempts to distinguish (what he accuses Aristotle of
failing to distinguish) between concept and definition.
(See also his shock at the inadequate basis of
Aristotle's apodeictic science on p. 274.) It is a
very real question, I think, whether we should attempt
to distinguish knowing and thinking, or definition and
concept, in Aristotle's thought. The unity of his
method depends, in large measure,upon seeing the
synthesis of these, not in trying to separate them.
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41. 21. See Ross (6), p. 676; cf. Categories 9a3f;
956b40.
Problemata
42. 22. By this stage the only requisite condition
desire, De An.417b27; cf. Meta.1048a16.
is that of
42. 23. e.g. Post.An.74b5f; E.N.1139b20f.
43. 24. Post An.93a5.







not entirely contradict such emphatic assertions as
e.g. Allan's ((1), p. 147): "It must be emphasized
again that this is not a principle of scientific
research, but an ideal (perhaps a visionary one) of
the presentation of scientific truth, obtained by other
means, in such fashion as to make its full necessity
appear."
Certainly the role of is the presentation
of scientific truth, but, it is argued here, that
"presentation" takes place principally within the
context of a search for the truth (though it acts,
too, as the model for the resolution of
encountered after the "truth" has been secured, and as
the model for the man who has attained philosophic
wisdom, E.N.VI,7).
e.g. De Anima 429b7; 417a27; E.N.10,7; Meta.1048a16.
For a revealing exposition of this important distinc¬
tion on Aristotle's part see On Memory and Recollec¬
tion 450b20-451a2.
Categories 6b2; 8b25; lla20; Physics 246b3f; 247blf;
E.N.1139b31; Post An.99b18,25,32. Generically, says
Aristotle, knowledge is a relation, while specifically,
sciences are qualities. cf. Meta.A, ch.15.
Bonitz, Ind. Arist. 261a13-14.
e.g. E.N.6,2.
(u is the source and sustenance of intellec¬
tual virtue (E.N.1103a15-16) because, it will be
suggested, it is a training in the way to use those
statements appropriate to each science so that the
"soul may tell the truth by way of affirmation or
denial" (E.N.1139b15).
45. 32. Categories 6b2; 8b25; lla20; Physics 246b3f; 247blf.
45. 33. cf. e.g. Categories 8b25f.
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45. 34. e.g. Post An.72a25f; 72bl-4.
46. 35. Post An.72b18f.
46. 36. e.g. E.E.1217alf.
46. 37. E.N. 1139b31-32.
46. 38. e.g. E.N.1143b6f; 1142a15f; E.E.1217alf.
46. 39. E.N.II,l,1103a14f.
46. 40. Note again the reference to time and experience. See
Chapter 2 above.
47. 41. E.N.II,5 and 6, especially 1106a15f.
47. 42. E.N.1106a16f; 1106a22-24; cf. Categories 8b25-35;
6^5f; 6b32-36; lla20.
47. 43. E.N.1,12, especially 1101b12-21; cf. 1,13,1103a8-10.
47. 44. Burnet calls attention to this point of similarity
between the moral and intellectual virtues in his
commentary on E.N.1103a32, see his edn. p. 77; cf.
Meta.IX,5.
47. 45. The text reads: OuSt- i/t* p Tov octitroJ d~>rer-<- Z~PorrDi/ drri
>
_ y. 1 / ,. > j x U cry
r<4- ffi' (-frc.tr-cyfj.uiv v fCjtc (rrc
Aristotle is not, of course, denying his long standing
principle that an irTrto-zr^'fx ^ is a • Rather^he is
pointing out that in one important respect an (rTTCa-rr^/j. vy
behaves in a different manner from the other 'states
of character.' His meaning is made clear in the
context.
47. 46. cf. E.N.1129a3f. Note Aristotle's comments at Meta.
994b32f.
48. 47. cf. e.g. De An.417a26f; 429b5.
48. 48. cf. E.N.1139b15.
CHAPTER IV - Tjcvc $((u
50 1. On this theme see Fortin. His study lays the ground¬
work for seeing a technical use for the term
in Aristotle, but does not make precise the lines that
tie it to the Analytics nor to its role within the
growth of science. cf. also Schramm, M., ch. 4, Die
Bedeutung Der Teleologie, especially pp. 150-153.
50 2. Burnet, p. xxxii.
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50. 3. On Jaeger's bracketing of these lines in the Oxford
text see Ross (3), pp. 262-263. See also Meta.995a12f
where the same theme appears.
I.
59. 4. Burnet, p. xxxiv.
51. 5. As, for instance, at Meta.994b32f; E.N.1094b23f.
51. 6. The burden of the passage at 994b32f seems to be to the
effect that we should suspend our methodological expec¬
tations and yet the concluding lines suggest rather
that we should equip ourselves with the right expecta¬
tions. £< o St-7 Vu>$
^ jC) " £-/T70- f /cd fjoZ/Tef
>ji '£rr< <S ' 00&& QArt-fa/ <?i/ Plat/3t-iif,
(995a12-14)
52. 7. cf. E.E.1216 35f examined below.
52. 8. Burnet, p. xxxii.
52. 9. Meta.l005b3; Meta.994b32; E.N.1094b22.
52. 10. It is in this sense that the Posterior Analytics is
about " TTot<roL. £1*.^
(Post.An.7lal).
53. 11. Except, presumably, where we are dealing with avhypo-
thesis (Post.An.76 27-31). But even here the student's
judgement determines the status of the procedure -
cf. 76b29-31.
53. 12. cf. De Part.An.639a14-15.
55. 13. Perhaps the principle of "excess and defect" is no more
a logical principle than the principle of the "middle
term" in logic or of the "mean" in moral growth. They
all constitute recurrences of a fundamental metaphysical
principle which lies right at the heart of Aristotle's
philosophical perspective, (cf. Meta.1005b5-8; and Meta.
T\ 4) All three principles require great descrimn-imt^
in their application.
55. 14. Presumably he acts on the basis of the
supplied in a thorough "historia-" cf.
below, pp. 1 obj-.
56. 15. Allan (2), p. 307.
57. 16. See below, Chapter 5, p. 90 and note 77
58. 17. cf. Prior.An.1,30.
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58. 18. Hicks, p. 190f, does not regard Aristotle's use of the
term here as strict and, accordingly, interprets this
passage differently. The considerations which compel
Hicks to take this path are themselves critically
examined, and their sting removed, in Chapter 5
below.
59. 19. Barnes (p. 145, note 103) acknowledges that the
passage at De_An.402al1-22 is "less clear" on his
interpretation. He shows no awareness of the present
passage (402t>l6f) at all.
60. 20. Ross (5), p. 167 offers the proper interpretation as
with Bonitz, Ind.Arist. 811a58, of tr^i/ j-tvva^r/-ci/
as col>c~o ©" j^Ve-rvct. With this idea cf.
Topics 163^9; cf. Wieland (1), p. 135.
60. 21. See also Hicks, p. 193.
£
61. 22. See De An.413 13f where Aristotle shows how the causal
definition of the parts of the soul reveals the nature
of soul.
61. 23. cf. Meta.1006 llf - see Chapter 5 below, especially
p. 98f.
CHAPTER V - £cJ,*(r/S^7\ r
62. 1. Roland-Gosselin, p. 236.
62. 2. Aristotle interprets Socrates' definitional method as
a "seeking to syllogise" Meta.1078^23-27. "But it was
natural that Socrates should seek the essence. For he
was seeking to syllogize, and the essence is the
starting point of syllogisms." See note 52 of this
chapter below.
62. 3. Mansion (2), p. 79.
62. 4. Mansion (2), pp. 58-59.
63. 5. One must recognize the debate between Wieland (1,3)
and his critics, notably Tugendhat. See Chapter 5
below, pp. 97-98. Wieland tries to discount passages




Mansion (2), p. 63.
For a comment on this sort of approach to the question,
see McKeon, pp. 37-38.
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64. 8. Mansion (2), p. 63.
64. 9. cf. E.N.1139b28f.
65. 10. See M. Grene, especially pp. 80-96.
65. 11. Roland-Gosselin, p. 674.
65. 12. e.g. Post An.90a6-92a5; 92b4-38; Prior An.2,23; Post
An.1,3; Meta.1025b14; 1064a9; De An.402a10f.
65. 13. cf. e.g. Post An.72b18f.
66. 14. De An.402a16-17. Of course the "question of essence"
is not met by the method proposed at Post An.II,13,
96a20f, nor does Aristotle make any such claim for
that method as providing a synthetic grasp of the
essence in its necessity. It is, rather, a method
"for tracing the elements predicated as constituting
the defineable form" (96a22-23). The role which this
particular technique plays within the overall economy
of Aristotelian method may be seen from the opening
words of the succeeding chapter (Post An.II,14): "In
order to formulate the connexions we wish to prove
we have to select our analyses and our divisions."
The technique proposed in Chapter 13 is a technique
designed to prepare the way for the syllogistic oper¬
ation by clarifying the nominal definitions of the
subject area involved, and as such it corresponds to
the advice given in Prior An.1,30. It is worth noting
for instance that Aristotle makes the same claim for
the value of division as preventing any omission at
Post An.96b35 as he made at Prior An.46a24-25.
66. 15. Aristotle there notes that the process of reasoning
used, e.g. by the carpenter or anyone involved in the
constructive sciences or arts, can not be used, "to
track back the series of necessary antecedents to a
starting point, of which you can say that, existing
itself from eternity, it has determined their existence
as its consequent" (Oxford translation).
See Chapter 2, above. cf. E.N.1143^13-14; also De Gen.
et Corr.316a5, and Post An.81b5. See M. B. Evans,
pp. 484-485.
e.g. Meta.1029a33-b12.
Allan (1), p. 112. But cf. Wieland (2), p. 152.
cf. Vlastos, pp. 291-296. For a similar view to







68. 20. e.g. Phaedo 100C9f. cf. Vlastos, p. 291f, especially
p. 296.
68. 21. cf. Phaedo 100C9 and 97Cf. cf. Wieland (2), p. 152f.
68. 22. Valstos, p. 297, note 15; p. 302 and note 35. Further
we must, of course, heed Vlastos' warning not to con¬
fuse the Greek aitia with what we might call cause.
We are not dealing here with science or with causes
as they might be recognised today.
69. 23. cf. Meta.987b1-4; Meta.1078^17-19,23. This is not to
say that proper scientific method is inapplicable to
such studies. Aristotle claims that his developed
method is applicable to all sciences. cf. De Part.An.
639alf. Also see Post An.1,1,7l^f, Prior An.1,30,
46a3-4; 46a10-18. At Eudemian Ethics 1216b35 Aristotle
again confirms this principle with reference to ethical
studies.
69. 24. There is also a further subdivision; see Physics 194
36-194b7. However this latter subdivision itself
disappears once Ethics is treated, methodologically,
as a practical science.
69. 25. Indeed, given the Socratic epistemological and ethical
doctrines as depicted in the early dialogues it would
seem not only "reasonable" but inescapable that he
should construct his method in this way.
70. 26. McKeon, passim.
70. 27. cf. E.E.1216bll-15.
70. 28. De Gen.et Corr.335^7-17.
70. 29. Plato himself points to the fact that the practical
and productive sciences originate in man's power.
Politicus 258d-^.
72. 30. During (2), p. 215.
72. 31. During, idem.
73. 32. cf. Meta.1025^31; 1064a23; Physics 194a6; De An.403^1;
in fact we might cite all those many passages where
Aristotle invokes the "snub nose" image as the paradigm
of method for the natural scientist, e.g. De An.429b14,
19; 431b13; Physics 186b22, 194a13; Meta.1030b17,29,
31; 1035a5-6; S.E.173b10.
73. 33. Aristotle insists that there is nothing to prevent
something being both for a purpose and by necessity.
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De Gen.An.788^9-20; 789^2-5; On Respiration 471^30-
472a25; cf. De Part.An.642a31-32. In fact showing how
that which is for a cause comes-to-be by necessity is
the core of his method in natural science, and with
suitable modifications, in other areas of study.
73. 34. During (2), p. 215f. Schramm, p. 167f; but cf.
Kullmann, p. 140, note 1.
73. 35. During (2), p. 216.
74. 36. See J. Owens (3), pp. 213-214, where there appears to
be something of a misconstruction of Aristotle's
intentions on this issue. Aristotle does not model
his scientific method on the processes operative in
the constructive sciences, but rather as the texts
here examined make clear, he develops his method in
the theoretical sciences out of a contrast with the
procedure of the constructive sciences on certain
crucial issues, notably the role of final cause. cf.
Wieland (2), p. 154.
74. 37. This is not to say that ethics, as a constructive
science, is simply a deliberative process. Clearly it
contains within it, as a means, a theoretical study
(conducted as a theoretical method - cf. E.E.1216^32f,
especially 35f) of the things that are always or for
the most part. Aristotle permits the integration
of theoretical studies into the constructive at E.E.
1216bl5ff. Eth ics combines what Aristotle separates
at e.g. Physics 194^1f.
For texts bearing on the identity of form and finality
see Bonitz, Ind.Arist., p. 753^28-32. On the synthesis
of these two in the producer see Owens (3), pp. 206-207.
Schramm, p. 171, however, casts this translation in
some doubt.
During (2), p. 218.
McKeon, p. 43.
cf. Meta.1045a20f.
Note Aristotle's problem with cv nvcuw Vvcu>^
Covt' at Post An. 94a2 l-22f. See Ross' (1)
comments (pp. 639-640). The distinction between
'atemporal' and 'eternal' in Aristotle's thought is








We can compare Aristotle's contrast between the 'best'
and the alternative modes possible with Socrates'
similar contrast at Phaedo 99cf. See Sayre, p. 4,
note 3, where he reviews the issues.
cf. Physics 198a21f; 198a31f; De An.403a24-b29. That
it is the principle, rather than the explicitly form¬
ulated final cause, to which the natural scientist
must hold, see Post An.2,6 and this chapter below,
p. 93f.
cf. Post An.79a24-25; 79a18-21. cf. also 88a5; 79a30;
78a5f~j 84^25-26. Barnes' attempt to take the "sting"
out of these passages (p. 143f) is somewhat hard to
accept. Barnes explains these passages on the grounds
that Aristotle is using a brachylogy. Yet Aristotle
goes on to explain that the universal and affirmative
features of the first figure fit it to disclose the
essence of a thing. This can hardly be regarded as a
brachylogy, especially in view of 79a30-31.
See Hope, p. 27.
e.g. De An.429al4,19; 431b13; Physics 186b22; Meta.
1025b31; 1030b17,29,31; 1035a5-6,26; 1064a23,25; S.E.
173b10.
cf. Post An.72 27-30. It must be remembered that the
De Partibus Animalium is concerned with the causes of
the parts of animals. cf. 639 10; 640a15; 646a7f; De
Gen,An.782a21f. See Peck's introduction to the Loeb
edn. , p. 8.
e.g. E.E.1216b3f.
e.g. De Gen.et Corr.315a35f.
Scientific knowledge is, for Aristotle, the ability
to solve problems, to resolve iciTc?~ it is not
so much the solution to those problems. Scientific,,
knowledge, the capacity to demonstrate, is coterminous
with the full comprehension of the subject essence as
the grounds for that possibility. Socrates' search
for definitions was truly a search for the ability to
syllogise, not for the sake of syllogising but for
the possibility that this creates for the knowledge
of essence. "For there was as yet none of the dialec¬
tical power which enables people even without the
knowledge of essence to speculate about contraries
and inquire whether the same science deals with con¬
traries" (Meta.107 8b23-27A
See above, pp. 79-80.
The structure must, as far as possible, be reduced
to the 1st figure to facilitate this process. (See
note 46 of this chapter above.) It must be remem¬
bered that Aristotle nowhere presents his method as
a universally applicable technique or device guaran¬
teeing easy resolution. Rather it is a universally
applicable 77~<* &C->-u •
For a selection of texts, cf. Bonitz, Ind.Arist., p.
753b28-32. cf. Wieland (2), p. 151f, especially
p. 152.
See above, pp. 70-71, 77f.
Ross (1), pp. 611-612 does not make the point that at
Meta.1041a15 Aristotle insists that for a substance to
be it must be something and in comprehending what it
is we comprehend that it is. We may note Aristotle's
insistence at Meta.1006a18-21 that something signifi¬
cant be said.
For some illuminating reflections on the possible
linguistic basis for this, see^J. Lyons. On the
strictly copulative nature of etvA.<. in Aristotle, cf.
De Interpretatione 16b19-25, especially 22-25. We
see this expressed, in the teachings of Meta.1041a15f,
and the first two chapters of Post An.2, as reasoned
doctrine.
cf. Post An.93 20-29. As long as we are aware simply
of the existence of something accidentally (having
inferred its existence by association), we are still
in a "wholly negative state as regards awareness of
its essential nature" (93a25-26). We must undertake
to change this to the positive state by establishing
the causes of the properties, for as soon as we
apprehend an element in the thing's (e.g. man's or
thunder's) essential nature we reduce our difficulties
(93a27-28). We demonstrate the eclipse of the moon
through the eclipse's defining cause and in so doing
we realise that the moon is such as can be so eclipsed
(90a12-14). Once the cause is secured we are enabled
(Post An.2,9) to go about the comprehension of the
moon's own nature in "some other" way (93b21f). The
"some other way" is the task of t^ig scientist to work
out once he has constructed the of the special
science. See Chapter 4 above, p. 54f. We must
determine how the subject matter may best be handled,
cf. De Caelo 293b21f; 297b28f.
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83. 60. Aristotle does not minimize the difficulty of this
task. cf. Post An.93^32f.
83. 61. De Gen.et Corr.335^16; generally see 335&24-336a14.
00 62. Aristotle is careful to meet this judgement again at
Meta.984a16f.
00 63. De Gen.et Corr.335^30-336a14; cf. Physics 255a31f.
oo 64. Yet the mechanist forces of nature are not always
entirely contained by the operation of form. See
Aristotle's treatment of the ttnrcoju.c^ in the De
Partibus Animalium and at De den.An.788a8.
oo 65. De Part.An.640a10f.
moo 66. See this chapter above, p. 75f.
86. 67. For a similar separation of processes, see Physics
194^If where, again, the one deals with the form and
the other with matter though not, of course, the
matter per se (194^8-9f).
kOoo 68. See Barnes' comments (p. 145) and an alternative view
expressed by M. Evans, p. 481f.
kO00 69. cf. e.g. De Caelo 293a23-30; 197a2-6; Meta.1073b32-38
oo 70. See R. Robinson, pp. 464-465 and passim. The nature
of Greek isv't-^uo-tj is much debated. In this work we
are concerned with the term only in its Aristotelian
sense, and particularly in C+- Zu r-<. « * . See fur¬
ther below, note 120.
89. 71. Ross (1), p. 396 interprets the line 46a27 in a
different sense in his summary translation, but offers
no comment on it in his notes.
89. 72. Is Aristotle acknowledging the possibility of his own
failure to check detail, a feature of his biological
writings for which he has been so often censured?
£
89. 73. cf. Bonitz, Index Arist.809 40f for a selection of
texts testifying to the purification of theories which
occurs when the scientist, acting qua teacher, under¬
takes to i<lTZ>
89. 74. At Post An.76^27f we perceive the procedure of the
teacher. He advances a cause - a^hypothesis which he
can prove but does not. The student accepts this
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without asking the teacher for a proof, and proceeds
to test it by himself, applying the rules of the
Analytics for he has the 77~.cc it has provided.
The student must have grounds, in the exposition of
the teacher for accepting it, and it must not fly in
the face of observed fact to which the student must
continually refer. If the student has no opinion or
a contrary opinion it is an illegitimate postulate
and must be abandoned (76^30-32). We begin to perceive
some of the rules operative in the pedagogic moot as
Aristotle would have it conducted. See Ryle. The
theories must not confute the phenomena De Caelo 303a
3-24; Meta.1039a3-14.
89. 75. Roland-Gosselin, p. 674.
90. 76. cf. During (2), pp. 217-218.
90. 77. If we look once again at the Eudemian Ethics (1216^3f)
where Aristotle comments on Socrates' procedure in
comparison with his own we see that these consider¬
ations of the foundations of method lead Aristotle to
adopt a different point of departure and a more elab¬
orate method of procedure in his own ethical studies
than does Socrates.
Aristotle recognises, in common with the generality
of men (E.E.1,1; cf. 1216a27-^2; E.N.1,4), that there
is a goal to human behaviour called happiness which
is something lying within man's power (E.N.1096^34-35).
Clearly he does not, at this point, know what happi¬
ness is (e.g. E.N.1095a20f). But then the architect
has no very clear picture of what constitutes shelter
when he starts. What the architect realises he must
do is to start with a survey of what are the proper¬
ties and conditions without which shelter could not
be. Once these are established he must then turn to
examine how these conditions and properties may best
be brought into being to serve the goal of shelter.
Through this analysis he will come to a comprehension
of the things within his power which are the means
to the becoming of the shelter. These means, thus
reached in analysis, when they are undertaken by the
builder will in their concerted functioning consti¬
tute the form of an object - a house - appropriate to
the final cause, shelter.
In ethics then Aristotle recognises that he is faced
with a somewhat similar problem and must pattern his
reasoning processes accordingly. He is faced with a
vaguely defined goal to be attained, happiness (E.N.
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1095 14-30). In the face of this problem Aristotle
comments (E.N.1095a30f; (cf. Physics 184a10-21; De An.
413all-16) ^
"Let us not fail to notice, however, that
there is a difference between arguments from
and those to the first principles. For Plato,
too, was right in raising this question and
asking, as he used to do, 'are we on the way
from or to the first principles?' There is
a difference, as there is in a race-course
between the course from the judges to the
turning point and the way back. For, while
we must begin with what is known, things are
objects of knowledge in two senses - some to
us, some without qualification. Presumably,
then, we must begin with things known to us.
Hence any one who is to listen intelligently
to lectures about what is noble and just and,
generally, about the subjects of political
science must have been brought up in good
habits. For the fact is the starting point,
and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he
will not, at the start, need the reason as
well. ..."
Aristotle realizes that he must first move away from
first principles, away from the "judges," by clearly
establishing what is known to man, viz. the properties
and conditions without which happiness, whatever it
is, could never come to be. This process narrows, in
the case of ethics, to virtue as the condition of
happiness (E.N.l,7,1098a16-18). "Human good turns out
to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue,
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance
with the best and the most complete. Let this serve
as an outline of the good."
This definition of the good in terms of the prime
condition without which it could not come to be is all
that is required at this point in the procedure. The
final synthetic definition must await the conclusion
of the process as Aristotle has just warned us (E.N.
1095b2f).
Having established virtue as the prime condition for
the being of happiness he must round the "turning
point" by examining virtue. So too, it will be remem¬
bered, did Socrates examine virtue (E.E.1216b3f). But
Aristotle does this in a somewhat different manner.
Aristotle does not, like Socrates, examine virtue as
though it were an end in itself. Rather he undertakes
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to define it in terms of how it is produced and in
what materials and in what manner it is exhibited
(E.N.II,1 - 111,5) because in this way Aristotle
returns to the "judges" by manifesting the fitness of
virtue to its actualizing final cause, viz. happiness,
and in so doing he comes to an awareness of what
happiness is. In this method we see Aristotle's
intention, like that of the architect, realised in so
far as he designs the medium, whereby the form and
finality of human behaviour are unified and further,
in adopting this procedure he reveals to the observing
mind that same unity so that people are properly con¬
vinced. "And about all these matters the endeavour
must be made to seek to convince by means of rational
arguments, using observed facts as evidence and
examples" (E.E.1216^26f).
90. 78. At 995^20f Aristotle asks whether Metaphysics must
study substance only, or the attributes of substance
too. At 997a25-34, he asks the same question in an
expanded form. He answers (1003 32-1005a18) that we
must study the attributes that inhere generally.
91. 79. Roland-Gosselin, p. 674.
91. 80. See LeBlond, p. 272. (See also Meta.1034^2Of.) It
is significant to note that Aristotle contrasts defi¬
nitional unity with the unity of the Iliad (e.g.
1045a13) indicating possibly that his own conception
of definition is not that of a brief formula, but a
rather more comprehensive and extended exposition -
in fact the kind of exposition which we find in his
own works when each is taken as a whole (with obvious
exceptions, of course).
91. 81. During (2), p. 218.
>
92. 82. cf. E.N.1098a33f. "But each set of principles we must
try to investigate in the natural way ( ^ ,
and we must take pains to state them definitely, since
they have a great influence on what follows" (1098^4-7)
92. 83. cf. De Gen.An.760^27-33: "Such appears to be the truth
about the generation of bees, judging from theory and
from what are believed to be the facts about them; the
facts, however, have not yet been sufficiently grasped;
if ever they are, then credit must be given rather to
observation than to theories, and to theories only if
what they affirm agrees with the observed facts."
92. 84. During (2), p. 218.






92. 86. For an alternative view in this context, cf. Evans,
p. 485.
95. 87. This is the only instance I have been able to find
where Aristotle offers to expand upon an issue in the
Analytics. Of course there are many references to the
Analytics in his other works (Bonitz, Index Arist.
p. 102a30f), and its doctrines are cited, but the
importance of Post An.2,6 to Aristotle's thinking is,
I would suggest, seen as of some significance in his
offering to expand upon it here and in Meta.8,6.
cf. De An.413al3-16.
cf. Woodbridge, pp. 13-14.
It might be asked whether Plato required that defini¬
tions have demonstrative cogency. We may compare the
language of the Parmenides with that of the Theaetetus
ao,d cite the internal and relative nature of the yeryovo<>
versus the simpliciter of the Republic and
Sophist.
97. 91. Wieland (1), p. 135.
98. 92. However no attempt has been made here to examine the
structure of such an intuitive faculty. This falls
beyond the immediate scope of this study. See above,
pp. 28-32.
99. 93. S.E.165a38-bll. See Barnes, p. 137f.
100. 94. cf. e.g. Meta.1073^36; E.E.1236a26; De Gen.et Corr.
325a26; De Caelo 306a7; 309a26; Post An.89a5; De Gen.
An.760^33. Note especially De An.402b23; E.E.1216b35;
E.N.1179a16-22.
100. 95. cf. Protr. frag. 22 (Ross); and Meta.980a21f.
100. 96. cf. Barnes, 145 - I find it difficult to see the
difference, in this context, between "progress-reports"
and "text-books." To whom would these "progress
reports" be addressed?
100. 97. See Kapp, pp. 86-87.
100. 98. cf. F. M. Cornford, who attempts to disentangle two
programmes in Plato's presentation of dialectic, "one
of education and the other of research" (p. 37). Plato
clearly considers the two elements as integrated and
Aristotle certainly does, starting as he does with the
conception of t-m^ as a .
As Conford says (p. 173) : "Not that they could ever be
separated: the researcher is always learning; and in
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communicating his results he is teaching; while the
student who follows those results is exercising the
same faculties in rediscovering them."
The integration, for Aristotle at least, is more com¬
plete than this comment would imply, for "in communi¬
cating his results" the.researcher is not only teaching,
but also providing himself with the conditions for testing,
appraising,and more completely comprehending his own
findings through the rigorous criticism raised by his
students.
100. 99. cf. Meta.993a2-10.
100. 100. De An.417^2-7; Physics 255a30-255^2; De Gen.An.742a26;
Meta.1029a33-b12.
101. 101. Physics 184a10-21; De An. 413all-16; EhN.1095b3; Prior
An.68b35-37; Topics 105a16-19; See also Aristotle's
preference for example over enthymeme (corresponding
to induction and syllogism) at Rhetoric 1356^22-24;
1368a29-33; 1394a9-16.
101. 102. Barnes seems nowhere to take this principle into
account when he suggests that "a series of demonstra¬
tions is appropriate to the setting out of knowledge
securely achieved" (p. 145). This is certainly true.
It is this fact which admirably suits it to the analytic
role in which Aristotle casts it. Barnes completely
reverses the roles and completely vitiates any prac¬
tical utility when he suggests that it can act as a
medium for the communication of "knowledge securely
achieved"_, and when he says (p. 138) that the apodeictic
syllogism is "concerned exclusively with the teaching
of facts already won."
101. 103. Eh_N. 1139b27-28; cf. Post An. 81a40.
101. 104. cf. E.N.1146b7 where Aristotle characterizes discovery
as follows: y*^ tj £-o-zr
101. 105. Barnes, p. 138.
101. 106. S.E.18 6b 26.
101. 107. Kapp, p. 70.
101. 108. Kapp, p. 71.
102. 109. Topics 101a27 and 28-30.
102. 110. Plato wrote his dialogues




initiated. So too tradi-
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tion leads us to believe we have in the extant .
Aristotelian corpus the lectures to the initiated while
his popular writings have been lost. We have good
evidence of the "tailoring" referred to here.
103. 111. See Ryle; also see Fortin.
103. 112. Barnes, p. 138.
103. 113. He had good reason to be aware if for no other reason
than the restrictions that had been placed on the use
of various such techniques - see Ryle, p. 42.
104. 114. See this chapter, note 77 above-
104. 115. Post An.79a4-6; Meta.982a9-10.
104. 116. See Chapter 2 above, p. 8f.
105. 117. Note that there is no suggestion here of the use of
the apodeictic syllogism to convince someone else. It
is the one performing the <jrro&t~cwho is to achieve
the knowledge.
105. 118. On this passage see Solmsen, p. 54, note 3.
105. 119. See this chapter above, p. 92f.
107. 120. cf. Post An.79a18-21, 24-25; 88a5; 79a30; 78a13; 84b
25-26.
No attempt has been made in this study to raise, let
alone to resolve, the controversy concerning the nature
of analysis in Greek methodological theory and practice.
Rather, a tactic has been borrowed from Ross (1), p.
400. That is, we have simply accepted the apparently
unobjectionable description given by Ross of Aristotle's
use of the term to imply "that the student has before
him an argument expressed with no regard to logical
form, which he then proceeds to 'break up' into its
propositons and those into their terms. . . . There
is a second use of (probably derived from
that found here) in which it stands for the reduction
of a syllogism in one figure to another figure." Such
a description neither broaches, nor, I think, pre¬
judices the larger issues one must face in a study of
analysis itself. In this study a methodological use
has been suggested for analysis which, it must be
admitted, does seem to correspond rather more with one
side of the controversy on analysis,but no attempt has
here been made to work out the possibilities or the
probabilities in this regard. We have tried to trace
the methodological use of the syllogism (and more
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particularly the demonstrative syllogism) and in
tracing this use there appeared a correspondence with
the way in which Ross describes Aristotle's use of the
term analysis and with the way Robinson treats the
method of analysis generally.
Proclus says: //tv ^
^ SlV T>| 3 &-TTJ Of4.D~rioj on/J.U'ti!/ oom*. To
^Tou/nt-u o . . . (ed. Friedlein, p. 211)
"Nevertheless there are certain methods that have been
handed down, the best being the method of analysis,
which traces the desired result back to an acknowledged
principle" (Morrow, p. 165).
Without wishing to prejudice the issue in any way, I
would tentatively suggest that the heuristic function
described in this study as falling within Aristotle's
intention for the apodeictic syllogism could be seen
to accord with Proclus' description. Of course they
could not be properly reconciled unless we were to
bear in mind the transferrence in application from
mathematical objects to objects of natural philosophy
and the like. But this is, as noted, a subject for
further investigation.
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